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In hierdie navorsing word die praktykgebaseerde benadering tot die regverdiging van 
organisatoriese kennis ondersoek met die spesifieke doel om by te dra tot ‘n konsepsueel 
duideliker begrip van die teoretiese konstruk van regverdiging op die gebied van 
Kennisbestuur.  
Hoofstuk 1 verskaf ‘n konsepsuele agtergrond tot die navorsingsprobleem en posisioneer die 
navorsing in die konteks van teoretici wat regverdiging benader van ‘n praktyk gebaseerde 
perspektief.  
Hoofstuk 2 verskaf ‘n gedetailleerde evaluasie van die ontwikkeling van die 
regverdigingsbegrip in Kennisbestuursteorie en brei uit op die verskille tussen die twee 
hoofbenaderings tot organisatoriese kennisregverdiging. Ook handel die hoofstuk oor die 
seleksiekriteria vir die twee praktykgebaseerde regverdigingsteoriëe wat in detail bespreek 
word in hoofstukke 3 en 4.  
Die eerste van hierdie bydraes, Georg von Krogh se bestuursregverdigings teorie, word 
bespreek in Hoofstuk 3 en fokus spesifiek op sy konsepsualisering van regverding in die 
konteks van autopoiesis, konstruksionisme and dominante logika.  
In Hoofstuk 4 word the pluralistiese regverdigingsraamwerk van Frederik Tell uiteengesit teen 
die agtergrond van epistemologiese pluralisme en die integrasie van uiteenlopende benaderings 
in die struktuur en proses van regverdiging. In beide hoofstukke word die bydrae van elke teorie 
oorweeg in verhouding tot die hoof implikasies en beperkinge wat die teoretiese raamwerk 
verskaf tot die konsep van regverdiging.  
Hoofstuk 5 sluit af met die oorkoepelende implikasies van die regverdigingskonstruk uit die 










In this research the practice-based approach to the justification of organisational knowledge is 
investigated with the specific objective to contribute to a conceptually clearer understanding of 
the theoretical construct of justification in the context of Knowledge Management.  
Chapter 1 of the research provides a conceptual background to the research problem and aligns 
the interest of the research with that of theorists’ who approach justification from a practice-
based perspective.  
The second chapter provides a detailed evaluation of the development of the justification 
concern in Knowledge Management theory and elaborates on the dissimilarities between the 
two main approaches to organisational knowledge justification. In addition this chapter 
elaborates on the selection criteria for the two practice-based justification theories that are 
considered in detail in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively.  
The first of these contributions, Georg von Krogh’s managerial justification theory, is 
discussed in Chapter 3 and pays specific attention to his conceptualisation of justification in 
the context of autopoiesis, constructionism and dominant logic.  
In Chapter 4 the pluralist justification framework proposed by Fredrik Tell is expanded on 
against the background of epistemological pluralism and the integration of divergent 
philosophical approaches in the structure and process of justification. In both chapters the 
contribution from each theory is considered in relation to the main implications and limitations 
that the theoretical framework provides to the concept of justification.  
Chapter 5 concludes on the overall implications of the justification construct when viewed from 
a practice-based theoretical perspective.  
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“. . . knowledge is a deeply puzzling concept. It appears in many guises and attempts to 
manage it gives rise to many special difficulties. We do not escape these just by adopting 
some of the arbitrary definitions of data, information, skill, knowledge, and wisdom that get 
stirred into the KM literature. Nor are we likely to find universal solutions, independent of 
the specific kinds of knowledge being considered.” 
J.C. Spender 2006: 239 
 
 
1.1 Background to the research problem 
In the preface to the 2002 edition of the Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Paul Moser 
remarks that “Epistemology, also known as the theory of knowledge, will flourish as long as 
we deem knowledge valuable . . . it’s hard to imagine a stable person, let alone a stable society, 
indifferent to the real difference between genuine knowledge and mere opinion, even mere true 
opinion.”2 In reading Moser’s comment in the context of knowledge management (KM), two 
phrases are of particular interest. Firstly, the proliferation of theories and practices relating to 
KM, as well as the generally accepted raison d'être for KM’s existence – the value of 
knowledge in the 21st century – suggests that in the age of the knowledge economy (KE), 
knowledge is arguably now valued more than ever before. Secondly, and from the point of 
view of this research more interesting, is Moser’s observation that the value placed on 
knowledge should stimulate interest in the difference between knowledge and non-knowledge.  
In KM theory, arguments drawing on the value of knowledge and the importance of the 
distinction between knowledge and opinion, is evident among authors engaging with the 
subject of knowledge from an epistemological or philosophical point of view. Illustrating this, 
Schreyögg and Geiger for example write that “If knowledge is supposed to build a 
                                                
2 Moser, P.K. 2002: viii. Emphasis added 
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distinguishing element with a high value for both organizations and societies, it has to be 
conceived in terms of distinctiveness.”3 This notion of distinctiveness, or difference, in 
epistemology draws on the idea that specific criteria exist to which a knowledge claim must 
adhere in order for it to represent knowledge. 4 Amongst the criteria that have to be met, 
epistemology prescribes that knowledge meets certain requirements for a claim to be justified, 
a process described by Mingers as providing “ . . . some evidence justifying the claim . . .”.5  
Authors such as Mingers and Schreyögg and Geiger, align KM theory with the epistemological 
position that there is a necessity to prescribe the standards to which knowledge claims must 
adhere, to be considered knowledge. This is, as explained by Seirafi,6 a concern with the 
correctness, or quality, of knowledge. Scholars working in this frame of reference therefore 
concern themselves with the identification of criteria that should result in a given claim, or 
belief, being accepted as knowledge. The purpose of such criteria is to uphold predetermined 
standards that allow for the universal acceptability of knowledge.7 From this perspective, 
engagement with justification is necessary as a result of the conceptual diversity in the 
knowledge construct and the lack of epistemic criteria in defining knowledge in KM. While 
various authors express this concern in different ways, the underlying intention is that the 
knowledge construct in KM has to be delimited and that the means to do so is, amongst others, 
represented in the epistemic standards of justification. The solution here is therefore one which 
proposes that no claim to knowledge can be accepted as knowledge unless it has passed certain 
epistemological criteria that justify the belief and distinguish “superior” from “inferior” 
knowledge.8 
A second approach in KM theory takes a different position with regards to epistemology and 
as a result reinterprets the justification concern. Exemplifying this approach Tsoukas, in his 
2005 publication, Complex Knowledge,9 argues that an increasing concern with knowledge in 
modern day organisations has resulted in the traditional philosophical concern of epistemology 
gaining increasing relevance to both the theory and practice of organisations. For Tsoukas the 
                                                
3 Schreyögg, G. and Geiger, D: 2007: 81 
4 Seirafi, K. 2012: 126 
5 Mingers, J. 2008: 68  
6 Seirafi, K. 2012: 154 
7 Seirafi, K. 2012: 148-149 
8 See for example Schreyögg, D. and Geiger. G. 2007; Seirafi, K. 2012 
9 Tsoukas, H. 2005: chapter 1 
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significance of epistemology to KM results, amongst others, from the increasing recognition 
of the value derived from viewing organisations through the perspective of knowledge, while 
simultaneously suggesting fields of inquiry that are pertinent to the KM discipline.10 While 
Tsoukas therefore acknowledges the contribution of epistemology to KM, he positions this in 
the realm of shared interest in the subject of knowledge, rather than a shared interest in 
prescribing what knowledge should be.11 Importantly, Tsoukas’ argument results in a 
reinterpretation of justification as an inquiry addressing such questions as “How are knowledge 
claims justified and legitimated within organizations? . . . [And] it is also important to look at 
organizations from ‘outside’ to explore how the knowledge claims they make are justified to 
external audiences, with what effects.”12 Tsoukas’ approach, which is based on the view of 
knowledge as constructed and situated in practice, therefore does not approach validation with 
the same concerns underlying normative approaches. Instead, his interest in justification stems 
from the desire to further KM’s theoretical understanding of the concept as central to the 
process of knowledge construction.13 The objective here is therefore much more pragmatic: 
justification of organisational knowledge needs to be understood as part of the process through 
which knowledge becomes accepted. In this sense, theories sharing this practice-based view of 
knowledge, position justification in KM as an open question, rather than a solution. Authors 
aim to understand how justification takes place, how this impacts organisational knowledge 
and which factors impact the validation process.14 
1.2 Rationale and problem statement 
Irrespective of the approach one follows, authors across the above-mentioned divide agree that 
the justification of organisational knowledge as a concern in KM is an under-researched topic. 
                                                
10 Tsoukas, H. 2005: 11-12 
11 Tsoukas, H. 2005: 10-11 “It is not only organizational and management researchers who, as professional 
enquirers, are concerned with knowledge, but organizational members too, at least if we take a knowledge-
based view of organizations. Epistemology is the domain of all those concerned with knowledge, in all its 
forms. . . . From a knowledge-based perspective, questions of epistemology . . . are no longer the prerogative 
of philosophers and social scientists alone but of organizations too. If we see epistemology in Bateson’s sense 
(1979:246), namely as a branch of science concerned with ‘the study of how particular organisms or 
aggregates of organisms know, think and decide’ . . . it makes good sense to want to study how organizations 
construct, process and justify knowledge . . .” 
12 Tsoukas, H. 2005: 11 - 12 
13 Compare for example Tsoukas, H. and Mylonopoulos, N. 2004: s2-s3  
14 See e.g. von Krogh. G., and Grand, S. 2000: 14-15 and Tsoukas, H. and Mylonopoulos, N. 2004 
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Here Tsoukas15 and Mingers16 for example emphasize a lack of engagement with foundational 
issues relating to knowledge in KM, resulting in insufficient theory development concerning 
the creation of knowledge and the distinctions applicable to knowledge. Firestone17 locates the 
lack of theory development in a number of (in his view) erroneous assumptions in KM theory, 
which effectively limit the depth and scope of engagement with concerns related to 
justification.  
Given the agreement between both normative and practice-based KM theorists on the apparent 
lack of engagement with the justification concern, the more fundamental question is then which 
avenue of inquiry into this topic is pursued? Following a normative epistemological approach, 
the purpose of studying justification is restricted to prescribing criteria to be followed in the 
creation of knowledge. The contrary proposal is that justification is conceptualised in the 
context of understanding organisational knowledge construction.  
As a theoretical inquiry, consideration ultimately must be given to the advancement of the 
discipline of KM. Therefore, taking cognisance of Spender’s advice that “to get closer to KM’s 
current nature and value, we need first to understand how it relates to established practices, 
things managers and firms do already,”18 this thesis conducted an inquiry into the practice-
based view of organisational knowledge justification. While this was by no means intended as 
an outright rejection of the normative approach, it does imply that the thesis assumed that the 
discipline will benefit from an understanding of the concept and role of validation in practice-
based KM theories.  
Against this background and rationale, the thesis aimed to contribute to a conceptually clearer 
understanding of the concept of justification as represented in practice-based KM theory. In 
order to achieve this, the investigation took the form of an evaluative literature analysis of two 
practice-based justification theories, namely von Krogh’s theory of managerial justification 
                                                
15 Tsoukas, H. and Mylonopoulos, N. 2004: S2 “accounting for how organizational knowledge is established in 
the first place remains relatively unexplored. It is one thing to take knowledge for granted . . . and quite 
another to explore questions regarding the social practices in organization through which what is regarded as 
‘knowledge’ attains this status, with what effects. . . . While it is important to study how knowledge assets 
develop over time . . . and how they impact corporate performance . . ., it is also important to do more 
foundational work by exploring how knowledge is constructed in the first place . . .” 
16 Mingers, J. 2008: 65 “It is interesting and perhaps indicative of the field that there is almost no discussion at 
all, within the KM literature, of the problems of truth or warrantability. The assumption seems to be made that 
either knowledge is no different from any other cognitive category such as thought or belief, or that 
determining whether something is or is not knowledge is outside of the scope for KM.” 
17 Firestone, J. 2004 
18 Spender, J.C. 2006: 239 
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and Tell’s pluralist justification framework. The selection of these theories was delimited by 
the following three factors represented in both approaches:  
a) An emphasis on practice as a core component of organisational knowledge 
b) An express and significant theoretical contribution to the understanding of justification 
of organisational knowledge by focussing on processes, criteria or influences in the 
legitimisation of knowledge in the context of organisations 
c) A primary focus on understanding knowledge validation from an organisational or 
managerial rather than research practitioner’s or theorist’s point of view 
1.3 Research aims 
Within the framework of the problem statement, the research aims addressed in this thesis were 
as follows:  
Research Aim 1:  Contribute to a conceptually clearer understanding of the knowledge 
justification debate in KM 
Objective 1.1:  A theoretical investigation into the historical development of the 
justification concern in organisational KM 
Objective 1.2:  Identification of the core differences between practice-based and 
normative justification approaches 
Research Aim 2:  Conceptually clarify the contributions of respectively von Krogh and Tell 
to practice-based theorising in the field of organisational knowledge 
validation 
Objective 2.1  A critical description of each of the main theories 
Objective 2.2 An analysis of the underlying assumptions in each theory 
Objective 2.3 An evaluation of the limitations and implications of each theory 
Research Aim 3:  Based on research aims 2 and 3 to provide a tentative conceptual summary 
of the construct of justification from a practice-based view. 
1.4 Assumptions and limitations 
Following from the delimitation of the research problem, the methodology and the theoretical 
framework employed, the thesis is subject to specific limitations and assumptions which 
impose certain constraints on the investigation and resulting findings.   
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a) The conceptual evaluation was not an attempt to arrive at a normative view of validation 
in KM. Nor did it represent an engagement with the debate concerning the nature of 
organisational epistemology. 
b) As a conceptual approach, the thesis did not attempt to offer empirical proof or testing 
of the accuracy or validity of the theories that were evaluated. 
c) The theoretical approaches to knowledge validation were limited to academic work 
published in English in publicly available sources at the time of conducting the 
research. This included a limited number of practice-based theories in KM that concern 
themselves with justification and the absence of current research that reviews the 
contribution to an understanding of validation from these theories in their own right.19 
d) By virtue of its inclusion criteria, the project purposefully excluded theoretical 
contributions that are mainly aimed at stimulating debate regarding the validity of 
knowledge created by organisational researchers and theorists in the field of KM.20  
1.5 Outline of the investigation 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the background to the problem from which the rationale, 
problem statement and objectives were derived. It further sets out the methodology, limitations 
and assumptions underlying the research project.  
Chapter 2 provides a detailed overview of the developments in KM against which the 
justification concern in KM is contextualised. This discussion firstly clarifies the relationship 
between epistemology and KM, while positioning the justification debate in the discipline in 
this context. Given the extent to which the latter is intertwined with the development of the 
knowledge construct in KM, the discussion then turns to the perceived problem of validation, 
or absence thereof, through the main phases of the KM discourse. Thereafter the discussion 
focusses on a detailed description of the normative approach that concerns itself with the 
problem of justification. This section furthermore explores the underlying concern in this 
research that normative approaches to the justification problem alone would deprive KM of 
valuable alternative views. Further elaboration on the former argument is presented in the final 
section of Chapter 2, which discusses the conceptualisation of knowledge and justification in 
                                                
19 Note this is in contrast to research that evaluates practice-based theories of justification as insufficiently 
normative 
20 As discussed by Tsoukas (2005), epistemology and questions concerning the justification of knowledge are 
relevant not only in the context of organisation in KM, but also to the justification of theories and research 
findings among organisational researchers and theorists 
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practice-based theory and contrasts this with the implications of a normative approach. This 
chapter concludes with the identification of the theoretical contributions of von Krogh and Tell 
and contextualises these against the background of practice-based justification theory. 
Chapter 3 deals specifically with the approach to justification in the paradigm of the 
Knowledge Creating Company as refined by von Krogh in the theory of managerial 
justification. The chapter starts with the theoretical basis of von Krogh’s conceptualisation of 
knowledge and truth, before engaging in a detailed discussion of his contribution to practice-
based justification theory. This theoretical contribution is then critically evaluated in light of 
its implications and limitations.  
In chapter 4, following a brief overview of Tell’s conceptualisation of knowledge and truth, his 
proposal for a pluralist justification framework is discussed. This discussion is presented in 
three main parts considering the structure of Tell’s framework, the resulting knowledge ideal 
types and justification contexts, and the interaction between these. The final section of Chapter 
4 evaluates the contribution of this theory in light of its implications and limitations for the 
practice-based view of justification.  
Chapter 5 concludes the research investigation by presenting, and elaborating on, seven core 
conclusions drawn from the research. This chapter concludes by offering some tentative 
remarks on the nature of justification based on the findings presented in the research.  
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Chapter 2 
Development of the justification 





The development of the justification concern in Knowledge Management (KM) is, on one hand, 
conceptually situated in the progression of the knowledge definition discourse in the discipline, 
and, on the other, in the broader epistemological debate concerning knowledge from both a 
philosophical and social sciences point of view. In this regard, debates regarding the 
justification of knowledge are subcategories of the overarching debates in KM and 
epistemology, which concern themselves with the nature of knowledge as the object of inquiry. 
To understand the epistemological background, this chapter starts with a brief overview of 
epistemology, and through this delineates the primary approaches to the validation concern 
influencing KM. The progression of the knowledge construct debate, and the resulting 
influence on theories of validation, is then elaborated on against the background of three 
distinctive phases in KM.21  
The first phase is characterised by the initial view of knowledge as an unproblematic concept 
based on the information management paradigm. The development of the second phase 
represents, in part, a reaction against this simplistic notion of knowledge, and originated with 
Nonaka’s neo-functionalist proposal on the Knowledge Creating Company.22 The current 
phase followed Nonaka’s 1995 publication and saw the increasing acknowledgement of 
knowledge as a problematic or complex construct. As it is specifically during the latter phase 
                                                
21 This approach draws on Dave Snowden’s (2002) conceptualisation of the three ages of KM 
22 There were other authors who challenged Cartesian notions of knowledge long before Nonaka’s original 
publications, but these theories focussed more generally on the knowledge society, knowledge economy and 
knowledge work. Noteworthy contributions include the various authors published in the 1993 November 
edition of the Journal of Management studies  
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that the wider concern with validation emerges, the discussion here turns to the two dominant 
approaches to validation, namely normative and practice-based approaches.  
2.2 Epistemology and the nature of knowledge 
The classical analysis of knowledge in epistemology departs from the argument that, for 
knowledge to exist, three conditions have to be met: knowledge has to consist of a belief, which 
is true and for which evidence or warrant can be provided.23 The component of justification 
relates to the latter condition, and from an epistemological point of view represents an approach 
to the question of “what would constitute proper justification for a belief?”24 In prescribing a 
method for arriving at warrant, justification in epistemology is normative, i.e. it proposes the 
one best method on which justification should be based.25 Of importance in this traditional 
analysis of knowledge, is that epistemology is concerned with the knowledge of the individual 
(the belief aspect), and consequently the requirements for an individual to possess justified true 
belief.26  
Although sharing KM’s concern with knowledge as a subject matter, epistemology’s traditional 
concern results in the argument that it is limited in its direct application to KM. In this regard 
Maasdorp27 for example refers to a “conceptual and contextual shift” in the meaning of 
knowledge in KM. Contextually KM is concerned with knowledge as found in organisational 
settings, resulting in the concept of knowledge being reinterpreted in the context of subjectivity 
and action. The resulting outcome is that the objectives of KM, in contrast to those of 
epistemology, are much more pragmatic. They include, amongst others, the problems of 
locating, processing, creating, using and sharing knowledge, compared to epistemology’s 
objective of providing a universal theory of knowledge that prescribes the conditions under 
which knowledge can be said to exist.28 These pragmatic concerns also influence theory in KM 
concerning the legitimisation or warrant of organisational knowledge. Here epistemology’s 
traditional proposal, that knowledge represents justified true belief, is for example considered 
too restrictive for understanding the decisions that inform the actions taken by organisations.29  
                                                
23 Crumley, J. S. 2009: chapter 2 and Mingers, J. 2008: 66 
24 Mingers, J. 2008: 66 
25 Crumley, J.S. 2009: 63 
26 Aarons, J. 2006: 166 
27 Maasdorp, C. 2001:04 
28 Maasdorp, C. 2001:04 and Aarons, J. 2006: 167 
29 Boisot, M. and MacMillan, I.C. 2004:504 
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Although the classical analysis of knowledge is conceptually much more limited than the 
knowledge of concern in KM theory, there is equally recognition that the questions asked by 
epistemology remain of importance and interest to the discipline of KM.30 One proposal in 
relation to the value that KM can derive from epistemology, is the argument that knowledge, 
irrespective of how it is conceived of (i.e. justified true belief or the capacity to act), is still 
subject to adhering to certain agreed standards.31 These standards, however, through challenges 
posed to philosophy from within and outside of the discipline, have been substantively 
redefined in relation to both justification and truth. While traditional epistemology assumes 
truth as representing correspondence to an external reality, this notion has been disputed by, 
amongst others, coherence theories of truth, which argue that truth is determined by the degree 
of coherence of a belief with other beliefs, and pragmatic theories of truth which propose that 
truth be judged by its practical value.32 Furthermore, debates centring on the possibility that 
knowledge can be infallibly true have given rise to arguments, in the philosophies of science 
and language, that, while truth exists, knowledge should always be considered fallible.33 Thus, 
philosophers such as Popper and Habermas maintain that knowledge is never absolute or 
final.34 In as much as these theories question the certainty of knowledge, they also propose a 
reconceptualisation of justification compared to the traditional reliance on cognitive rationality. 
Popper for example rejected the idea of justification, and instead proposed that knowledge 
claims should be subject to criticism in order to evaluate their veracity.35 Habermas proposed 
that justification must always take place in discourse and that rationality must prevail in 
deciding on the better argument to support a given knowledge claim.36  
In as much as the critical approaches proposed by Habermas and Popper reconceptualise the 
traditional concerns of epistemology, their resulting alternative theories retain philosophy’s 
                                                
30 Boisot, M. and MacMillan, I.C. 2004. and Aarons, J. 2006 
31 Aarons, 2006: 167: “The standard approach in epistemology may be too limited and too narrow for KM, but it 
also is not totally irrelevant. At its foundation the KM conception of knowledge should at least be compatible 
with the epistemological definition, since even thought [sic] the disciplines have different interest in the 
concept, at its base it is still essentially the same idea. Factual, tacit, practical, technical, and other forms of 
knowledge must still all meet certain criteria in order to be genuine knowledge . . . Although precisely what it 
takes to meet these criteria is the topic of vigorous debate, it is clear that genuine knowledge must have some 
standards.” 
32 Mingers, J. 2008: 66- 67 
33 Firestone, J.M. and McElroy, M.W. 2003: 10 
34 Mingers, J. 2008 
35 Firestone, J.M. and McElroy, M.W. 2003: 04 
36 Mingers, J. 2008: 66 
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normative concerns. A second development in epistemology, which has spilled over into 
theories of knowledge in sociology, concerns a challenge to the normative approach taken to 
knowledge in philosophy.37 In this regard philosophers such as Quine38 proposed that the 
normative epistemic concern of traditional epistemology be discarded in favour of an empirical 
understanding of why human beliefs form, and how knowledge results from external 
experience.39 This argument, for the naturalisation of epistemology, has variously been 
interpreted as repositioning epistemology toward pragmatism;40 providing support for the 
proposal that non-logical factors play a role in the creation of knowledge;41 and that an 
understanding of knowledge cannot be attained in isolation of its context.42 In relation to 
justification, Boisot and MacMillan43 observe that naturalisation results in the reframing of the 
concern with the validity of knowledge away from logic and reliability, to focus on social 
agreement. Here, rather than emphasizing the need to demarcate knowledge as representative 
of truth, there is a concern with the relationship between action and knowledge, which supports 
the survival and prosperity of a knowing agent. Additionally, the authors argue that the 
naturalisation of epistemology has led to acknowledgement of the co-existence of multiple 
epistemologies that represent valid knowledge under differing circumstances. In the context of 
the knowledge society, Knorr Cetina describes justification through the concept of consensus 
formation, as involving processes of decision making which evaluate validity and pragmatic 
value. As a process, this reframes justification in relation to agreement and acceptance by a 
specific community.44 Rather than conceiving of justification in this sense as an objective and 
detached endeavour, consensus formation is viewed as contingent upon context and influenced 
by “non-epistemic factors”.45 Underlying these views of justification is the central tenet that 
knowledge in practice cannot be adequately understood through prescribing how knowledge 
                                                
37 This argument draws on observations by Knorr Cetina, K. and Mulkay, M. 1983: 2 - 4 
38 Quine’s proposal is based on the argument of the underdetermination of theory by data, which essentially 
holds that theoretical choice in scientific knowledge is insufficiently explained by the data invoked to support 
the theory (see Knorr-Cetina, K. and Mulkay, M. 1983: 03) 
39 Freedman, K.L. 2001: 12 & 30 
40 Boisot, M. and MacMillan, I.C. 2004: 522 
41 Knorr Cetina, K. and Mulkay, M. 1983: 4 
42 Freedman, K.L. 2001: ii 
43 Boisot, M. and MacMillan, I.C. 2004: 521-522 
44 Knorr Cetina, K. 2010: 176 
45 Knorr Cetina, K. 2010: 176 
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ought to be justified, as practice indicates that the process of validating knowledge does not 
follow the philosophical ideal of a unitary approach to validation.46 
The foregoing discussion serves to highlight two issues of importance for this research. On one 
hand it illustrates briefly how this thesis conceives of the main distinction in approaches to 
justification in KM, while on the other, it provides a background for broadly conceptualising 
the notion of justification in KM. In both instances the justification concern involves a decision 
concerning the validity of knowledge. The difference in approaches results from how the 
decision process is viewed. Where the philosophical concern is afforded primacy, the process 
relates to how the decision that something is knowledge should be taken.47 Validation in this 
context therefore becomes a matter of specifying rules or processes for justification which have 
to be followed in order to create knowledge. On the other hand, where authors side with the 
view that challenges normativity, the process of taking a decision is a question of how the 
decision is made, rather than how it should be made. In this sense justification of organisational 
knowledge becomes a decision on the validity of knowledge that is determined in practice, 48 
rather than the result of following prescriptive proposals on how knowledge should be created 
in an essentialist manner.49 
2.3 The knowledge discourse in KM 
The conceptualisation of knowledge in KM provides the basis for how scholars and 
practitioners research knowledge; propose to manage knowledge; locate knowledge in an 
organisational setting; delimit knowledge; report on knowledge; measure knowledge; and 
propose to create and share knowledge. 50  As such, how knowledge is defined determines if, 
and how, validation concerns are raised and addressed in KM theory. Through this process the 
                                                
46 See for example Knorr Cetina, K. 1999 
47 Seirafi, K. 2012: 146: “What makes knowledge to knowledge is not only that it is created and applied, but 
also that it is more than mere belief (or more than just a proposition, or more than just a narrative, etc.). . . . 
From its outset, Western epistemology has always been in search of normative criteria of knowledge, i.e. what 
something has to fulfil in order to be valid knowledge.” Emphasis added 
48 Compare Boisot, M. and MacMillan, I.C. 2004: 507: “Epistemology, however, is not physics. Its principles 
and its application will vary according to time and place. There is therefore a need to identify the different 
circumstances – social, technological, economic, etc [sic] – in which knowledge is considered valid and 
actionable.” 
49 Compare Hecker, A. 2012: 425 
50 Alavi, M. and Leidner, D. E. 2001; Baskerville, R. and Dulipovici, A. 2006 
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development of the justification debate in KM is conceptually underpinned by fundamental 
shifts in the definition of knowledge.51  
While taxonomies of KM phases and discourses abound,52 the basic underlying conceptual 
break in the characterisation of knowledge can be viewed as the distinction between knowledge 
as either unproblematic or problematic.53 Theoretically the knowledge construct is considered 
unproblematic where authors adopt a rational and positivist approach to knowledge. Here, the 
problem of managing knowledge is narrowly defined as solving issues concerning the absence 
of knowledge. Approaches in this paradigm generally conform to mainstream KM’s emphasis 
on managing the availability of organisational knowledge through KM systems aimed at 
optimising knowledge processes, to ensure the seamless availability of knowledge.54 In 
contrast, theoretical approaches that view knowledge as inherently problematic recognise the 
limits of Cartesian rationalism and positivism in relation to organisational KM.55 In this sense, 
these theories problematize the concept of knowledge in KM. As knowledge is no longer 
accepted as an unproblematically existing phenomenon in organisations, theories in this frame 
of reference focus on understanding how organisational knowledge is created.56  
As argued above, definitional assumptions have significant implications for the resultant KM 
theory; however, for purposes of this discussion, these implications are limited to the 
consequential objectives of KM in as far as this influences the role allocated to epistemology 
and validation in the proposed KM theory. Following this line of argument, a distinction is 
                                                
51 The conceptual outline of this paragraph draws on the work of Firestone, J.M. and McElroy, M.W. 2002, as 
well as that of Koenig, M. 2002 
52 Compare Firestone, J.M. and McElroy M.W. 2002, Koenig, M. 2002, Snowden, D. 2002, Kakabadse, N.K., 
Kakabadse, A. and Kouzmin, A. 2003 and Baskerville, R and Dulipovici, A. 2006 
53 See Spender, J.C. and Scherer, A.G. 2007:11: “One of its paradoxes is that KM is only separable from 
existing disciplines such as microeconomics and organization theory when it treats knowledge itself as 
problematic. It get is traction from admitting we do not know what knowledge is, so demanding we think 
about the ways managers and organizations respond to these doubts. Out normal theorizing, especially the 
positivistic tradition, regards knowledge as problematic only in its absence.” 
54 Compare Snowden, D. 2002: 100-101 as well as Firestone, J.M. and McElroy, M.W. 2002:08 
55 See Spender, J.C. and Scherer, A.G. 2007: 14-15: “In short KM’s real agenda spins around problematizing the 
most commonly assumed aspect of our concept of knowledge, that of rationality itself. . . . While rationality is 
obviously incredibly important to managers and theorists alike, it is simply incapable of grasping 
organizational practice adequately. Thus KM’s foundational notion of an unreasoned but nonetheless 
proficient form of practice, such as ‘flow’ (Czikszentmihalyi, 1988), takes us beyond perfect rationality and 
brings it back from pure abstraction and into the real world.” 
56 Compare Snowden, D. 2002: 101 and Firestone, J.M. and McElroy, M.W. 2002: 09 
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drawn between three phases of KM theory characterising the problematization of the 
knowledge construct. Each of these phases are discussed in more detail below.  
2.4 Mainstream KM 
Mainstream KM has its roots in Information Management (IM) and to a large degree reflects 
initial attempts at repackaging existing information systems to deal with the growing 
recognition of knowledge as a primary organisational resource in the Knowledge Economy.57 
While the KM discourse chronologically originates with this view, the conceptual nature of 
knowledge in this paradigm is secondary to the functional concern of managing knowledge.58 
This is illustrated by Firestone and McElroy’s argument that, where KM is primarily viewed 
as a managerial activity, its main challenge is contextualised as a management task of how to 
capture, store and disseminate knowledge.59 This task takes precedence over a conceptual 
understanding of knowledge. KM’s focus is on the provision of access to data and information 
so that knowledge can be created outside of its domain of concern.60 Access in this context 
closely links KM to information technology (IT) as an enabler of knowledge dissemination. 61 
2.4.1 Knowledge as an existing asset to be managed 
In the mainstream view knowledge is assumed to exist either as explicit knowledge stocks or 
identifiable knowledge flows. As a stock, knowledge is disembodied and viewed as an asset 
that can be captured and modelled through increasingly sophisticated computing systems. As 
a flow, organisational knowledge is regarded as the connection between information 
repositories and knowledge users.62 Underlying both approaches is the assumption that 
knowledge can be codified, and represents an unproblematic construct either resulting from 
data and information,63 or pre-existing in knowledge resources which are subject to 
organisational management.64  
                                                
57 Tuomi, I. 2002: 02 – 04. Note that while Tuomi draws a distinction between Information Systems and 
Business Intelligence for the purposes of this research these two phases of KM are treated as one based on the 
reliance they place on computing to enable KM 
58 Compare Firestone, J.M. and McElroy, M.W. 2002 
59 Firestone J.M. and McElroy, M.W. 2002: 08 
60 Kakabadse, N.K., Kakabadse, A. and Kouzmin, A. 2003: 77 
61 Wiig, K.M. 1997: 8 - 10 
62 Tuomi, I. 2002: 04 
63 Butler, T. 2003: 153 
64 Styhre, A. 2003: 34 
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In the first instance, the object to be managed by KM is quantifiable, and an outcome that 
results from transformation processes applied to data and information. Typifying this approach, 
Grover and Davenport65 define knowledge in the context of a continuum that starts with data, 
which is transformed through largely mechanistic processes to information and finally 
converted (through less mechanistic processes) to knowledge. The transformation process from 
data to information involves the application of data in a specific context, which in turn 
determines the value of information. Knowledge is created from data in context (information) 
when it is applied to a specific problem context, in the human mind. This process of application, 
which transforms information to knowledge, involves cognitive activities such as interpretation 
and bringing individual experience to bear on information.  
The second view of knowledge as an unproblematic construct is evident in Terret’s66 approach 
to emphasizing the practical concerns of knowledge in an organisational context. The 
underlying assumption is that knowledge assets exist irrespective of what knowledge may 
comprise, or how it is different from data or information. For Terret, the objective of KM is to 
concern itself with managing knowledge assets which exist in one of three locations: codified 
in documents; represented in processes that define procedures; or as cognition inside “people’s 
heads”. KM as a strategy then concerns itself with “getting as much out of people’s heads into 
other people’s heads and/or into the corporate knowledge bank”.67 
Given the focus on managing knowledge through IT, the representation of the knowledge 
construct in mainstream KM draws on three basic assumptions. Firstly, knowledge originates 
from, and is therefore inseparable from, data. Knowledge in this sense is constructed from a 
raw resource (data) to which meaning (information) and interpretation is added.68 As the basis 
for knowledge, data is value-free as it represents “objective facts” that contain neither 
judgement nor interpretation.69 Knowledge, therefore, is ultimately based on the interpretation 
of an objective representation of reality.70  
Secondly, knowledge is cognitively possessed by individuals. This is clearly illustrated in 
Terret’s assertion above that knowledge exists inside “people’s heads,” as well as Davenport 
                                                
65 Grover, V. and Davenport. T.H. 2001: 06- 07 
66 Terret, A. 1998 
67 Terret, A. 1998:70 
68 Tuomi, I. 1999:104 
69 Davenport, T.H. and Prusak, L. 1998: 02-03 
70 Tuomi, I. 1999:105 
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and Prusak’s notion that “knowledge derives from minds at work”.71 This cognitive view 
however also implies that individuals own knowledge, and in mainstream KM this possession 
represents a potentially valuable resource to the organisation. In both instances discussed 
above, the ability of organisations to extract and sell this resource represents an important 
benefit to be derived from KM.72 
The foregoing assumption, that knowledge is owned, also informs the third assumption 
underlying the knowledge construct, namely that knowledge exists as an independent entity. 
While Davenport and Grover view the process of converting information to knowledge as tied 
to humans and specific to context, knowledge as an asset in organisations is resolutely entitative 
as it is separable from both knower and context.73 
As will be discussed below, these principle assumptions of the mainstream KM construct have 
been heavily criticised for a number of reasons. However the attractiveness of this view to KM 
theory is clear when considering that, if the problem at hand is to manage knowledge as a 
resource, it can be achieved much more economically through a reductionist view of the object 
of KM.74 
2.4.2 The validation concern in mainstream KM 
In mainstream KM, validation as a concern closely aligns to both the unproblematic 
conceptualisation that characterises knowledge, and the centrality of the IM paradigm as 
defining of the objective of KM. In the first instance, the question of the validation of 
knowledge is irrelevant precisely because knowledge is considered to already be in existence 
and, by implication, the process of validation must then have occurred outside of the scope of 
KM. This argument is illustrated in Bell’s definition of knowledge as purely that which is 
                                                
71 Davenport, T.H. and Prusak, L. 1998: 05 
72 Compare Swan, J. and Scarborough, H. 2001 
73 Davenport, T.H. and Grover, V. 2001: 15: “An inherent source of inefficiency in this [knowledge] market is 
the difficulty in assessing the value of knowledge. As knowledge assets evolve through generation, 
codification, and realization, their uncertainty is reduced and their source of value is easier to see. Therefore, 
while knowledge in the generation stage (or a knowledge creator) might have tremendous potential for value, 
its uncertainty reduces the present value of the future returns from the asset. Knowledge in the codification 
stage (if explicit) is visible to customers and somewhat easier to assess. The value of knowledge in the 
transfer and realization stages might be the most tangible since its value is based on visible products and 
services that it can create.” 
74 Styhre, A. 2003:34 
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objectified, and through this process of objectification already contains the basis of its 
warrant.75  
Where validation is not a concern, the argument of mainstream KM theorists generally relates 
to the distinction they perceive between epistemology and KM. Here Davenport and Prusak76 
for example argue that, as epistemology concerns itself with a definitive answer on the nature 
of knowledge, its concerns are not those of KM. Rather KM should concern itself with a 
working definition of pragmatic value in terms of understanding what knowledge means in an 
organisational context and why it is difficult to manage. In similar vein Meindl,77 while 
acknowledging that the rationalist approach inherent in the IM paradigm raises certain 
epistemological limitations, dismisses these in favour of emphasising the practical managerial 
implications of information support.78 Peters, Maruster and Jorna79 locate the reason for this 
“dismissal” of epistemological concerns, in the dominant role of information technology as the 
solution to whatever KM problems are encountered. What little attention validation receives in 
this context is therefore dealt with from a technological point of view. 
The latter point is illustrated when considering that validation in the context of knowledge 
capture is essentially a judgement of the quality of codified resources which may relate to the 
relevance such resources have to a specific audience;80 the degree to which the source of 
information is trusted;81 and the extent to which certain pre-determined quality standards are 
met.82 In this sense, validation in the IM paradigm becomes a problem of governance, related 
to the quality of codified knowledge contained in an information repository. This follows the 
so-called “garbage can” analogy of data management, where the quality of knowledge 
contained in a repository is a function of the quality control exercised during the input process. 
KM governance in this scenario has the function of determining if validation of knowledge 
inputs will be required, or if all knowledge inputs will be accepted. Where validation is required 
                                                
75 Alvesson, M. and Karremän, D. 2001: 997: “Bell, for example defined knowledge as ‘that which is 
objectively known, an intellectual property, attached to a name or group of names and certified by copyright 
or some other form of recognition (e.g. publication).’” 
76 Davenport, T.H. and Prusak, L. 1998:05 
77 Meindl, J.R., Stubbart, C. and Porac, J.F. 1994: 292 
78 Note that this interpretation draws on that of Tuomi, I. 1999: 104 
79 Peters, K., Maruster, L. and Jorna, R. 2010: 246 
80 Markus, M.L. 2001: 79 
81 Alavi, M. and Leidner, D. E. 1999 
82 Durcikova, A. and Gray, P. 2009: 83 
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inputs are subject to quality reviews by subject matter experts.83 For mainstream KM, 
validation in this sense is a function of managing the content of codified resources84 and 
ensuring that process design enables the reuse of prior knowledge.85  
2.5 Neo-functionalist86 KM 
Much of the initial academic interest in KM took issue with the narrow conceptualisation of 
knowledge and the limitations it imposed on what would be managed through KM.87 The 
perceived simplistic view of knowledge, proposed by mainstream KM, as well as its managerial 
focus, contrasted with the view that knowledge in itself and its creation is beset by 
complexity.88 From an academic point of view, the challenge to the mainstream approach 
largely developed since the 1995 publication of Nonaka and Takeuchi’s seminal work on 
organisational knowledge creation.89  
2.5.1 Nonaka’s challenge to the mainstream view 
Nonaka proposed his theory of the knowledge creating company (KCC) as an alternative to the 
perceived dominance of useful knowledge as quantifiable data and facts in Western 
management theory. He argued that the dominant mainstream view was at the root of poor 
innovative capability in Western corporate environments and contrasted this with the broader 
notion of knowledge in Japanese companies, where innovation is a constant achievement.90 
Resulting from this, the publication of KCC theory represented an important step toward 
structuring a more encompassing knowledge concept, and proposing a shift in the focus of KM 
towards knowledge creation.91 Of specific relevance to this research project is Nonaka’s 
contribution to the problematisation of knowledge through the introduction of the notion of 
tacit knowledge,92 as well as the introduction of justification in the process of knowledge 
                                                
83 Durcikova, A. and Gray, P. 2009:83 
84 Offsey, S. 1997:120 
85 Compare Markus, L.M. 2001 
86 The term neo-functionalist, to identify Nonaka’s work, is adopted from the work of Schultze, U. and Stabell, 
C. 2004 
87 It is important here to note that the academic interest in knowledge work, knowledge organizations and the 
knowledge economy is considered separate from the interest in KM per se 
88 Styhre, A. 2003: 33 
89 Snowden, D. 2002:101 
90 Nonaka, I. 1991: 96 - 97 
91 Compare Snowden, D. 2002:101 
92 Nonaka’s interpretation of tacit knowledge has attracted significant criticism, nonetheless he has to be 
credited for introducing the concept to KM 
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creation. The centrality that Nonaka afforded to justification as part of the knowledge creation 
process not only introduced the notion of validation to the KM debate, but also positioned the 
justification process, and the criteria required for justification, outside of the scope of normative 
epistemology. 
Borrowing from Polanyi’s criticism of objectivist epistemology,93 Nonaka’s focus on tacit 
knowledge drew attention to the nature of knowledge as inclusive of highly personal 
knowledge, inherently related to human action and not resulting from quantifiable data and 
information.94 In this frame of reference, the focus of KM was shifted to managing knowledge 
creation as the outcome of a dynamic process of interaction between tacit and explicit 
knowledge. This process of interaction is described through a conversion cycle in which each 
of the two forms of knowledge forms the basis for the creation of the other, as well as the 
creation of new knowledge of the same form.95 In contrast to the linear view of knowledge as 
an outcome, Nonaka proposed, through the above process, a continuous spiral as the underlying 
structure of knowledge creation. Fundamental to this structure are the interactions between 
organisational members and an emphasis on non-technological modes of knowledge creation. 
In as much as Nonaka is, from the outset, concerned with the requirements of incorporating 
subjective knowledge into the knowledge construct, he approaches this issue by proposing a 
reinterpretation of what he considers to be the dominant Western approach to epistemology, 
defining knowledge as “justified true belief” (JTB).96 While Nonaka argues that traditionally 
JTB is associated with explicit knowledge,97 he rejects this approach and substantively 
reinterprets the definition.98 In doing so, Nonaka adopts a pragmatic definition of truth99 and 
argues for a relaxation of the truth condition as secondary to the condition of justification.100 
This, for him, further implies that in KCC theory, knowledge therefore no longer takes on the 
                                                
93 Virtanen, I. 2010 
94 Nonaka, I. 1994: 16 
95 Nonaka, I. 1991: 96 & 98 
96 Nonaka, I. 1994: 15 
97 This interpretation by Nonaka is severely criticised by Gueldenberg, S. and Helting, H. 2007 who argue, 
amongst others, that Nonaka failed to correctly interpret Plato’s intention in the Theaetus and equated all 
Western epistemology with Cartesian approaches to knowledge   
98 Nonaka, I. 1994: 15. Note here that the term substantive is used to indicate the degree to which Nonaka 
deviates from the original intended meaning of JTB rather than the depth of his argument for changing the 
definition. The latter is criticized by, amongst others, Gourlay, S. and Nurse, A. 2005: 305-306 
99 Nonaka, I. 1994:24. Note however that Nonaka’s conceptualisation of truth in pragmatic terms is only really 
expanded on in a later publication with von Krogh (Nonaka, I. and von Krogh, G. 2009: 639-640) 
100 Nonaka, I. 1994: 15 
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static Cartesian characteristics of certainty.101 Knowledge then is not simply the justification 
of a belief towards absolute truth, but rather “a dynamic human process of justifying personal 
beliefs as part of an aspiration for the truth”.102 
2.5.2 Nonaka’s theory of justification in the KCC 
Justification in Nonaka’s early work is bound to the processes through which individual 
knowledge becomes organisationally articulated and accepted.103 In KCC the justification of 
knowledge, in an organisational context, occurs both informally and formally. Informal 
justification takes place continuously during the process of knowledge creation, while formal 
justification occurs through managerial authority.104  
With regard to informal justification, Nonaka commented in his early work that there are 
several levels of social interaction that could legitimise individual knowledge. He conceives of 
one of these sources as a diverse informal community that may include members from outside 
of the organisation.105 In a later collaboration with von Krogh,106 he writes that justification 
starts during the sharing of tacit knowledge, which requires each individual to justify personally 
held tacit knowledge in the public and social context of the organisation. He has also conceived 
of the informal justification process as representing the entire knowledge conversion cycle 
which acts as a “social process of validating truth”.107 Knowledge conversion here is then 
viewed as facilitating the process of validating subjective personal belief toward objective 
organisational knowledge, which in turn is subjected to formal justification through the 
market.108  
In terms of formal justification, Nonaka’s conceptualisation of the organisational knowledge 
creation process positions justification as a method of convergence in the ongoing cycle of 
knowledge creation (see figure 2.1). It serves the function of judging the usefulness of created 
knowledge in an organisational context by considering the “truthfulness” of knowledge against 
a set of standards or criteria determined by management. Criteria for evaluating knowledge 
                                                
101 Nonaka, I. 1994: 15 and Gueldenberg, S. and Helting, H. 2007: 103 & 104 
102 Nonaka, I. 1994: 15 
103 Nonaka, I. 1994: 21 
104 Nonaka, I. & Takeuchi, H. 1995: 86 
105 Nonaka, I. 1994: 17; For example in Nonaka, I. and Peltrokorpi, V. 2006: 80 “people validate tacit 
knowledge through social interaction”   
106 von Krogh, G., Ichijo, K. and Nonaka, I.  2000: 16-17 
107 Nonaka, I. and Toyama, R. 2005: 422 
108 Nonaka, I. and Toyama, R. 2005: 422-23 
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claims can be multi-fold, and Nonaka includes in his examples of such criteria, financial (cost 
and profitability); functional (organisational growth) and qualitative criteria (alignment with 
corporate vision and brand image). 109 
 
Figure 2.1: Nonaka’s organizational knowledge creation process 
Source: Nonaka, 1994: 27 
 
Determining the criteria against which knowledge claims are evaluated is considered by 
Nonaka to represent a strategic task which requires management to set and evaluate 
justification criteria against “higher-order value systems”.110 These value systems are 
conceived of as representing the organisational intention as contained in vision or strategy.111 
It follows from this that justification criteria are determined by what an organisation aims to 
achieve in the long term, and evaluated in terms of how set criteria would contribute to 
organisational vision or strategy. Nonaka draws a distinction here between the role of top 
                                                
109 Nonaka, I. 1994: 26. Included among the qualitative criteria is “romanticism, adventure and aesthetics” 
which appear to relate to brand image values that an organisation may consider in evaluating knowledge 
110 Nonaka, I. 1994: 27 
111 Nonaka, I. & Takeuchi, H. 1995:87 
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management in determining the organisational value system and the resultant criteria, and 
middle management as executing against these criteria in the role of mediators between 
employees’ knowledge claims and the organisation’s justification standards.112  
2.6 Knowledge as a complex construct 
Post-Nonaka, discourses on organisational knowledge expanded significantly, and in the 
process the true complexity of knowledge in the organisational context came to the fore. This 
level of complexity is exemplified in Jakubik’s113 analysis of four themes pertinent to the 
knowledge construct debate: epistemology, ontology, commodity and community. The 
complexity in the knowledge definition that arises from the aforementioned theoretical 
approaches is not only reflected in the incorporation of multiple views in a single knowledge 
construct, but also in the sheer volume of knowledge constructs that follows from the possible 
permutations resulting from, as well as the interaction between, sub-constructs, in each view 
(compare figure 2.2 below).  
Schultze and Stabell’s114 observation on the incorporation of duality in the epistemological 
debate in KM, demonstrates a further point of how complexity infiltrated the knowledge 
debate. Here, the authors distinguish between the simplistic “either/or” approach of dualism, 
noticeable in Nonaka’s distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge, and the more complex 
approach of “both/and” duality. This move toward duality in the knowledge construct is evident 
in the work of authors such as Cook and Brown,115 Snowden116 and Spender.117 As a general 
theme, these authors reject the idea that knowledge exists in unitary form and, while critical of 
Cartesian notions of knowledge such as that evident in mainstream KM and Nonaka’s dualism, 
they do not propose to replace these views of knowledge. Rather, what is proposed here is the 
recognition that knowledge exists in multiple forms simultaneously.  
  
                                                
112 Nonaka, I. 1994: 32. It’s worth noting here that in collaboration with Takeuchi in the 1995 publication, 
Nonaka allowed for middle management to set “mid-range” criteria and employees to set sub-criteria (1995: 
87) 
113 Jakubik, M. 2007 
114 Schultze, U. and Stabell, C. 2004: 553 
115 Cook, S.D.N. and Brown, J.S. 1999  
116 This type of epistemological duality also exists in Snowden’s Cynefin model, where knowledge 
simultaneously exists “as a thing and a flow” (Snowden, D. 2002:102) 
117 Spender, J.C. and Scherer, A.G. 2007:15 
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Figure 2.2: Jakubik’s themes and knowledge constructs in KM literature 
Source: Jakubik 2007: 11 
 
 
While a comprehensive review of the developments that led to the current state of the 
knowledge construct, as well as the various definitions that accompany this, is outside of the 
scope of this research, it is worth noting some of the most pertinent ideas that these debates 
contributed to organisational knowledge as a concept, amongst others that knowledge is:118 
• context dependent 
                                                
118 See for example Allee, V. 1997:01; Alvesson, M. & Karremän, D. 2001: 995; Blackler, F. 1995: 1039; Cook, 
S.D.N. and Brown, J.S. 1999: 382, 388; Hislop,  D. 2005: 17; Schneider, U. 2007:617; Stehr, N. 2001: 203; 
Styhre, A. 2003:35; Tsoukas, H. & Vladimirou, E. 2001: 973; von Krogh, G. Roos, J. and Slocum, K. 1994:61 
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• created through social processes 
• inseparable from individual and organisational action, capabilities and practice 
• dynamic and fluid 
• fallible and tentative 
• multi-dimensional 
Increasing complexity in the organisational knowledge construct is seen by Spender and 
Scherer as fundamentally an acknowledgement that knowledge is a “problematic concept.”119 
This problematic nature of knowledge, combined with its co-existence with mainstream and 
neo-functionalist definitions in the KM domain, and the pervasiveness of knowledge in the KE, 
has created what Spender and Scherer refer to as a “conceptual space into which many different 
anxieties are now being projected.” 120 From the point of view of this thesis, these “anxieties” 
include a general concern with organisational knowledge creation, and within this a specific 
concern regarding the validation of knowledge.  
2.6.1 Normative approaches: complex knowledge as cause for anxiety 
A key reason for the epistemological anxiety over the complex knowledge construct is evident 
in the work of criticalist121 authors, where the central argument is that in KM there is a lack of 
consideration for how knowledge is qualified. Schreyögg and Geiger122 for example depart 
from the point of view that the definition of knowledge in KM has become inclusive to the 
point where “everything is knowledge.” In this broad conceptualisation, the authors question 
the value of knowledge as a factor of production in the knowledge economy.123 If, they argue, 
knowledge is indeed as important as literature suggests, then surely it must be distinct from 
“everyday action.” If the object of KM is not intended to be everything, but rather intended to 
be valuable, there has to be some concern with how organisations qualify, as knowledge, the 
values, beliefs, judgements, know-how, know-that, culture and everything else that is 
considered instrumental to a broad knowledge definition.124 For Schreyögg and Geiger the 
solution to this problem is achieved by imposing a framework on the broad notion of 
knowledge that is capable of distinguishing the knowledge of value in the KE from the 
                                                
119 Spender, J.C. and Scherer, A.G. 2007: 08 
120 Spender, J.C. and Scherer, A.G. 2007: 07 
121 The concept “criticalist” is used here as a broad notion that groups critical theory, critical realism and critical 
rationalism together 
122 Schreyögg, G, and Geiger, D. 2003: 06 
123 Schreyögg, G, and Geiger, D 2003: 06 - 07 
124 Schreyögg, G, and Geiger, D, 2003: 02-03 
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everyday notion of knowledge.125 This framework, which acts as the process of validation, 
consists of three interrelated requirements which are expanded on in more detail in section 
2.6.1.1 of this chapter. For now, it is sufficient to note that Schreyögg and Geiger propose that 
the process of validation consists of a knowledge claim, which contains an assertion of its 
validity, of which the quality has been evaluated through argumentation. 
A second approach, evident in concerns about the conceptual clarity of the knowledge 
construct, is presented in the theoretical proposals of Mingers126 and Faran.127 In both instances 
the authors are concerned with a lack of consideration with truth in the knowledge construct. 
Mingers, for example, expresses dissatisfaction with existing definitions of knowledge and 
finds, through a literature review, that there is almost no consideration in KM literature of the 
relationship between knowledge and truth. He argues that this lack of consideration is not just 
evident in KM theory that completely ignores the validation requirement, but also among 
authors who do consider justification, but fail to relate this issue to truth.128 His concern with 
truth is based on the traditional epistemological arguments that belief has to be validated and 
proven to relate in one way or another to truth. As truth is not a simplistic notion and is neither 
absolute nor final, justification becomes all the more important, as it serves the function of 
warranting why, under a given set of circumstances, a specific belief is accepted as being 
true.129 
For Faran, a lack of consideration of truth in KM implies a significant organisational risk in as 
far as the consequences of managing and acting on false knowledge are concerned. In his 
argument, KM as a discipline is neglecting this risk by paying too little attention to the 
traditional epistemological requirements of justification and truth. At the same time, he is 
critical of the approaches in KM that acknowledge justification, but essentially “decouples” 
this from truth.130   
For Firestone and McElroy, knowledge claim evaluation (KCE) represents the specific process 
through which knowledge is tested and identified as knowledge in an organisational context.131 
                                                
125 Schreyögg, G. and Geiger, D 2007: 81 
126 Mingers, J. 2008 
127 Faran, D. 2014 
128 Mingers, J. 2008: 65ff 
129 Mingers, J. 2008: 73 
130 Faran, D. 2014 
131 Firestone, J.M. and McElroy, M.W. 2005: 195 
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It is inherently part of a larger framework of knowledge creation called the Knowledge Life 
Cycle, and is underpinned by a normative philosophical approach to management, called the 
Open Enterprise.132 Unlike Schreyögg and Geiger, Firestone and McElroy’s concern with the 
validation problem in KM does not originate from the concept of knowledge, but rather from 
the function of KM that results from a specific notion of knowledge. For them, KM represents 
two distinct phases, respectively focused on the supply of knowledge and the generation, or 
creation, of knowledge. In the latter phase, which they term second generation KM, theoretical 
concerns broaden to include the notion of how knowledge processes in organisations ultimately 
lead to new knowledge being created.133 In this process they identify validation (KCE) as a 
fundamental, but neglected,134 process in knowledge production.135 With regards to the 
centrality of KCE to KM theory, Firestone puts forward the argument that it is ironic that while 
KM is intended as a decision support mechanism, it ignores the decision function in KM. This 
decision function is conceptualised as KCE, the process of “selecting among competing 
knowledge claims . . . [those that are of] . . . the highest quality.”136 For Firestone the reasons 
for the neglect of KCE relate, on one hand, to the dominant supply-side paradigm in 
mainstream KM, and on the other, to the incorrect conceptualisation of validation and 
knowledge in second-generation KM. Relating to the latter, he argues that Nonaka’s notion of 
justification leads to a neglect of validation criteria as it does not concern itself with rational 
decision making.137 He also dismisses the notion of validation as socially constructed as found 
among authors who embrace constructivist approaches to knowledge. Here he argues that the 
fundamental assumptions inherent in constructivism are flawed, as neither reality nor 
knowledge is relative, and that history illustrates that knowledge cannot effectively be 
evaluated through social consensus.  
                                                
132 Firestone, J.M. and McElroy, M.W. 2005 and Firestone, J.M. and McElroy, M.W. 2003b 
133 Firestone, J.M. and McElroy, M.W. 2002 
134 Firestone and McElroy’s claim that validation is an ignored aspect of KM theory is supported by Peters, 
Maruster and Jorna (2010: 252 – 253) who concluded that, on the whole KM theory not only gave little 
attention to KCE, but in addition, existing theory on the evaluation of knowledge claims was conceptually not 
satisfactorily understood. In this regard the authors analysed eight contributions published between 1995 and 
2008 expressly concerning knowledge creation and concluded that, in addition to the work of Firestone and 
McElroy, only one other major theoretical paradigm dealing with validation existed. 
135 Firestone, J.M. and McElroy, M.W. 2005: 194 and Firestone, J.M. 2004 
136 Firestone, J.M. 2004 
137 Firestone, J.M. 2004 
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Although the motivation for engaging with validation in the context of KM can be based on 
either a concern with the complexity of knowledge as a construct, or the implications of this 
complex notion for creating knowledge, an underlying consequence of the aforementioned 
theories is that the notion of knowledge is constrained by imposing boundaries on the construct 
that specifies normative criteria to distinguish knowledge from non-knowledge.  Central to this 
approach is the requirement that the quality of knowledge claims is evaluated, in order to ensure 
only those claims of the highest quality are accepted. To illustrate this, and the implications 
thereof, for the notion of knowledge in organisational KM, further consideration is given to the 
validation approaches proposed by Schreyögg and Geiger and Firestone and McElroy. 
2.6.1.1 Validation as conscious reflection through social discourse 
Schreyögg and Geiger138 propose that the solution to vague notions of knowledge in KM is for 
the discipline to draw on epistemology,139 and more specifically on the requirements of 
scientific knowledge that can be derived from this discipline. For the authors the core process 
in scientific knowledge, that distinguishes it from non-knowledge or false knowledge, is the 
use of tests to determine the validity of a knowledge claim. Although recognising that 
epistemology is characterised by disputes, they argue that irrespective it still allows for 
determining high-level dimensions that characterise the nature of scientific knowledge, 
namely: 
• knowledge represents statements that are communicated 
• each statement contains a claim to validity 
• claims can only be accepted as valid once the reasons proposed for their validity have 
been examined.140 
While concerned with validity, Schreyögg and Geiger do not relate validity to objective truth, 
but instead to the criteria used by the scientific community to decide on the acceptability of a 
knowledge claim. To bridge the established notion in philosophy, that science is the only 
institution that can create knowledge, with their recognition that all social systems generate 
knowledge, they investigate the notion of evaluation in non-scientific contexts. In doing so they 
turn to the philosophy of communication, and argue that all forms of knowledge are 
                                                
138 Schreyögg, G. and Geiger, D. 2003 
139 Note that Schreyögg and Geiger refers to epistemology as the philosophy of science. See also Seirafi, K. 
2012:150 
140 Schreyögg, G, and Geiger, D, 2003: 09 
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linguistically constructed, and that its objectivity derives from consensus-seeking arising 
through discourses in specific communities.141 In this communicative view of knowledge, 
validation results from the inherent claims to validity that are raised by all statements made in 
discourse. For the purposes of distinguishing the organisational knowledge of concern to KM, 
Schreyögg and Geiger differentiate between implicit and explicit claims to validity. Here, 
organisational knowledge is specific to claims that are raised explicitly and resolved through 
argument as the means to obtain rational persuasion.142  
Given the epistemological requirement, that validation is not merely a process of establishing 
the acceptability of a knowledge requirement, but concerned with the quality of the reasons 
claimed to support its validity, the form of argument used to test validity claims has to meet 
certain criteria which adhere to the standards of philosophical argument and reasoning. 
Particularly, Schreyögg and Geiger single out Toulmin’s framework for argumentation to 
illustrate the required logic to be followed in determining the validity of a knowledge claim. 
Briefly, this framework involves the idea that any knowledge claim is initially substantiated by 
referring to data. Where a question is raised as to the degree to which data substantiates the 
claim, the validity of the claim is called into question. Validity then needs to be illustrated by 
presenting warrants or logical deductions that support substantiation of the claim by the data.143 
Having proposed this process of validation, Schreyögg and Geiger put forward the argument 
that the notion of knowledge should be restricted to “all those propositions that have been 
made subject to an argumentative process in the sense outlined above.”144 Organisational 
knowledge in this sense is limited to essentially the same characteristics that define scientific 
knowledge in Schreyögg and Geiger’s epistemological reading of the overarching 
characteristics, namely that it is: 
• a linguistic assertion 
• for which the reasons are communicated 
• and through discourse accepted as good reasons in a particular community.145 
                                                
141 Schreyögg, G, and Geiger, D, 2007:83: “Whilst rejecting the positivist idea of objectivity in terms of 
correspondence with the world out there, the major stream within the philosophy of language introduces 
another idea of objective knowledge, i.e. objectivity in terms of inter-subjectivity brought about by joint 
linguistic constructions of a community . . .” 
142 Also see Bermejo-Luque, L. 2006:76 on the normative nature of argument 
143 Schreyögg, G, and Geiger, D, 2007: 84-85 
144 Schreyögg, G, and Geiger, D, 2007: 85 
145 Schreyögg, G, and Geiger, D, 2003: 11 
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While acknowledging that this view has been criticized as positivist, Schreyögg and Geiger 
argue that this is not the case, as their conceptualisation of knowledge does not subscribe to the 
acceptance of final and universal truth. The latter is also related to their express rejection of 
universal justification criteria, as the determination of what constitutes “good reasons” is 
locally constructed.146 The normativity in Schreyögg and Geiger’s proposal is therefore not 
related to criteria for justification, but rather to the normative prescription that knowledge is 
restricted to only that which has been “evaluated in light of reasons” and accepted as “the best 
reasons.”147 At the level of the individual this requirement translates into the “acceptance of 
the normative power of reasons,”148 explained by Schreyögg and Geiger as the requirement 
that, as better reasons emerge through discourse, these will be accepted. The former introduces 
into Schreyögg and Geiger’s proposal the requirement of normative rationality as the procedure 
through which discourse is to be managed in order to create knowledge.149  
Schreyögg and Geiger’s normative approach to validation leads them to the argument that 
knowledge in KM should not include tacit knowledge. Instead of viewing tacit knowledge as 
knowledge, they propose that it is viewed as skilful practice. For them, skilful practice refers 
to action rather than cognition. As action, it cannot be considered knowledge as it cannot be 
fully described, and as such defies explanation as it cannot be substantiated through reasons. 
Consequentially, tacit knowledge cannot be tested through logical argument, nor can it be 
proven to be true or false; good or bad; or valid or invalid.150  
In arguing against the idea that KM concerns itself with knowledge as the capacity for action, 
Schreyögg and Geiger put forward the claim that this view is too close to the notion of everyday 
knowledge which characterises the phenomenological account of life in general. This criticism 
follows from their understanding of knowledge as the basis for action, resulting from a 
phenomenological view of knowledge as the construction of reality. In this account of 
knowledge, it becomes the basis of everyday life and the “cultural repository of a 
community.”151 For Schreyögg and Geiger, this ubiquity of everyday knowledge, as practice, 
                                                
146 Schreyögg, G, and Geiger, D, 2007: 87 
147 Schreyögg, G, and Geiger, D, 2007: 86 and Seirafi, K. 2012: 150 
148 Schreyögg, G, and Geiger, D, 2007: 84 
149 “Argumentation processes are finished by consensus which relies idealistically only on the force of the 
‘better argument’. It is a paradoxical force, because it is conceived as being forceless: ‘the forceless force of 
the better argument’.” Schreyögg, G. and Geiger, D. 2007: 85  
150 Schreyögg, G, and Geiger, D, 2007: 88 - 89 
151 Schreyögg, G, and Geiger, D, 2007:83 
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does not entail anything of importance in the sense that knowledge is intended in the KE, i.e. 
as a valuable resource. Furthermore, they argue the notion of knowledge as practice implies an 
unreflective acceptance of the validity of knowledge underlying practice, which contrasts with 
the idea that knowledge is created at the point where conflicting viewpoints arise that cannot 
be resolved by reverting to everyday practice. What distinguishes societies, organisations and 
work in the KE from this everyday notion of knowledge, is precisely the fact that it is 
characterised by critical reflection on the validity of knowledge claims. Of importance to note 
here is that Schreyögg and Geiger do not deny that tacit knowledge or knowledge as action 
play a role in organisational knowledge, but that both are insufficient as constructs to 
distinguish organisational knowledge from everything else organisations do. 152 The former in 
their argument is an important basis for distinguishing between the “superior” knowledge of 
knowledge-intensive organisations, and the everyday knowledge used in non-knowledge 
intensive organisations. In their estimation, it is only when organisations are able to execute on 
the requirements of the procedural normative prescriptions of rational validation in discourse, 
that they will gain competitive advantage in generating “superior” knowledge.153 
2.6.1.2 Validation as a defining characteristic of fallible knowledge 
Similarly to Schreyögg and Geiger, Firestone and McElroy154 view validation as a core 
determinant of distinguishing knowledge from, amongst others, information, action and 
understanding. As such they too afford a primary position to validation as a definitional 
characteristic of knowledge as “tested, evaluated, surviving and encoded structures . . . that 
help the systems that produce them to adapt.”155 The knowledge structures of concern in this 
definition are derived from Popper’s distinctions between World 1, 2 and 3 knowledge, and 
respectively represent physical or material structures (World 1), personal belief (World 2) and 
codified knowledge (World 3).156  
Drawing extensively on Popper’s critical rationalism (CR), the authors are at pains to point out 
that their conception of knowledge claim evaluation (KCE) is not the same as the notion of 
justification, and in fact is based on Popper’s anti-justificationism. In Firestone and McElroy’s 
                                                
152 Schreyögg, G, and Geiger, D, 2007: 83 & 90 
153 Schreyögg, G, and Geiger, D, 2007: 93 
154 Note that Firestone and McElroy have extensively published on the subject of KM, both in their individual 
and combined capacities. In this thesis, reference to works published by either or both is ascribed to both 
155 Firestone, J.M. and McElroy, M.W. 2003b: 57 
156 Firestone, J.M. and McElroy, M.W. 2003b: 58 
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reading of anti-justificationism this relates to a rejection of the idea that any belief can be 
proven as infallibly true.157 The authors relate this rejection of justificationism not only to the 
epistemological debate from which Popper’s rejection stems, but also to the organisational risks 
they perceive in accepting justificationism as the basis for knowledge. Here they for example 
point to the threat posed by the acceptance of knowledge based on authoritative forms of 
justification and the counterproductive consequences of isolating knowledge creation, but more 
importantly evaluation, to an organisational elite.158 The programme of CR as an alternative to 
justificationism, in theory, proposes a wider process of knowledge creation and the critical 
evaluation of knowledge claims. Knowledge in this view, instead of being representative of the 
justification of a belief as true, is viewed as the tentatively surviving knowledge claims that 
emerge from a process of evaluation, testing and criticism. The acknowledgement that 
knowledge is fallible (and the epistemological rejection of justificationism) is predicated on 
Popper’s argument that while truth exists, it is not possible to derive a set of objective criteria 
which can be used to establish truth in a specific knowledge claim.159 Truth, in this sense, thus 
functions as a “regulative ideal”160 in the process of subjecting a knowledge claim to an 
evaluative process. At the risk of oversimplifying Firestone and McElroy’s theory of KCE, it 
is the latter epistemological assumptions contained in the notion of CR that inform their view 
of validation as a normative process in KM. This view of validation imposes certain constraints 
on what is considered to be organisational knowledge and how validation is conceptualised in 
relation to organisations.  
The first constraint that is imposed on organisational knowledge is similar to that of Schreyögg 
and Geiger’s linguistic requirement, namely that for a knowledge structure to be subject to 
validation, it has to be expressed objectively. Objectivity in this sense represents the ability to 
                                                
157 Firestone, J.M. and McElroy, M.W. 2003b: 2 
158 Firestone, J.M. and McElroy, M.W. 2003b: xiv: “Thus, Enron adopts a solution to the problem of 
maximizing its market value that, after initial success, in the end destroys nearly all of its market value. And it 
does so, in great part, because it hides critical details of its market strategy from employees and Board 
Members alike, and concentrates knowledge of it within a very small band of insiders. Similar stories apply to 
Worldcom, Tyco, Global Crossing, and many, many others. For these companies steering the course of 
adaptation was relegated to the hands of a few in relatively closed conditions. Learning and the adoption of 
new knowledge was restricted to small groups within top management. Stockholders and other parties were 
excluded, even though their vested interest in the quality of knowledge produced and integrated into practice 
in the firms was enormous. Knowledge Processing in such firms is carried out by innovation oligarchies, 
whose tight-fisted control over the power to produce and adopt ideas is only exceeded by their authority to 
compel their subordinates to carry them out. Bad ideas get too far along in such ways.” 
159 Firestone, J.M. and McElroy, M.W. 2003b: 2 
160 McElroy, M.W. 2008: 63 
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objectify a knowledge claim as information161 in codified form which may take on the 
characteristics of “descriptions, models, theories, or arguments.”162 It is this objectivity in 
knowledge claims that allows it to be subject to evaluation, as it is accessible to all, shareable 
through interaction with others and as such is available to be critiqued.163 This objectivity is 
essential in distinguishing the organisational concern of knowledge from subjective or World 
2 knowledge. As beliefs are tied to individuals and as such are not shareable, they cannot be 
subjected to the same external processes of validation and can therefore not be considered 
organisational knowledge.164 Firestone and McElroy’s notion of action in relation to World 2 
knowledge also leads to them discarding the conceptualisation of knowledge as the capacity 
for action. Here they locate action as a consequence of World 2 knowledge. Action therefore 
follows from beliefs that at best have been subjectively and personally validated.165  
Of importance to the notion of knowledge as a complex construct in KM are two central 
underlying assumptions that characterise the KCE process, namely realism and rationalism.166 
In the first instance, in as much as Firestone and McElroy reject the idea that objective criteria 
of truth can be identified, their approach to validation remains grounded in the adoption of a 
correspondence theory of truth. As the authors draw a distinction between theories of truth and 
evaluation, their adoption of correspondence here is limited to truth operating as a regulative 
ideal.167 Truth then exists in facts which are independent of the knowledge claims referring to 
these facts. In this sense there is a clear distinction between reality and knowledge of reality, 
which is fallible. Claims to knowledge must therefore be proven to correspond to the facts to 
which they refer.168 How this is achieved is determined by the fallibilist evaluation theory 
represented by CR. A core component of this approach is the search for error elimination, a 
process which Firestone and McElroy expanded on through the introduction of fair comparison 
criteria that act as normative standards against which KCE must be performed. Rationality, in 
the context of their adoption of CR, then takes on the nature of the task to be critical and is 
                                                
161 McElroy, M.W. 2008:50 
162 Firestone, J.M. and McElroy, M.W. 2002: 110 
163 See also McElroy, M.W. 2008:50 
164 McElroy, M.W. 2008: 50 
165 Firestone, J.M. and McElroy, M.W. 2002:114-115 
166 McElroy, M.W. 2008: 50 
167 McElroy, M.W. 2008: 51 
168 Firestone, J.M. and McElroy, M.W. 2003b: 70 
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open to accepting alternatives in the face of valid criticism.169 Attaining knowledge in this 
sense therefore is a matter of subjecting codified knowledge to rational tests which determine 
its correspondence to the factual nature of reality. 
2.6.2 Summary remarks on normative approaches 
In both instances discussed above, the theoretical proposals result in monist conceptions of 
organisational knowledge and justification.170 Here both Schreyögg and Geiger, as well as 
Firestone and McElroy, propose that validation should only take place in one prescribed way, 
resulting in the production of knowledge with essentially similar characteristics. Knowledge 
must be explicated and subject to tests of its veracity. Such tests must be rational, and it is only 
if rationality prevails that organisations create valuable knowledge. While both acknowledge 
that other forms of “knowledge” exist, they essentially propose that this is not the knowledge 
that is of importance to the KE, and by implication not the knowledge that should be considered 
by KM as a discipline. KM as a discipline must therefore concern itself with ensuring the 
creation of rational knowledge, be that against locally determined criteria of truth as in the case 
of Schreyögg and Geiger, or against an external reality of facts as in the case of Firestone and 
McElroy. By attempting to reduce the complexity of knowledge through prescribing one “right 
way” of arriving at knowledge, both theories exhibit characteristics of an objectivist KM 
epistemology as described by Hislop.171 Of concern here is that, if KM is to progress beyond 
the narrow notions of knowledge in mainstream practice, it appears ill-advised to replace the 
limited view of knowledge as an outcome of data and information, with knowledge as a concept 
still narrowly defined but merely based on different criteria.172  
2.6.3 Practice-based approaches 
In contrast to the anxiety a complex notion of knowledge invokes among proponents of 
normative validation, the acceptance of complex knowledge is a defining characteristic of 
authors writing from practice-based perspectives. While various theoretical paradigms reflect 
this perspective, following Marshall and Rollinson173 these can be grouped together under the 
                                                
169 McElroy, M.W. 2008: 30 
170 This argument draws on Spender, J.C. 1998 
171 Hislop, D. 2005: 17 summarises the four main characteristics of an objectivist epistemology as follows. 
“Knowledge is an entity/object; Based on a positivistic philosophy: knowledge regarded as objective ‘facts’; 
Explicit knowledge (objective) privileged over tacit knowledge (subjective); Knowledge is derived from an 
intellectual process” 
172 This argument draws on Spender, J.C. 1998 
173 Marshall, N. and Rollinson, J. 2004: S73 
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construct of practice-based approaches to knowledge. A shared understanding among these 
theories relates to the view that knowledge is far removed from the notion of considered 
rationality by human agents. To illustrate why practice-based theory adopts this position 
consideration can be given to arguments proposed by Knorr Cetina.174 For Knorr Cetina, a 
fundamental characteristic of the knowledge society (KS) is that the influence of knowledge is 
dispersed and distributed beyond conceptualisations of the KE, as characterised by more 
artefacts of knowledge. In her argument she proposes that focussing exclusively on outputs 
fails to recognise that the concept of the KS also implies the amplification of the processes of 
knowledge creation. These processes are defined not merely by their products, but by the 
practices through which knowledge is created.175 It is through focussing on practice that the 
assumptions of the universality of rationality as the means of knowledge creation are 
questioned, as practice illustrates that the activities underlying the production of knowledge 
cannot be understood only in terms of the rational and cognitive proposals of the philosophy 
of science.176  
2.6.3.1 Complex knowledge as an enabler 
A focus on practice precedes the development of KM, and has been significantly influenced by 
mid-20th century philosophical arguments in the field of epistemology. This has led to, amongst 
others, criticism of epistemology as a philosophical approach, the pre-eminence afforded to the 
economic vs. social role of knowledge, positivism and rationality.177 Drawing on these 
criticisms, authors such as Cook and Brown,178 Blackler,179 Alvesson,180 and Tsoukas181 
position the complexity of knowledge in organisational contexts as an opportunity to enrich 
the theoretical understanding of knowledge, by reconceptualising traditional epistemology and 
                                                
174 Knorr Cetina, K. 1999: 07-08: “A knowledge society is not simply a society of more experts, more 
technological gadgets, more specialist interpretations. It is a society permeated with knowledge cultures, the 
whole set of structures and mechanisms that serve knowledge and unfold with its articulation. The traditional 
definition of a knowledge society puts emphasis on the knowledge seen as statements of scientific belief, as 
technological application or perhaps as intellectual property. The definition I advocate switches the emphasis 
to knowledge as practiced – within structures, processes and environments that make up specific epistemic 
settings. If the argument about the growth of expert systems is right, what we call “society” will to a 
significant degree be constituted by such settings.” 
175 Knorr Cetina, K. 1999: 07-08 
176 Knorr Cetina, K. 2007: 363 - 364 
177 Compare for example Blackler, F. Reed, M. and Whitaker, A. 1993 and Knorr Cetina, K. 1999. 
178 Cook, S.D.N. and Brown, J.S. 1999 
179 Blackler, F. 1993 
180 Alvesson, M. 1993 
181 Tsoukas, H. 2005: Ch. 1 
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knowledge, as well as the concerns of truth and justification. As argued below, in these 
instances there is a strong focus on how practice suggests a much more complex notion of 
knowledge and knowledge creation than suggested by KM theory that attempts to position 
knowledge away from action. Secondly, an engagement with practice illustrates that the locus 
of knowledge creation is found in the activities of organisations and in the interaction between 
different forms of knowledge, rather than in the creation of a single form of knowledge. 
Alvesson182  for example argues that much of the work done in knowledge-intensive firms has 
little in common with traditional notions of knowledge as formal and theoretical education and 
the skills obtained through this. Instead he proposes that the real knowledge applied in these 
organisations is characterised by ambiguity that captures the essence of creativity, social skills 
and tacit elements which define the ability of organisations to solve problems in a 
“knowledgeable” way. Similarly to Alvesson, Blackler et al183 view the importance of 
knowledge as a complex construct in the KE not in terms of objective functional resources, but 
in terms of practice and action. For them, the ability of organisations to benefit from knowledge 
resides in their ability to act creatively in resolving problems or finding new opportunities. This 
view contrasts with the accepted mainstream view of knowledge as a resource or possession 
that is crucial to organisational success in the KE. For Cook and Brown, this complexity of 
knowledge in organisational settings represents a “generative dance” between knowledge as a 
thing and knowing as action. Here the acknowledgement of various forms of knowledge (tacit, 
explicit, group and individual) is central to understanding that knowledge in different and 
distinct forms exists simultaneously, and enables action unique to each form of knowledge. At 
the same time, the authors argue that, while knowledge as a possession is used in action, action 
constitutes more than that which can be explained by the view of knowledge as possession.184  
As a consequence of locating knowledge in practice, practice-based theories have questioned 
some of the more fundamental assumptions underlying traditional views of rationality, truth 
and justification in relation to knowledge.  Blacker185 for example argues that the desire to be 
                                                
182 Alvesson, M. 1993: 997 
183 Blackler, F. Reed, M. and Whitaker, A.1993: 855 
184 See Cook, S.D.N. and Brown, J.S. 1999: 384 
185 Blackler, F. 1993: 865-866: “. . . the rhetoric of traditional rationalism has retained its attractions. Objectivist 
images of professional knowledge retain a powerful mystique. . . . Part of the explanation for the continuing 
vitality of rational-cognitivism in management can be sought from an analysis of the pressures within 
organizations themselves. Staw (1980) notes that while most theories of individual and organizational 
behaviour assume that behaviour is logical, goal seeking and self-interested it is not that difficult to show that 
neither individuals or [sic] organizations are likely to act in such a way very often. Yet most organizations, he 
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seen as behaving rationally pervades organisational life and managerial practice, and as such 
creates the perception that knowledge in an organisational context is derived through rational 
processes. From a postmodernist perspective, this pseudo-rationality creates the impression 
that knowledge, and organisational structures sustaining knowledge, are independent from 
interpretation and social construction. However, postmodernism questions the notion that 
knowledge can be derived objectively, by submitting that all knowledge is constructed through 
language, which can never be objective or neutral. Emphasizing the subjective nature of 
knowledge, postmodernist and relativist authors criticize the idea that knowledge can ever be 
a representation of an independent world. The notions of truth and justification in this view 
therefore substantively differ from accepted notions in philosophy in so far as postmodernists 
reject both correspondence and consensus as means to achieve truth.186 Truth rather becomes 
a constructed notion that is specific to local circumstances and open to constant revision. As 
such, neither truth nor justification exists in any universal from.  
Applying constructionist arguments in the context of science as the beacon of knowledge, 
sociologists of science have sought to illustrate that even among the highest forms of 
knowledge, socially negotiated construction is a characteristic of knowledge, and that claims 
to objectivity are largely manufactured in the process of justification as an attempt to objectify 
knowledge and separate it from its socially constructed nature.187 For Blackler, Reed and 
Whitaker188 the combined effect of such theorising has largely discredited views of knowledge 
as objective truth. Instead, what they propose is that truth is a story that works to justify 
knowledge in a given situation. In this view it is not only the story that matters, but also the 
extent to which these stories represent an accepted standard that has been socially negotiated 
in a particular knowledge context.  
While the preceding arguments indicate that practice-based approaches in KM are generally 
united in their view that narrow conceptualisations of knowledge fail to capture the richness of 
knowledge construction that characterises the activities of organisations, it is important to note 
                                                
points out, are intendedly rational and pressures to act in a prospectively rational manner are strong in areas 
where performance is visible and easily monitored. Moreover, people are expected also to be able to justify 
their past actions in acceptable terms; indeed, goal-seeking prospective rationality at a senior level is likely to 
be translated into self-protective, retrospective rationality elsewhere. According to Staw, pressures for rational 
explanations of behaviour pervade organizations.” 
186 Johnson, P. and Duberley, J. 2000: 03 
187 Knorr Cetina, K. 1999. 
188 Blackler, F. Reed, M. and Whitaker, A. 1993: 854 
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that these approaches do not represent a uniform set of theories.189 Such differences are, 
amongst others, evident in the degree to which practice-based theory will engage with 
epistemological concerns, as well as the portrayal of epistemological concerns and the value 
that could be derived from engaging with epistemology. As illustrated in the arguments below, 
practice-based theories vary from the concern that epistemology detracts from KM’s 
objectives, to the view that epistemology can, and should, contribute to theorising in knowledge 
management.   
In considering the need for pluralism in KM, Spender190 proposes the argument that 
engagement with epistemology places KM as a discipline at risk, and detracts from the possible 
unique contribution that the field can deliver to organisational management. Here specifically 
he raises the concern that approaching KM from an epistemological point of view subjects the 
discipline to the same problems to which epistemology has failed for centuries to provide final 
answers. He sees this risk particularly arising in the work of authors who insist that KM finds 
a clear solution to the problem of what knowledge is, before attempting to manage it. For 
Spender this approach fails to recognise epistemology’s concern with the nature of knowledge 
as part of the human condition vis-a-vis KM’s concern with organisational life only. 
Contrasting with epistemology’s search for a final answer on the status of knowledge, KM’s 
contribution resides in its recognition that knowledge is a problematic construct. In this sense 
KM needs “to turn the entire epistemological project upside down”.191 Here it is precisely the 
recognition that knowledge is more than what any individual can consciously express, that 
provides KM with an opportunity to provide a unique perspective on organisations.192 
Moving beyond an understanding of epistemology as constraining the notion of knowledge, 
authors such as Tsoukas and von Krogh approach epistemology with the view to redefine it in 
the context of organisations. These approaches to epistemology reposition the debate on the 
nature of knowledge away from epistemology’s normative concern, toward a practical concern 
of work and action. In doing so, knowledge creation in an organisational context aligns to 
theoretical description and understanding, rather than normative prescription. Tsoukas 
probably illustrates this best when he argues that, from an organisational point of view, 
                                                
189 This characteristic of practice based theories is general to the approach and concerns significantly more 
elements of diversion that those of concern in this thesis, see for example Schatzki, T.R. 2005. 
190 Spender, J.C. 2009:09 
191 Spender, J.C. 2009:11 
192 Spender, J.C. 2009: 11-12 
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epistemology is the study of how knowing, thinking and deciding takes place in 
organisations.193 In this sense organisational epistemology is redefined as a framework for 
understanding organisations as systems of complex knowledge. While in one sense this view 
of epistemology positions it as a descriptive and empirical endeavour, it also raises a set of 
concerns much broader than that of the philosophical view. Here epistemology is not just 
concerned with the components, conditions and limits of knowledge,194 but also with how this 
is applied within organisations and what the internal and external consequences of using and 
creating knowledge are.195  
In defining corporate epistemology as an approach to strategic management, von Krogh, Roos 
and Slocum focus on the need to redefine management in the context of organisations “as a 
stream of knowledge.”196 This redefinition takes place against the background of the growing 
importance of knowledge to organisations and the need in this context to adapt organisational 
strategy and management to a view of organisations grounded in knowledge. Epistemology in 
this sense represents a framework to understand knowledge and to reinterpret management 
activity in the context of knowledge. While drawing on philosophy’s insights on knowledge, 
corporate epistemology is not an attempt to prescribe “the best”197 epistemology, but rather it 
focusses on the need for mutual understanding, the contextuality of knowledge and 
consequently the ways in which epistemological discussions enrich organisational notions of 
knowledge.198  
Von Krogh et al’s approach to redefining epistemology in KM away from its essentialist 
nature,199 is also reflected in the work of authors such as Tell,200 as well as Boisot and 
MacMillan. 201 In both instances the authors consider the value that epistemology can offer to 
                                                
193 Tsoukas, H.  2005: 11: “An enquiry into organizational epistemology would be concerned, inter alia, with the 
following questions: What is organizational knowledge and what forms does it take? What are the forms of 
life within which different kinds of knowledge are embedded? How is new knowledge created? How do 
individuals draw on different forms of organizational knowledge, with what effects? What are the 
representational and social practices through which organization construct and communicate their forms of 
knowledge? How are knowledge claims justified and legitimated within organizations?” 
194 Compare Moser, P.K. 2002: 03 
195 Tsoukas, H. 2005: 11-13 
196 von Krogh, G. Roos, J. and Slocum, K.1994:54 
197 Venzin, M. von Krogh, G. and Roos, J. 1998:60 
198 Venzin, M. von Krogh, G. and Roos, J. 1998: 37 & 59-60 
199 This observation draws on comments from Tell, F. 2004: 444 & 446, as well as Hecker, A. 2012: 425 
200 Tell, F. 2004 
201 Boisot, M. and MacMillan, I.C. 2004 
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the KM discipline specifically in relation to understanding, at a general level, justification 
practices in organisations. However, this consideration takes place in broader and more general 
terms than intended in traditional philosophy. In this regard, Boisot and MacMillan find value 
in Plato’s original conceptualisation of JTB to describe, under the practical circumstances of 
creating organisational knowledge, how justification, truth and belief can variously act as the 
basis for validating knowledge. Of critical importance here is that the authors reinterpret the 
essential nature of JTB not as a single set of criteria of validating knowledge, but as diverging 
elements giving rise to divergent worlds which act as the basis for justifying knowledge under 
specific circumstances.202 In similar vein Tell proposes that a general understanding of 
organisational justification practices can be attained through understanding the various 
approaches in philosophy to establishing grounds for justification, but not by reducing 
organisational knowledge to an essentialist project. Instead he proposes that by foregrounding 
the pluralist nature of knowledge, pluralism in justification criteria must too be retained. By 
arguing for a move away from essentialism, Tell focusses on how divergent justification 
criteria enable the existence of different forms of knowledge in organisations.203 
2.6.3.2 Validation as part of complexity 
Given the aforementioned role of epistemology, the importance of justification in practice-
based KM theory results from precisely this concern with the extent to which the complexity 
of knowledge demands a deeper understanding of its development.204 As argued above, from a 
practice perspective, justification forms part of the epistemological nature of organisations. 
However, as with the conception of epistemology, the concern with justification is first of all 
positioned in the context of the organisation. This notion is illustrated by the pragmatic 
approach to epistemology taken by Boisot and MacMillan, who reframe the question of 
justification in the context of KM as an answer to “what constitutes valid knowledge for who 
and under what circumstances?”205 In this sense concerns with justification in the context of 
practice based KM theory start with a view on the nature of organisational knowledge, and not 
with the question of how organisational knowledge should be delimited to represent a 
normatively acceptable knowledge construct. Departing from this perspective has a number of 
consequences for the conceptualisation of justification in practice-based theory. By engaging 
                                                
202 Boisot, M. and MacMillan, I.C. 2004 
203 Tell, F. 2004 
204 Compare Venzin, M. von Krogh, G. and Roos, J. 1998:36 
205 Boisot, M. and MacMillan, I.C, 2004: 507 
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with the concern of justification, there is general acceptance that all organisations engage in 
the practice of deciding on the legitimacy of knowledge claims.206 This practice of legitimising 
knowledge claims draws on the determination of criteria for the validation of knowledge 
claims, which involves the organisational relationships between processes, policies, 
procedures207 and actors.208 A focus on these relationships furthermore introduces the dynamics 
of social factors in determining the organisational validity of knowledge claims. As a field of 
interest in practice-based theory, the justification of knowledge claims is therefore positioned 
as encompassing a much wider variety of concerns than that associated with an essentialist 
approach. 
At the level of justification criteria, the acceptance of knowledge as multi-dimensional implies 
that justification criteria are equally considered as multifaceted.209 Practice-based theorising 
therefore allows for the simultaneous existence of seemingly conflicting criteria of 
justification.210 However, from a theoretical point of view, practice scholars differ in the degree 
to, and the level at which, theorising about these practices are generalised.211 This can be 
understood as the extent through which local contingency212 is considered more or less the 
determinant in how justification takes place as a process, and how criteria for justification are 
determined. Where practice theory is strongly contextual, theories of justification will tend to 
propose the local determination of justification criteria. Tsoukas for example argues that “when 
organizational members are asked to justify their actions, they do so in the terms provided by 
the organizational discourses in which they participate.”213 Justification criteria in this sense 
are viewed by Tsoukas as changing, dependent on the nature and content of organisational 
discourse, and as discourse is determined locally, so is the means through which justification 
is expressed. While still maintaining a strong focus on practice, authors such as Robertson et 
al214 draw attention to the institutional nature of justification, and in this sense offer a more 
generalised view of knowledge legitimisation, as drawing on epistemological bases that span 
                                                
206 Tsoukas, H. 2005: 10 - 12 
207 Tsoukas, H. and Mylonopoulos, N. 2004:S4 
208 Tell, F. 2004: 465 and Blackler, F. 1995: 1037 - 1039 
209 Compare Allix, N. 2003 
210 See for example O’Leary, M. and Chia, R. 2007: 394 & 398 
211 This argument draws on the views of Tell, F. 2004 
212 This argument draws on the views of Knorr Cetina, K. 1999: 01 - 11 
213 Tsoukas, H. 2005: 275 
214 Robertson, J., Scarbrough, H. and Swan, M. 2003 
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across organisations. The contextuality of practice in this instance exists not at the level of the 
individual organisation, but rather in the differences in legitimising knowledge between 
different professions.215 A similar view, but here focussed more generally at the level of culture, 
is proposed by O’Leary and Chia216 who apply Foucault’s concept of episteme to practice and 
sense-making. Here the authors expand on Foucault’s proposal that, in practice, the creation of 
knowledge often involves the “unconscious” enactment of an underlying set of culturally 
approved rules for the creation of knowledge, including rules that govern the legitimacy of 
knowledge. Contextuality of practice exists in how an organisation relates in its specific 
activities to locally determined criteria, but the criteria themselves draw on a generic 
structure.217  
On one level it is possible to argue that an outcome of acknowledging conflicting justification 
criteria is a concern in practice-based theory with the internal dynamics of mediating between 
seemingly incommensurable validity criteria.218 The latter is for example considered in the 
characteristics of organisational practices that influence the process of validation. In this 
instance von Krogh and Grand,219 for example, argue that understanding justification in 
practice-based theorising results in greater consideration for the role that managerial choice 
and praxis play in establishing organisational knowledge. Viewed from this perspective, 
managerial preference permeates organisational justification processes and, as it is deeply 
embedded in practice, it constrains the introduction of alternative validity criteria.220 A second 
focus in this line of theorising is on how accepted validation practices become established. 
From this point of view, the focus shifts to the role that power, politics and interests play in 
determining validation criteria and processes.221 This has amongst others led to the recognition 
that claims to the validity of knowledge are influenced by the position of knowledge workers 
in an organisation, and that predominant notions of what constitutes valid organisational 
knowledge are biased toward externally legitimated expertise over internal experience.222 
Similarly, keeping the notion of validation open has allowed for an appreciation of the role that 
                                                
215 Robertson, J., Scarbrough, H. and Swan, M. 2003: 835 
216 O’Leary, M. and Chia, R. 2007 
217 O’Leary, M. and Chia, R. 2007: 404 
218 O’Leary, M. and Chia, R. 2007: 404  
219 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000:15 
220 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000 
221 Tsoukas, H. and Mylonopoulos, N. 2004 
222 Tsoukas, H. and Mylonopoulos, N. 2004: S5 and Yanow, D. 2004: S10 
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politics and power play in challenging notions of validation as the outcome of rationally-agreed 
discourse, instead focussing attention on how exerting power represents an attempt to redefine 
the criteria used for justification in a particular context.223  
The remainder of this research project focusses on obtaining an in-depth understanding of the 
conceptualisation of justification in the practice-based KM tradition. To facilitate this, the 
respective work of von Krogh and Tell, in proposing theories of justification, will be evaluated. 
The selection of these two theories is, first of all, constrained by the objective of this research 
to evaluate validation from the perspective of practice-based KM. By implication, any theory 
considered for selection must therefore meet the minimum criteria of being classified as a 
practice-based theory. To evaluate this, consideration is given to the definitional components 
of knowledge as contained in the work of these authors. In this regard von Krogh defines 
knowledge as residing “in mind, body, and the social system. It is observer- and history 
dependent, context sensitive and not directly shared, only indirectly through discussions”. 224 
An important component of von Krogh’s conceptualisation of knowledge is that, as a construct, 
it is inadequately understood as an objective representation of an external reality; instead, he 
emphasizes the constructed nature of knowledge and the intimate relationship between 
knowledge and the knower.225 For Tell, organisational knowledge resides in practices and 
activities and cannot be separated from the social context in which organisational members 
justify knowledge claims. Arguing from the perspective of Wittgenstein’s notion of language 
games, Tell proposes that knowledge in this view is positioned away from concerns with 
cognition and correspondence, and instead positions it as a concern of justifying knowledge in 
“the social practice of knowing in organisations.”226  
The second criterion that is applied in this thesis is that the theory should offer an express and 
detailed contribution to understanding justification in the context of the practice of 
organisations. In this instance von Krogh positions the contribution of managerial justification 
theory as “explicitly analysing of the role of justification”227 in organisational knowledge 
creation. In similar vein, Tell situates his pluralist approach in the realm of “analysing 
                                                
223 Marshall, N. and Rollinson, J. 2004: S81 
224 Venzin, M. von Krogh, G. and Roos, J. 1998: 43 
225 von Krogh, G. Roos, J. and Slocum, K.1994: 57-58 
226 Tell, F. 2004: 447 
227 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000:15 
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organisational knowledge as a process of justification in different contexts”.228 In both 
instances the theories selected are therefore attempts at providing general theories that are of 
specific concern to the justification of organisational knowledge.  
Although the two theories chosen here are classified under the broad practice-based 
perspective, there are important differences in these approaches which further inform their 
selection. Firstly, von Krogh’s approach is developed in the context of autopoietic 
epistemology, which positions knowledge development as inherently related to the 
organisation as a self-referential entity.229 As a result of the former, organisational closure is 
assumed230 and justification is positioned at the level of an internal organisational process that 
continually refers back to the organisational identity.231 Theoretically von Krogh’s 
conceptualisation of justification draws on the sociology of knowledge and constructionism,232 
and in this sense is an attempt to understand the process of justification outside of the traditional 
concerns of epistemology with validity criteria. In contrast to von Krogh’s proposal, Tell 
positions the justification concern in the realm of validity criteria.233 In this regard he reviews 
essentialist approaches’ concern with the basis for accepting knowledge claims,234 but proposes 
that, instead of reducing knowledge to a single type, an understanding of divergent justification 
criteria allows for an understanding that knowledge exists in multiple forms. Unlike von Krogh, 
Tell’s theory is not a generalisation at the level of validation processes, but rather at the level 
of justification criteria.235 In doing so he draws on different theories of justification in 
philosophy, and positions this in the broader framework of pluralism. Resulting from the 
former, Tell’s proposal, by design,236 is not focussed on the contextual and constructed nature 
of justification as a process, but instead on generalising at the societal level by arguing for 
parallels between general justification criteria and organisational practice. 
                                                
228 Tell, F. 2004: 443 
229 von Krogh, G., Roos, J. and Slocum, K. 1994 
230 This comment draws on arguments from Giroux, H. and Taylor, J.R. 2002: 502 
231 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000 
232 See for example von Krogh, G. and Roos, J. 1994 and von Krogh, G. and Roos, J. 1995 
233 Tell, F. 2004: 443 - 444 
234 Note here that, while Tell (2004: 444) addresses the question raised by authors such as Schreyögg and 
Geiger, his work precedes their theory and draws more generally on the claim that in practice based theory the 
definition of knowledge is vague  
235 Tell, F. 2004 
236 Tell, F. 2004:464 describes his approach as an argument for an organisationally “weaker understanding of 
knowledge as justification criteria are generic rather than confined to the boundaries of the organisation” 
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2.7  Conclusion 
In this chapter the development of the validation concern in KM has been contextualised as an 
outcome of the implicit epistemological assumptions underlying specific approaches to 
knowledge, which in turn influence the debate on the nature of knowledge and the functions of 
KM. In mainstream KM, with its predominant notion of knowledge as an unproblematic 
construct, validation is either ignored or seen in information management terms. A more 
complex notion of knowledge developed over time and has been accompanied by engagement 
with the justification debate in the context of KM. From this engagement it is evident that 
normative approaches to validation have important consequences for both the construct of 
knowledge and the process of validation. Knowledge, by virtue of the fact that it has to be 
linguistic, must be explicated and codified. Validation as a process requires organisational 
actors to behave rationally. Contrasting with the normative approach, practice-based theories 
emphasize the need to see validation as a core component of knowledge creation that must be 
understood, rather than prescribed. In this approach the validation process is kept open to 
complexity, and, as it is not aimed at delimiting the notion of knowledge, it does not result in 
the rejection of certain forms of knowledge. The next two chapters will turn to a more detailed 
evaluation and understanding of the practice-based approaches to justification as respectively 
represented in the theories of von Krogh and Tell. 
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Chapter 3 




Managerial justification theory in the work of von Krogh237 is an exposition of the “black 
box”238 of knowledge creation and justification, conceptualised through the adoption of 
constructivism and systemic constructivism as represented in autopoiesis. An important point 
to note here is that von Krogh’s preference for constructivist theory stems from the adoption 
of a sociology of knowledge approach to understanding knowledge creation, a position which 
contrasts with the more traditional approaches to the philosophical understanding of 
knowledge. This positions von Krogh’s work away from the concerns of normativity and 
towards the concerns of description and understanding.  
Prior to the publication of the theory of managerial justification, von Krogh established a body 
of work positioning organisational knowledge within the broader constructivist framework. 
This included an expansion of the autopoietic intention in Nonaka’s KCC theory of knowledge. 
While the centrality that Nonaka afforded to justification, as well as the overall emphasis on 
the knowledge creation process, arguably influenced the development of managerial 
justification theory, von Krogh’s approach to the organisational legitimation of knowledge 
preceded the formalisation of his theory of justification. A discussion of managerial 
justification must therefore be preceded by an understanding of the constructivist view von 
Krogh employs in conceptualising organisational knowledge and truth. Consequently this 
chapter starts with an investigation of the conceptual roots of managerial justification theory.239 
                                                
237 von Krogh’s ideas have been developed in collaboration with various others. In this thesis reference to von 
Krogh is used as short hand for his collaborative work 
238 von Krogh, G. and Grand. S. 2000: 15 
239 It should be noted here that von Krogh’s work on the subject of organisational knowledge is prolific, the 
investigation is therefore guided by the need to ultimately understand how the earlier work in organisational 
knowledge lays the groundwork for managerial justification theory, rather than to represent a comprehensive 
review and discussion of von Krogh’s constructivist theory of knowledge. 
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Having elaborated on this, the chapter turns to von Krogh’s theory of justification and the 
particulars thereof. Finally the implications of this theory as elaborated by von Krogh, as well 
as its limitations in the context of a constructivist approach to justification, is discussed.  
3.2 Conceptual roots of managerial justification theory 
Conceptually managerial justification theory is founded in a constructivist view of knowledge 
that draws both on “weak” constructivism, as represented in the constructivist interpretation of 
phenomenology, and systemic or cognitive constructivism240 as found in the autopoiesis of 
Maturana and Varela and the interpretation of society as an autopoietic system by Luhmann. 
In both instances, von Krogh draws on the constructivist understanding of knowledge to 
provide an alternative view of knowledge that contrasts with the cognitivist notion of 
knowledge in strategic management.241 
3.2.1 Knowledge as socially constructed 
Managerial justification theory is conceptually grounded in the interpretation of knowledge as 
a core determinant of organisational competencies. In this view it represents an attempt to 
overcome the limitations of traditional resource-based approaches to firm performance, 
specifically in relation to addressing the problem of sustainable competitive advantage. Given 
this shortcoming, von Krogh’s approach is encased in the broader objective to redefine strategic 
management by considering constructivist theory as an enhancement to mainstream managerial 
approaches to knowledge in particular and strategy in general.242  
As a core problem in strategic management theory von Krogh243 identifies the inability of 
resource-based theories of the firm to account, in a conceptually clear manner, for the 
intangible resources which are the root of sustainable competitive advantage. To address this 
problem, he introduces the concept of competency as a construct that links knowledge to a 
specific task. Of specific importance to this research project is the constructivist 
conceptualisation of knowledge that von Krogh proposes in relation to competencies. 
Constructivism is firstly introduced to overcome the problem of the traditional dichotomy 
between knowledge as a social product on the one hand, versus individually possessed on the 
                                                
240 This characterisation draws on the observations of Knorr Cetina, K (1993) and Grand, S. Ruëgg-Stürm, J and 
von Arx (2010) in relation to the classification of constructivist/constructionist theories 
241 von Krogh, G. Roos, J. and Slocum, K. 1994 
242 von Krogh, G. and Roos, J. 1995 
243 von Krogh, G. and Roos, J. 1995 
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other. In the context of strategic management von Krogh argues that it is necessary to overcome 
this distinction by merging both the micro-level understanding of knowledge (individuals) with 
the macro-level understanding of knowledge (firms) as the primary unit of analysis in 
organisational competence. This merger is achieved through constructivism’s roots in 
phenomenology244 and specifically through the notion of intersubjectivity as an explicit attempt 
at combining the concepts of individuals and society.245 Intersubjectivity exists because the 
individual’s experience (subjectivity) of everyday life exists only in relation to other members 
of society.  Individual knowledge is therefore always situated in social structures.246  
Constructivism, rather than deny the role of individual knowledge by focussing only on the 
social, redefines it to substantively diverge from the cognitivist notion of individual knowledge 
as an objective mental representation of an external social reality, which can readily be 
transferred between individuals without loss of meaning. Instead, what is proposed through 
constructivism is that individual knowledge represents a subjective interpretation of reality 
which can never result in the direct transmission of knowledge as objective entity. Rather, 
subjective knowledge is shared between individuals through the process of objectivation and 
through this process social knowledge is created.247 Objectivation draws directly from the 
phenomenology of Schutz and Luckman, and concerns the process through which subjective 
knowledge is socialised and as a result becomes embodied in the everyday life world.248 The 
process of objectivation acknowledges that tacit knowledge can often not be expressed directly 
through language, and as such incorporates the use of marks, tools and signs in addition to 
language in the process though which subjective knowledge is shared. 249  
It is through the process of objectivation that von Krogh positions legitimation as a function in 
the acceptance of subjective knowledge at the level of the organisation. The overarching 
objective here is to guard against the destabilisation of the firm’s established legitimised 
practices through the introduction of subjective knowledge. In this sense, subjective knowledge 
must be legitimised against the same criteria that underlie the legitimacy of the organisation. 
These criteria, as identified by Berger and Luckman, are then reinterpreted by von Krogh as 
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246 Berger, P. and Luckman, T. 1991: 78-79 
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representing the levels of legitimation that must be addressed for subjective knowledge to be 
adopted as social knowledge.250 At the level of incipient legitimation von Krogh argues that 
subjective knowledge is legitimised using commonly accepted means of objectivation (i.e. 
language, signs, tools and marks). An important point here, is that these means of objectivation 
do not necessarily have to be commonly known, and can include the use of words and concepts 
that are new to a specific group. The second level concerns pragmatic means of legitimising 
knowledge, and is bound up with traditions and stories in the organisation, which convey the 
reasons for adopting certain actions. Thirdly, organisations adopt formalised and specialised 
systems of theoretical knowledge such as those contained in accounting practice. Legitimation 
in this sense is achieved through either referencing or using such systems. Finally, at the 
symbolic level, organisations’ knowledge is legitimated through accepted frameworks that 
guide organisational behaviour in a broader societal framework. This involves the socially 
accepted knowledge that defines, for example, industry-appropriate behaviour.251 By 
considering the constructionist implications for legitimation, von Krogh is able to position 
justification as a local and contingent process.  
3.2.2 Knowledge creation as autopoiesis 
One of the earliest contributions from von Krogh to the KM debate considered a 
reinterpretation of organisational knowledge through an autopoietic epistemology.252 With this 
proposal von Krogh sought to enhance the theory of organisational knowledge by considering 
a supplementary253 theory to the dominant cognitivist notion evident in strategic management 
literature.254 This cognitivist conception of knowledge was born out of the mid-20th century 
                                                
250 von Krogh, G. and Roos, J. 1995: 64-65; see also Berger, P. and Luckman, T. 1991: 110 - 113 
251 von Krogh, G. and Roos, J. 1995: 64-65; and Berger, P. and Luckman, T. 1991: 110 - 113 
252 von Krogh, G. Roos, J. and Slocum, K. 1994: 58: “Evoking autopoiesis theory implies rethinking some of the 
very basic assumptions behind . . . how and why organizations know. We want to speculate on what happens 
if one relaxes some of the assumptions of the cognitivist perspective and replaces them with the assumptions 
of autopoiesis theory. In doing this we believe that autopoiesis theory emerges as an important contribution to 
these previous works in strategic management. Unlike the cognitivist perspective, autopoiesis theory suggests 
that the world is not a pre-given state to be represented, but rather that cognition is a creative act of bringing 
forth a world.” 
253 It is important to understand from the outset that autopoietic epistemology is not intended as the 
epistemology of organisational knowledge, but rather as a complimentary viewpoint in a pluralist 
understanding of organisational knowledge. In this context von Krogh argues that “Some phenomenon might 
be better understood and explained within the cognitivist epistemology – but some are not, and so call for a 
new epistemology” (von Krogh, G. Roos, J. and Slocum, K. 1994: 57). An autopoietic approach to knowledge 
is therefore intended to supplement and enrich the concept of organisational knowledge rather than to displace 
out of hand, existing and alternative epistemologies. 
254 von Krogh. G., Roos, J. and Slocum, K., 1994: 58. It is important to note here that in later work e.g. Venzin, 
M. von Krogh, G. and Roos, J. 1998, autopoiesis has also been contrasted with connectionist epistemology. 
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development of cognitive science as the study of knowledge and cognition beyond the 
traditional concerns of philosophy and psychology. As a new theory of knowledge, cognitivism 
mainly distinguished itself from pre-existing approaches through the parallels drawn between 
human cognition and information processing using digital computers. Simultaneously 
cognitivism retained significant influences from Cartesian rationalism and representationalism 
which has considerable implications for its notions of truth and justification.255 While a 
comprehensive review of cognitivism is beyond the scope of this research, it is important in 
the context of von Krogh’s approach to organisational knowledge in general and justification 
in particular, to elaborate on the primary implications of this representationalist epistemology.  
3.2.3 Basic assumptions of representationalism 
At the core of representationalism is the belief that reality is characterised by pre-given features 
which can be represented in cognition which, through reason, come to represent the true nature 
of an external world.256 In this sense representationalism appeals to the dominant Western 
notion of understanding entities as clearly demarcated systems.257 From the view of 
organisations it is therefore possible to demarcate the organisation from its environment as an 
independent system. Within the environment there are certain knowable facts which are 
cognitively stored by individuals in the organisation. Through fact-processing, organisations 
build a representation of the environment which becomes increasingly accurate as more facts 
are stored and new incoming information is related to previous representations.258 The resulting 
notion of knowledge is that of representations of an external reality, where the processes of 
representation are akin to the ways in which computers process and store information.259 This 
interpretation of knowledge lends primacy to reality and truth, as respectively the external 
reference points for knowledge, and the evaluation of knowledge judged against the degree to 
which it accurately reflects this reality.260 The primacy afforded to cognition as the method 
                                                
However as the core concept of dominant logic as relevant to von Krogh’s theory of organisational 
justification developed from the cognitivist tradition, this research focusses exclusively on cognitivism in 
contrast to autopoiesis  
255 Varela, F.J., Thompson, E. and Rosch, E. 1993: 6-8 &138-140; also see Tsoukas, H. 2005: 394-395 
256 Tsoukas, H. 2005: 395 
257 Morgan, G. 2006: 245 & 369 
258 Venzin, M. von Krogh, G. and Roos, J. 1998: 38-39 
259 von Krogh, G. Roos, J. and Slocum, K. 1998: 57 and Varela, F.J., Thompson, E. and Rosch, E. 1993: 140 
260 Huemer, L. von Krogh, G. and Roos. J. 1998: 131: : “ ‘Reality’ and ‘truth’ hold privileged positions, reality 
being the point of reference for inner representations and truth being the degree to which inner representations 
correspond to the outer world . . .” 
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through which knowledge reflects the truth of an external reality, draws on the assumption that 
through reasoning, based on logic and probability judgements, humans develop increasingly 
accurate representations of an external world.261 The process of reasoning, through which 
knowledge is acquired, is based on the assumption that humans possess the innate ability to be 
rational.262 Concomitantly the rules according to which data is processed are, from the 
cognitivist view, universal.263 Following the rationalist tradition, an important consequence of 
representationalism, in relation to justification, results from the preceding, namely that 
justification must lead to a universal truth, where truth must be understood as correspondence 
to reality.264 The underlying assumption here is that increasing information and data continually 
improve the degree of correspondence between reality and cognitive representation. In this 
manner more data and more information allows for increasingly accurate representations of the 
world.265  
An important underlying assumption to this cognitivist approach is that the truthfulness of 
knowledge can be judged as if through an objective process. In essence this can be understood 
as a vantage point removed from both reality and knowledge (see figure 3.1), where one would 
then be able to determine the extent to which knowledge corresponds to reality, i.e. its 
truthfulness.266 This notion, that knowledge exists in reality and is uncovered in the process of 
arriving at truth, remains at the centre of most epistemological approaches followed in KM, 
even those critical of the idea that universal truth can be discovered through reason, or that 
judgements made in relation to the accuracy of truth can be objective. Referring back to the 
two normative approaches discussed as possible solutions to KM’s validity problem in chapter 
2, it is worth noting here that, while both are critical of the original notions of Cartesian 
rationalism, they maintain allegiance to the notion of reality as existing independently of 
cognition. Popper’s critical rationalism for example, while rejecting Cartesian foundationalism 
as the basis for justification, is still based on the idea that knowledge can exist “without a 
knowing subject”267. Habermas’ ideal speech situation, from which Schreyögg and Geiger draw 
                                                
261 Huemer, L. von Krogh, G. and Roos. J. 1998: 131 
262 Nagel, J. 2014: 38 
263 Venzin, M. von Krogh, G. and Roos, J. 1998: 38-39 
264 Rorty, R. 1989: 169: “For to be truly rational, procedures of justification must lead to the truth, to 
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for their approach, is similarly framed as an approach where truth statements relate to an 
objective reality.268  
Figure 3.1: Simplistic representation of the cognitivist perspective of knowledge269  
 
3.2.4 The autopoietic challenge to representationalism 
Given the extent to which most KM theories, since Nonaka, have focussed on positioning 
themselves in opposition to Cartesian rationalism, it is important to understand that most still 
maintain this so-called realist ontology.270 It is precisely this latter idea, that reality can be 
understood independently of knowledge, which is challenged by an autopoietic 
epistemology.271 As autopoiesis views all knowledge as constructed in a specific context, there 
is in essence no objective position which can be occupied by a knower to evaluate the extent 
                                                
268 Mingers, J. 2008: 69 
269 Note that the symbolic representation is not intended as literal 
270 Varela, F.J., Thompson, E. and Rosch, E. 1993: 133: “Thus even when the very ideas of representation and 
information processing change considerably, as they do in the study of connectionist networks, self-
organization and emergent properties, some form of the realist assumption remains.” 
271 Varela, F.J., Thompson, E. and Rosch, E. 1993: 150 
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of correspondence between knowledge and reality.272 Moreover, as explained by von Krogh,273 
“cognition is a creative act of bringing forth a world.” In this sense, any understanding of 
reality is a construction like all other cognitive understanding. It is important to elaborate on 
this point to avoid confusing the autopoietic notion of reality with a relativist or idealist 
position. Autopoiesis does not deny the existence of an independent world, in the sense of 
idealism which holds that what is represented as reality is merely a reflection of our 
cognition.274 Rather, autopoiesis attempts to bypass the notion of representationalism275 found 
in both cognitivism and idealism, by viewing knowledge as developing through action in the 
world.276 Epistemologically, autopoiesis therefore repositions its core question away from a 
concern with how humans represent the world, to how humans live in the world.277 
Von Krogh elaborates on the implications of this approach by exploring the autopoietic view 
of knowledge which holds that knowledge is inseparable from the knowing individual. This 
notion, of the embodiment of knowledge, implies that knowledge can never be objective, as it 
is always intimately tied to the knower, both from a cognitive and contextual perspective. 
Hence the context in which an individual is situated and her pre-existing knowledge determines 
both what is observed and what is deemed relevant to knowledge. In this process, individuals 
draw on norms and distinctions as processes for determining observation and meaning.278 
Knowledge originates with distinctions which in turn are based on action in the world; in this 
sense any distinction can only be related back to the human action which allows for drawing 
                                                
272 Sice, P. and French. I. 2004: 57 
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278 von Krogh. G., Roos, J. and Slocum, K. 1994:58: “Moreover, at the individual level, knowledge is not 
abstract but rather is embodied in the individual . . . the proposition of ‘embodied knowledge’ suggest that all 
knowledge is dependent on the manager, or everything known is known by somebody. More important, 
however, knowledge depends very much on the ‘point of observation’ of the manager. Where you stand or 
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the distinction.279 Knowledge is therefore personal, as each individual develops knowledge 
based on personal action in the world and her own cognitive knowledge structure.280  
As a process, knowledge development is self-referential, referring to what is known already, 
but also to what is considered as relevant in the world.281 This idea underscores the anti-
representationalism of an autopoietic epistemology. As a concept, self-referentiality implies 
that the environment of the organisation is determined by a cognitive distinction and not by an 
objective fact. Consequently, how reality is perceived in relation to the organisation is 
determined internally by the organisation. As knowledge development always refers to prior 
distinctions, existing distinctions will determine if environmental data is considered as noise, 
or considered as relevant and therefore incorporated in further distinctions. In this sense the 
relevance of data as representative of reality, viewed from the cognitivist paradigm, is 
challenged. Whereas the cognitivist view sees organisations as valuing all environmental data, 
and continuously attempting to increase its access to this data,282 the autopoietic view argues 
that organisations will only recognise the value of data based on their pre-existing 
interpretations of the environment. This argument relates to the notion of a self-description of 
the organisation, which plays a central role in the self-referential process that characterises 
organisational knowledge.283 Here, an organisational self-description defines the essence of 
how the organisation reflects on, and describes, itself and fundamentally draws a distinction 
between it and its environment.284 In the practice of strategic management, von Krogh relates 
this self-description to the organisational identity as contained, amongst others, in its mission, 
vision, strategy and organisational culture. Through self-reference, this description forms the 
core of legitimising knowledge in the organisation, as it “provides criteria for selecting what 
passes for ‘knowledge.”285  
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Organisational knowledge creation as an autopoietic process, however, requires more than a 
self-description as, contrary to autopoietic processes at the individual level, which are 
dependent only on a single being, organisational knowledge is shared, and distinctions must be 
maintained at the level of the organisation.286 This requirement is contained in the notion of 
knowledge connections, which specify that, for the organisation to be able to act self-
referentially in relation to prior distinctions, knowledge must connect at different points in time. 
While this is partially achieved through a self-description, it also involves both the formal and 
informal relationships that exist between members of the organisation.287 In an autopoietic 
epistemology these social relationships are expressed through language, understood not as a 
vehicle through which knowledge is transferred, but rather as a process through which “a 
consensual domain of behaviour”288 is created. To capture the dynamic nature of language, von 
Krogh identifies languaging as a process through which distinctions are organisationally agreed 
and maintained, but simultaneously subjected to being discarded. Where distinctions are 
agreed, they can be developed into further distinctions, thus advancing organisational 
knowledge. On the other hand, a lack of understanding of or disagreement about distinctions 
will result in them falling out of favour and being discarded.289 
3.3 Theory of truth 
An important consequence of anti-representationalism is that “by accepting that there is not an 
objective reality, different standpoints are possible.”290 This represents a rejection of the idea 
that truth exists in relation to knowledge in any absolute or objective way. Knowledge creation 
therefore is not about attaining truth, but concerns the process of justifying belief so that it 
becomes accepted as truth in a specific context. In this sense truth is therefore just a distinction, 
or a word, which has meaning in a specific context.291 This understanding of truth, and the 
foregrounding of justification, follows from von Krogh’s adoption of Nonaka’s interpretation 
of knowledge as justified true belief. In adopting this definition, von Krogh emphasizes the 
relational and relativized nature of knowledge, in this sense relating it back to the idea 
expressed in his autopoietic epistemology that knowledge is never context-free. Given this 
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argument, he proposes that knowledge is created with the aim of addressing a specific issue, 
and as such truthfulness is not the primary criterion against which the adequacy of knowledge 
is judged.292  
Truth in this view follows from justification; it is a status that is conferred on beliefs as a result 
of the justification process.293 The acceptance of multiple truths in autopoietic epistemology 
implies that there is no absolute truth that can be obtained, and that multiple truths may exist 
in the organisation at any specific point in time.294 The purpose of justification in this context 
is therefore to aid the process through which beliefs in the organisation become accepted as 
true. 
3.4 Theory of justification 
Von Krogh’s theory of managerial justification draws on four propositions, which are 
incorporated into an overall theory that links justification to language as the means for 
knowledge creation in the context of an autopoietic epistemology. In proposing this theory, 
von Krogh elaborates on these four propositions through the notions of dominant logic and 
discourse. His departure point for the first proposition follows from the principal argument that 
an anti-representationist understanding of knowledge affords primacy to justification, rather 
than truth, in determining knowledge. Here he argues that this view of knowledge emphasises 
“the need for permanent implicit and explicit justification.”295 In this sense, knowledge creation 
cannot be understood without understanding the justification process, as it is through this 
process that “new knowledge is rejected, returned or . . . appropriated”296 in an organisational 
context. 
The requirement to understand knowledge creation in an organisational context, however, 
places limits on the ability of shared experience and mutual understanding to explain 
justification. A theory of justification therefore needs to explain how, in the absence of all 
                                                
292 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 14: “Corporate knowledge as Justified True Beliefs [:] Consequently, 
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organisational members sharing the same experience and understanding, justification takes 
place and knowledge creation is possible.297 To elaborate on this von Krogh assigns a central 
role to the construct of dominant logic, formulating his second proposition: that knowledge 
creation cannot be separated from the role of dominant logic as the established base of 
knowledge in an organisation and the primary influence on justification in the organisation. 
This relates to his third proposition, namely that knowledge creation is regulated by both the 
dominant logic and the process of justification, as two core determinants of the manner in which 
organisational knowledge develops. The final proposition he puts forward is that the principles 
of justification that guide decision-making on the status of knowledge can be best understood 
as represented in everyday management discourse.298  
3.4.1 Justification as central to knowledge creation 
Drawing on Nonaka’s approach to knowledge creation, the managerial approach takes as its 
primary departure point to organisational justification the view that knowledge is subjective in 
origin.299 As such, any explication of knowledge involves a mode of knowledge sharing,300 but 
is simultaneously constrained by its subjective nature, which implies that what is shared is an 
approximation of knowledge delimited by that which can be expressed.301 Following Nonaka, 
von Krogh positions the starting point of organisational knowledge creation as tacit knowledge, 
which exists as personally justified true belief. When tacit knowledge is explicated, it becomes 
formalised as concepts which can be communicated in language.302 In Nonaka’s view of the 
KCC, this process of externalising tacit knowledge is however separate from justification, as 
the immediate process through which tacit knowledge is converted takes place in a narrow 
organisational context. In moving from tacitly held belief to organisationally accepted belief, 
the question that needs to be addressed is, how such narrowly accepted explicit knowledge 
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becomes accepted as organisationally true? The organisational justification process therefore 
is characterised as bridging the basis for personal justification to a broader audience that does 
not share the same personal experiences. In this sense, it is a process of convincing others of 
the value (truth) of externalised tacit knowledge which subjects new knowledge to decision-
making. It is these decisions that involve the acceptance, rejection or return of new 
knowledge.303  
Knowledge, as argued by von Krogh, is, however, never context-free. Here the basic and 
general context of knowledge creation is represented by an existing base of knowledge which 
incorporates the accepted view of the organisation as “frames and schemes”.304 The 
frameworks established by the existing knowledge base serve to balance the organisational 
need to understand the situational complexity of the corporation, with the simultaneous risk of 
overwhelming the organisational worldview with complexity. While the knowledge base 
incorporates complexity, to ensure a sufficiently deep understanding of its situation, it 
simultaneously acts as a “cognitive filter” that simplifies elements of complexity into a 
worldview that can guide actions and decisions.305  
To illustrate how the existing knowledge base, of accepted practice, serves as a framework and 
guideline for corporate action and decisions, von Krogh draws on evolutionary economic 
theory, the KCC theory and organisational learning theory.306 Evolutionary economic theory 
provides the notion of organisational routines as representative of the largely unreflective 
behaviour an organisation engages in based on its experience of “the best it knows and can 
do.”307 Such routines exist in three main forms: those concerned with operating procedures, 
financial decision-making and innovation.308 As innovation in itself represents a routine, the 
established base of corporate knowledge provides organisations with a set of customary 
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behaviours for the acquisition of new knowledge.309 Both the KCC and learning theory further 
relate the established knowledge base to the organisation’s accepted approach to new 
knowledge. In the KCC the concept of redundancy serves as an enabling condition of 
knowledge creation. The existing knowledge base in this instance represents a common 
framework of reference, which encompasses a broader notion of organisational understanding 
than that which is only of relevance to organisational members’ immediate areas of 
performance. This overlapping access to organisational information aids both understanding 
and communication.310 Finally, in drawing on organisational learning theory, von Krogh relates 
the existing knowledge base to the ability of the organisation to absorb and learn when new 
knowledge is encountered. In this learning system, organisations maximise their ability to 
benefit from new knowledge by relating it to a diverse base of existing knowledge. This implies 
that an organisation that has gained knowledge through experience in a specific field, is better 
suited to recognise the potential of new knowledge in this field.311  
Knowledge creation takes place in this context of the prevailing view, but simultaneously 
implies the development and revision of established notions.312 As implied by the concepts of 
redundancy and learning, knowledge is more readily accepted if there is some form of existing 
appreciation of its relevance. The paradox inherent in knowledge creation however results from 
precisely this condition, as any alternatives represent a contradictory or conflicting challenge 
to the established knowledge, which serves as a condition of its acceptance in the first instance. 
As such, the incorporation of new knowledge is not a seamless process of integration into an 
existing frame of reference, but rather is characterised by the tension inherent to taking 
decisions that may fundamentally alter an existing world view. In this interpretation of 
knowledge creation, von Krogh positions justification processes as mediating the contradiction 
between accepted knowledge (which is required to recognise new knowledge) and the 
requirement to transcend the existing knowledge base to create new knowledge. Justification 
therefore represents a dynamic of the organisational knowledge creation process which 
encompasses practices through which new knowledge is judged.313 The three possible 
outcomes of this (acceptance, rejection or return) represent a decision-making process that 
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evaluates new knowledge to determine its value to the existing base of knowledge. Where new 
knowledge is considered to be irrelevant it is rejected; where it is potentially relevant but not 
clearly so, it is returned for re-evaluation; and finally, where it is accepted it is incorporated 
into the existing knowledge base.314 
3.4.2 Dominant logic 
In managerial justification theory, the established base of knowledge is understood in terms of 
the concept of dominant managerial logic.315 As a construct dominant logic originates in the 
sphere of strategic management research into organisational performance and the firm’s ability 
to deal with diversity.316 Conceptually it represents a shared framework among top 
management in an organisation that develops from experience and is reinforced by past 
successes, which in turn gives rise to a set of preferences for organisational behaviour.317 These 
preferences find expression in a core set of assumptions regarding the business, the evaluative 
criteria for judging success and the influence of past achievements on managerial thinking. 
Through acting as a representation of accepted truth in a particular organisational context, the 
dominant logic characterising an organisation has been justified, and as such appropriated as 
organisational knowledge.318  
In the context of organisational justification von Krogh319 isolates the origin, function and 
characteristics of dominant logic as primary to understanding its influence on knowledge 
creation. The origin of dominant logic is located in the presence of a dominant coalition as a 
collection of individuals that exert considerable influence on the management of an 
organisation. Within the dominant coalition, the contextually based understanding resulting 
from past experience prevails and gives rise to a set of “ideas and interests” 320 that acts as the 
guiding framework for organisational action. Organisational behaviour, in this sense, becomes 
an enactment of the dominant logic which functions to improve the efficiency and speed with 
which decisions are taken. This enactment is however an almost subconscious process of doing, 
with little explicit realisation of the underlying structure that dominant logic provides to 
                                                
314 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 18 
315 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 19 
316 Bettis, R.A. and Prahalad, C.K. 1986: 499 
317 Bettis, R.A. and Prahalad, C.K. 1986: 491 - 492 
318 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 19 
319 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 19 - 20 
320 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 19 
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corporate processes and procedures. This leads the author to question the possibility that 
decision-making is characterised by either rationality or corporate politics.321 
3.4.2.1 Dynamic of dominant logic 
As knowledge development primarily represents the interaction between dominant logic and 
new knowledge, which simultaneously builds on accepted notions and challenges them, von 
Krogh proposes that dominant logic is a dynamic construct constituted by three core 
dimensions.322 First among these is the corpus of knowledge, which represents the “basic 
content of some dominant logic”.323 As a feature, the corpus of knowledge draws on the notion 
of paradigm324 and specifically its application in strategic management as a source of dominant 
logic in business.325 In this interpretation, the corpus of knowledge represents that which is 
believed to be true by an organisation, and the ability of members of the organisation to justify 
this knowledge. These sets of shared beliefs focus on, amongst others, the context of the 
organisation and the criteria for successful action in this context. In each instance, beliefs are 
substantiated through argument and narrative that support the overarching belief structure 
characteristic of the corpus of knowledge.326 The latter establishes the link between the corpus 
of knowledge and the second component, images of knowledge, which largely represents the 
organisation’s tacit assumptions about the nature of knowledge. As such it relates to the 
accepted criteria for legitimizing knowledge and the required evidence to be provided in this 
process. From the perspective of process, images of knowledge will prescribe the method of 
justification as argument, explanation or appeal. They will secondly determine the necessary 
criteria to invoke, such as tradition, rationality, authority, innovation or analogy. Finally, they 
                                                
321 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 20: “As a result, the concept of dominant logic would cast doubt upon the 
idea that resource allocation and investment decisions are the result of a rational evaluation process or the 
outcome of corporate power-plays of self-interested individuals.” 
322 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 20 - 21 
323 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 21 
324 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 21-22: “This corresponds by what we understand by paradigms (Kuhn, 
1962 [1970]), including the explicit contents of what is known by a corporation and can be partially explained 
by the people involved.” 
325 Bettis, R.A. and Prahalad, C.K.1986: 492: “The concept of dominant logic also derives direct support from 
Kuhn’s (1970) work on scientific paradigms  . . . Kuhn, a historian of science, argued that a particular science 
at any point in time can be characterized by a set of ‘shared beliefs’ or ‘conventional wisdom’ about the world 
that constitutes what he called the ‘dominant paradigm’.” 
326 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 22; also see Bettis, R.A. and Prahalad, C.K. 1986: 492 
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determine the evaluative dimension for the method and criteria, including, amongst others, 
financial return, industry trends and stakeholders.327 
The evaluative dimension relates images of knowledge to the final component of dominant 
logic, namely, the ideological values that characterise the organisation. These ideological 
values are contained in the organisational culture and the guiding vision, which position the 
organisation in a particular context. As a regulating factor on knowledge evaluation, the 
ideological values determine the basic reference points for claims to knowledge and the 
relevance of specific methods of justifying knowledge.328 
To von Krogh the importance of understanding dominant logic and its components in relation 
to the justification of knowledge, stems from the variety of methods and evidence that may be 
invoked in justifying new knowledge. While different approaches may all result in justified 
belief, dominant logic regulates the possibility of acceptance of new knowledge in a particular 
organisational context. In this sense, it prescribes the most likely route to ensuring acceptance 
of a knowledge claim. However, dominant logic is not presented as a conscious ongoing 
process of surface reflection, but rather incorporated into managerial action and discourse, as 
a self-evident and accepted mode of organisational behaviour.329 As such, the corpus and 
images of knowledge, as well as the ideological values of the organisation, are portrayed in the 
quotidian practice and discourse of organisational life. Here the core features of dominant logic 
act as resources for organisational members’ own interpretations, arguments and ideas. To 
understand the role of dominant logic in justification, it is therefore necessary to understand 
how the patterns contained therein are both reproduced and transformed through the process of 
knowledge creation.330   
3.4.2.2 Dominant logic and plurality 
In as much as dominant logic acts as a source of cohesion for organisational decision-making, 
it represents a variety of organisational actions that are structured by it. These actions find 
expression in the routine managerial discourse characterising the organisation and are subject 
to processes that homogenise managerial action and discourse into an underlying dominant 
                                                
327 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 22 
328 Von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 21 - 23 
329 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 23 
330 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 24 
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logic that characterises managerial practice.331 It is these homogenising processes that represent 
the dynamic of justification which determines the status of new knowledge. In evaluating the 
mechanisms that act on mundane management practice to reproduce dominant logic, von 
Krogh draws on Foucault’s poststructuralist interpretation of discourse practices.332 Here he 
associates the everyday patterns of managerial discussion with three procedures that act as 
constraining factors that elucidate the underlying dominant logic: 
a) Procedures of exclusion constitute the influences on managerial discussions that 
demarcate the boundaries between that which will be considered acceptable and 
unacceptable in a particular context. Concerning both the form and content of discourse 
and prescribing how justification should take place and what is considered valid 
evidence, they relate back to the images of knowledge as a constituting element of 
dominant logic. Procedures of exclusion are contextually determined and consequently 
may vary depending on the particularities of the setting in which discourse takes place, 
such as the organisational hierarchy or business context.333  
b) Procedures of self-control represent the internal processes that regulate organisational 
discourse through exercising control over arguments and interpretations. 
Fundamentally they represent patterns in discourse that aim at disciplining and 
regularising arguments in order to achieve consistency and standardisation of 
interpretation. They present themselves as debates that question the basis and coherence 
of arguments that have been put forward. In this sense procedures of self-control 
generate the corpus of knowledge and relate images of knowledge to criteria for 
truthfulness.334 
c) Conditions of involvement335 relate managerial discourse to the concrete environment 
in which it takes place, involving those procedures and rules that stipulate who in an 
organisation will have access to justification procedures. They involve on the one hand 
formal procedures, and include elements of organisational hierarchy and design that 
determines access to discourses and the locus of research and innovation; while on the 
                                                
331 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 24-25: “By legitimatizing their ideas and new approaches, managers 
relate concrete situations to possible interpretations in terms of the established organisational knowledge.” 
332 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 25 – 26, also see Hook, D. 2001 
333 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 26 
334 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 26 
335 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 26 refers to this as Conditions of ‘Mise en Jeu’ 
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other also reflect informal networks that influence “communication, discussion and 
decision making.”336 
In summary, the plurality of schemata that are represented in an organisation is restrained by 
the above procedures and conditions which act to confer on them the characteristics of the 
dominant managerial logic. Through this, everyday managerial action reinforces the existing 
dominant logic.337  
3.4.3 Justification of new knowledge: subverting dominant discourse 
As in the preceding arguments the implications of a Foucauldian view of discourse provides 
managerial justification theory with a basis for conceptualising dominant logic as a system that 
reproduces itself;338 however, the Foucauldian view simultaneously implies that the 
constraining rules on discourse limit the introduction of novelty and innovation.339 In order to 
position the justification of new knowledge within the limits imposed by this view, von Krogh 
applies Foucault’s principles of analysis as the means to subvert dominant discourse. Broadly 
speaking, he views the opportunity for subversion as located in “ambiguous and paradoxical 
argumentation patterns, metaphorical forms of argument and analogies.”340  
Theoretically, this idea of destabilising the existing order draws on Foucault’s concern with the 
power of critique that stems from peripheral knowledge. As peripheral knowledge has been 
rejected by the current practices of justification, it is fundamentally reflective of the dynamics 
of power in maintaining the status quo of established knowledge. This bestows on peripheral 
knowledge the characteristic of being unrestricted by the prevailing discourse, which in turn 
allows this knowledge to be enlisted against the power relations exerted and maintained 
through the dominant discourse.341 The project in which Foucault proposes to enlist peripheral 
knowledge, is intended as a methodology based on the epistemology of critique. Here the 
                                                
336 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 27 
337 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 25 & 27 
338 Compare Hook, D. 2001: 02-03: “. . . discourse itself is both constituted by, and ensures the reproduction of, 
the social system, through forms of selection, exclusion and domination” 
339 Compare Hook, D. 2001: 09-10: “Foucault’s suggestion here is that we over-play the importance of 
originality and freedom in everyday discourse when in fact much of what is spoken is really the product of 
repetition, discursive ‘re-circulation’. By playing up the ‘finitude of discourse’, Foucault is making us aware 
of the presence of the limits within which we speak. As such, the questions of innovation, novelty, our 
presumed ability to utter whatever we will, refers not merely to what is said, but instead to the reappearance of 
what has been said before (Foucault, 1981a).” 
340 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 27 
341 Hook, D. 2005: 05-06 
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overarching objective is to assemble peripheral knowledge in service of critique against the 
dominant discourse, with specific emphasis on the ability to bolster critique in a coordinated 
onslaught on the coercion embodied in dominant discourse.342 In support of the epistemology 
of critique, Foucault identified four principles that form the basis of his discourse analysis. 
While Foucault conceived of the principles as a methodology to enable critical analysis of 
knowledge and power, von Krogh adapts these as characteristics that bestow on dominant logic 
a porosity which enables it to be infiltrated by new knowledge. In this regard his proposal is 
based on two core assumptions. Firstly, the subversive strategies (Foucault’s principles) are a 
precondition for the justification of ideas that fall outside of the dominant logic. Secondly 
subversion is not equated with displacement of the dominant logic, but rather with a “shift 
towards new formations, gradually opening up for argument which have so far been 
excluded.”343 These four principles as originally conceived by Foucault,344 and their 
interpretation in the context of managerial justification, are elaborated on in more detail below. 
3.4.3.1 Principle of reversal345 
In enabling a critical understanding of discourse, the principle of reversal focuses on the orders 
of discourse and particularly their formation; the role they play in serving interest; their 
effectiveness in constraining discourse as well as how modification, displacement and evasion 
of these processes take place.346 The subversive nature of this principle relates to the 
connotation of reversal as enabling an exposition of how processes and procedures, considered 
to be enabling of discourse, act as negative inhibitors through limiting and rarefying 
discourse.347 The focus of analysing discourse repositions discourse from what is presented as 
text, and therefore included in discourse, to that which is purposefully excluded from 
discourse.348 Through this Foucault conceives of discourse as an event, and argues for the 
analysis of discourse as constitutive of a plurality of influences. The ultimate objective of 
                                                
342 Hook, D. 2005: 07 
343 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 27 
344 As will be argued later in this chapter Foucault’s intention with the principles of discourse essentially 
focusses on a reading of discourse as maintaining certain interests. von Krogh’s application of Foucault’s 
principles does not support this foregrounding of power relations, but rather focusses on its ability to 
destabilise accepted justification criteria 
345 Note that von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000 refers to these principles in the original French, whereas in this 
thesis the English translation as published in Young, R. 1981 is used  
346 Foucault, M. 1981: 70 
347 Hook, D. 2001: 17 
348 Ahl, H. 2007: 223 
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analysing discourse through this principle is to lay bare the influence of power and politics by 
delving ever deeper into its origins and through this to identify how exclusion acts on 
discourse.349 
In managerial justification theory, this principle is largely interpreted in terms of the potential 
to raise that which is excluded from a discourse as relevant arguments in justifying new 
knowledge. Here, reference to excluded images and beliefs is introduced to discourse through 
referring to counter arguments dealing with possible objections. In this sense discourse is 
implicitly characterised by its reference to the “excluded and reverse.”350 Consequently, that 
which is not considered as core to the corpus and images of knowledge still forms part of the 
discourse in as far as it exists as beliefs and images that are not viewed as sufficient reasons 
for justification. This allows managers to access that which is excluded as “potentially relevant 
to certain issues.”351  
3.4.3.2 Principle of discontinuity 
The Foucauldian perspective of discontinuity in discourse positions the development of 
discourse outside of the realm of unilinear progression and instead proposes that discourse 
consists of a series of parallel and discontinuous components. As a perspective on elucidating 
the underlying power structure and interests, the principle encompasses scepticism toward 
linear coherence and progression in the development of discourse. This specifically derives 
from the argument that attempting to understand the historical roots of discourse as a system 
of linear causality, results in the retro-fitting of current value systems onto historical 
contexts.352 For Foucault, the methodological approach to avoiding this lies in the recognition 
of the breadth of discourse, as represented in a series of parallel components, existing in both 
textual and non-textual discursive elements. This notion of discourse as a series draws attention 
to the possibilities of discontinuity and contradiction in the functioning of the parallel 
components, in relation to the discourse. In this sense, Foucault positions the development of 
discourse away from a logical flow from one point to the next, and raises awareness of the 
points of vulnerability in discourse. While each series in the discourse has the characteristics 
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350 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 28 
351 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 28 
352 Hook, D. 2001: 21 – 23 and Hook, D. 2005: 10 
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of homogeneity, the discourse that is constituted by this is diverse. It is in this diversity that the 
potential for contradiction and discontinuity exists.353 
Von Krogh uses this principle to argue that while the narratives that form part of the corpus of 
knowledge are presented as continuous and consistent, there is a realisation among employees 
that this unified view is a social construction, rather than a reflection of experience. This 
realisation follows from the discrepancies between personal experience and the organisational 
narratives presented. In context of dominant logic, these narratives exist in the success stories 
and examples invoked to justify knowledge. However, the realisation of, on the one hand, the 
constructed nature of these organisational narratives, and on the other, the extent to which these 
constructions function as interpretations of the organisational past as a seamless history, enable 
employees to identify “open spaces, inconsistencies and contradictions.”354  Unlike the other 
principles von Krogh does not explicitly state how this strategy enables the introduction of new 
justification criteria. However, in concluding on the implications of the theory of managerial 
justification, he indicates that awareness of the socially constructed nature of organisational 
reality “opens up the discussion to critical reflection and systematic comparison.”355 Applying 
this insight to the principle of discontinuity, one can therefore argue that awareness of the 
discontinuity in organisational narratives provides the space to introduce a discussion on 
alternative interpretations, which may result in the introduction of new justification criteria. 
Such an interpretation would be consistent with the understanding that Foucault’s approach to 
discourse analysis is ultimately aimed at uncovering alternatives to the dominant discourse, not 
as a means to elucidate the truth, but as a means to propose differing views from which the 
contribution can be evaluated.356 
3.4.3.3 Principle of specificity 
With the principle of specificity Foucault draws attention to the constructed nature of truth and 
meaning through discourse. As a principle of analysis, specificity relates discourse to the 
relativist view that notions of truth and meaning do not exist independently in the world to be 
discovered through discourse, but are of themselves products of discourse.357 At the same time, 
                                                
353 Hook, D. 2001: 21 – 23 and Hook, D. 2005: 10 
354 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 28 
355 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 32 
356 Compare Ahl, H. 2007: 224: “The discourse does not hide any unknown truth – a series of discourses, 
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the principle of specificity grounds discourse in both text and practice, and represents an 
argument for a shift from language as the primary signifier of discourse, to an understanding 
of the physical and material manifestations of discourse. Knowledge and truth, in this sense, 
needs to be understood as part of a discursive practice that includes action. Here discourse is 
understood to have material effects that are visible in practice and action, as a reflection of a 
socially constructed truth which represents the “right thing to do.”358  
Managerial justification theory applies this principle in arguing that dominant logic, as 
expressed in discourse, serves the function of disciplining, informing and reproducing itself in 
mundane organisational activity. Dominant logic in this sense is thus seen as embedding itself 
in organisational activity. For von Krogh, awareness of the former allows organisational 
members to challenge the impact of dominant logic on the basis of its consequences. An 
understanding of how dominant logic reproduces itself in practice, in turn reveals the potential 
for changing it.359  
3.4.3.4 Principle of exteriority 
In essence exteriority is an argument for a movement away from analysing the depth of 
discourse as text, toward understanding the breadth of discourse as circumstances. As with the 
principle of specificity, there is a requirement for the focus to shift from text, but this time to 
the enabling circumstances of a discourse. In this sense, it relates back to the principle of 
discontinuity which has established discourse as arising from variety.360 Exteriority focusses 
on the understanding of how these exterior elements to the discourse represent “overlapping 
forms of support”361 which simultaneously define the limits of discourse and the possibility of 
discourse. The principle therefore invokes the requirement of an understanding of the 
conditions exterior to a discourse, which enables the statements made as part of a discourse. 
These exterior factors again focus on discourse as more than text, in as far as it considers the 
“material historical and institutional circumstances”362 that enable discourse.  
For von Krogh exteriority in management discourse is represented through the identification 
                                                
358 Fadyl, J.K., Nichols, D.A. and McPherson, K.M. 2012: 488 
359 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 28: “Discourses . . . must be understood as disciplining everyday 
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of patterns in the discourse beyond the text. This function is performed through “reflexive 
thematization”363 which introduces a perspective that is removed from the pure interpretation 
of the immediate text. This follows from discourse not only representing the corpus of 
knowledge (text), but also the images and ideological values inherent to dominant logic. The 
introduction of a broader perspective, aimed at understanding the influences on discourse, 
exists in observations in the form of “jokes about certain arguments, comment on . . . activities, 
and evaluat[ing] the patterns which crystallize in meetings and discussions.”364 The 
thematization facilitates the identification of arrangements impacting on discourse, which is 
crucial if transformation is to be achieved.365 Following the general argument presented by 
managerial justification, that the acceptance of new knowledge requires the introduction of 
alternate justification criteria, such an introduction would then too be dependent on an 
understanding of how dominant logic acts to reinforce itself in discourse, and where in this 
process there is opportunity to introduce alternatives to destabilise the hold it has on established 
patterns of managerial decisions.366  
In summary, von Krogh presents discourse and the introduction of new justification criteria as 
a process that simultaneously needs to a) refer to what is acceptable justification criteria (as 
encompassed in the dominant logic), and b) attempt to expand this through the use of certain 
strategies. An attempt to legitimise knowledge as organisationally valid, therefore, first lies in 
realising the constructed nature of dominant logic. This realisation enables identification of 
areas of permeability where dominant logic can be infiltrated, so that new criteria can be 
integrated to facilitate the justification of new knowledge claims. Influencing dominant logic, 
in this sense, becomes a process of identifying the functions, patterns and actions resulting 
from discourse, and understanding the potential that the constructed nature of these offers for 
altering existing beliefs on the nature and legitimisation of knowledge.367 
3.4.4 Dominant logic as resource and language game 
An important outcome of managerial justification theory’s interpretation of dominant logic is 
the repositioning of the function of dominant logic in management strategy. Here von Krogh 
argues for an understanding of dominant logic not as a screening mechanism as intended by 
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Bettis and Prahalad, but as a resource.368 In relation to the former, Bettis and Prahalad proposed 
that dominant logic functions as a filter which focusses “organizational attention . . . only on 
data deemed relevant by the dominant logic.”369 Contrasting with this, von Krogh argues for 
the positioning of dominant logic as a “resource . . . and language game  . . . which allow actors 
to interpret and evaluate complex situations, to grasp the intentions of others, to achieve 
intersubjective understanding and co-ordinated actions,”370  
This reinterpretation of dominant logic draws on the anti-representationalism inherent to von 
Krogh’s autopoietic epistemology.371 As an argument it relates to an earlier analysis by von 
Krogh concerning Bettis and Prahalad’s own repositioning of dominant logic away from the 
original notion of a representationalist structure. Here von Krogh argues that in the 
development of the concept of dominant logic Bettis and Prahalad redefine the world in which 
the organisation functions as one that does not exist independently of managerial perception. 
Rather “the business world for a manager is neither pre-given, nor predefined.”372 This 
reconceptualisation provides the basis for arguing that dominant logic essentially incorporates 
a view of knowledge as a socially constructed phenomenon, as evidenced through the emphasis 
placed on contextuality and historical dependency. More importantly though, it enables von 
Krogh to argue that dominant logic is an essentially self-referential process.373 As a self-
referential process, dominant logic does not act as a filter imposed onto an external 
environment, but rather represents a resource that is referenced (existing knowledge) in order 
to make sense of what is observed.374 This allows dominant logic to be conceived as an enabler 
of an organisational member’s ability “to interpret and evaluate complex situations”.375  
The second element in the reconceptualisation of dominant logic is to position it in the context 
of language games. This shift relates dominant logic both to the concept of languaging,376 as 
                                                
368 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 29 and von Krogh, G. and Roos, J. 1996  
369 Bettis, R.A. and Prahalad, C.K.1995: 07 
370 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 29 
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defined as: “refer[ring] to the process by which language is not only maintained but is constantly being 
created within the firm, based on previous language.” Compare von Krogh, G. and Roos, J. 1994: 61 and 
Roos, J. von Krogh, G. and Yip, G. 1994: 400 
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introduced in autopoiesis, while also providing the basis for consolidating the argument that 
organisational knowledge, in the context of managerial justification theory, is underpinned by 
social action.377 In this view, language acts as the means through which “intersubjective 
understandings and co-ordinated actions are achieved”.378 As discussed earlier, von Krogh, in 
identifying an autopoietic epistemology, focussed on languaging as the means through which 
organisational knowledge is maintained and distinctions are developed. The introduction of the 
notion of language games expands on the function of language in organisations, by focussing 
on how language enables mutually agreed representations and actions. Here, the specific 
concern is to understand how von Krogh’s notion of dominant logic as a language game relates 
back to the co-ordinating function that autopoiesis assigns to language.379 
For von Krogh language games refer to the self-referential manner in which language develops, 
and in this sense it is a restatement of the idea that distinctions are maintained or discarded in 
language between organisational members. In this context, the meaning of a distinction (a 
word) is determined by the context in which it is used, and not the object to which in relates in 
the world. Meaning here is derived in the context of rules that govern the use of words.380 For 
example, all organisations have a set of rules that govern the use of the term innovation. The 
rules maintain a basic distinction between innovation and what is not innovation,381 i.e. 
innovation versus improvement or imitation. Therefore, in relation to a particular proposal, one 
would have to consider which criteria need to be met (rules) to term the proposal an innovation 
or an improvement. From this it follows that one of the fundamental characteristics of words 
in language games is therefore that meaning is locally determined rather than universally 
true.382 If one considers dominant logic as a language game, it represents rules that need to be 
observed in discourse to enable shared understandings.  
The second characteristic of language games, that relates it to dominant logic, is the extent to 
which both exhibit the same contradictory characteristic aimed at simultaneously sustaining 
                                                
377 Note that von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000 does not expand on the concept of language games in their 
theory of managerial justification. In the context of this research this discussion is however introduced to 
facilitate further understanding of how their notion of dominant logic relate back to the autopoietic view of 
knowledge 
378 Von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 29 
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and challenging the status quo. Magalhães383 elaborates on the dual function of language 
games, by referring to the need for languaging to both create the organisational identity, but 
simultaneously provide the means through which new distinctions maybe developed, that may 
result in challenges to the very distinctions from which it draws.384 This same contradiction is 
found in the process of justifying new knowledge in the context of dominant logic, where, as 
argued earlier, justification is essentially a “contradiction between relating new insights and 
ideas to some established dominant [logic] . . .”.385 This understanding of justification gives 
expression to the argument that dominant logic, as a language game, provides the interpretative 
context for deciding if data is integrated into organisational knowledge as new information.386  
3.5 Implications 
Managerial justification theory provides a conceptual framework for understanding 
justification in a particular form: the justification of external knowledge in a given organisation, 
in an attempt to ensure it is accepted as knowledge, within the boundaries of this specific 
organisation. Von Krogh proposes that this process takes place through discourse that is self-
referential with regards to an existing dominant logic, which is simultaneously maintained but 
subject to gradual change. In establishing such a strong focus on justification practices, von 
Krogh emphasises the need for understanding how mundane activities impact the success or 
failure of new knowledge claims. His overall objective in this regard becomes one of raising 
awareness of the inhibiting role that accepted practice and discursive patterns play in allowing 
development of new justification criteria that support organisational knowledge acceptance. 
This approach is particularly evident in the work von Krogh has published since his managerial 
justification theory, which focusses on how organisations can create environments that are 
conducive towards the justification of new knowledge.  
A consequence of the fundamental assumption that organisational knowledge exists only in a 
social context, and the related notion that individual knowledge is inseparable from the 
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knowing individual, is that knowledge as such cannot be directly managed.387,388 Instead, the 
requirement for knowledge management shifts to the management of justification and 
discourse. This implication is specifically pertinent in von Krogh’s work in relation to care and 
enablement. Drawing on the requirement that organisational justification takes place in a social 
context, von Krogh views the process of justification as a “highly fragile process.”389 The 
underlying reasons for the fragility of justification can be related back to von Krogh’s 
conceptualisation of dominant logic, specifically in relation to the extent that as the accepted 
basis of knowledge in the organisation it presents a barrier to the adoption of new knowledge.  
3.5.1  Awareness of implicit assumptions 
A central argument in von Krogh’s conceptualisation of dominant logic is the extent to which 
it is actualised in mundane managerial practice. As a construct in organisations, it is therefore 
conceptualised as an almost unconscious set of tacit assumptions that expresses itself in 
organisational behaviour. Any attempt at improving justification practices requires awareness 
of the nature of dominant logic and its influence on managerial practice.390 The perceived 
embeddedness of dominant logic tends to convey onto its understanding in organisations an 
“objective” character. In this sense dominant logic is perceived as a factual representation of 
an external reality, rather than a social construction. A core requirement of improving 
justification practice is therefore first of all the realisation that dominant logic is locally 
produced and therefore contestable. Through creating awareness of the contingent and 
constructed nature of dominant logic, opportunities are created to reflect critically and 
systematically on how justification of knowledge claims takes place at the organisational 
level.391 
Awareness of, and reflection on, the nature of dominant logic supports an understanding of the 
consequences and biases inherent in the justification processes inherent to organisations. Here, 
for example, it is possible to argue that the privileging of “scientific” over local knowledge as 
                                                
387 Sveiby, K.E. 2001. 347: “Since knowledge cannot be managed the knowledge strategist looks at enabling 
(von Krogh et al., 2000) activities rather than command-control activities.”  
388 Gourlay, S. 2001:34: “If knowledge is inseparable form people since it is created only by individuals and 
groups in self-sustaining processes, or in or by the mind, this implies that ‘knowledge’ itself cannot be 
managed – only the conditions under which it exists can be influenced.” 
389 von Krogh, G. 2009: 135 
390 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 31: “The explicit confrontation between different dominant logics as well 
as scientific paradigms is a precondition for reflecting the implicit assumptions and unreflected fundaments 
which shape most actual positions, approaches and statements.” 
391 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 32 
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described by Yanow392 can be understood as part of an unreflective expression of dominant 
logic evident in many organisations. In this regard, Yanow questions why so many 
organisations fail to recognise, and use, local knowledge, but instead prefer to procure, at great 
cost, so-called expert knowledge. She locates the reasons for this in the embeddedness of, 
amongst others, organisational values that reflect and underpin a distinction between universal, 
detached knowledge and local, personal knowledge. These distinctions reinforce themselves in 
organisational practice through the distinction between management and line workers, and in 
work structured around thinking and doing.393 Viewing these knowledge distinctions as 
essentially representative of images of knowledge in the dominant logic, it becomes clear that 
partiality towards “scientific” knowledge is a consequence of a set of beliefs enacted through 
managerial practice that knowledge legitimised by scientific approaches is superior to 
knowledge gained through experience. In the context of justification criteria, raising 
consciousness of the extent to which “scientific” knowledge represents a belief that is labelled 
as true for the organisation, opens the way for debate and critical reflection on how this, as part 
of dominant logic, impacts the justification process and in turn hampers or enables knowledge 
creation in the organisation.  
3.5.2 Care, enablement and understanding 
Related to fragility associated with justification, von Krogh identifies among the barriers that 
have to be overcome in an organisational context, the use of legitimate language, organisational 
narratives, habits and routines, as well as the organisational paradigm.394 In reading von 
Krogh’s description of how these act as barriers, the relationship to dominant logic is self-
evident. For example, the justification of new knowledge needs to take place in the context of 
“language that is known and acceptable . . . However some personal knowledge can only be 
expressed by using words that are unknown.”395 This largely expresses the need for introducing 
new distinctions through languaging, while observing the rules of the language game of 
dominant logic. Similarly, the dimensions of dominant logic as an obstacle to justification is 
evident as “Personal knowledge that conforms with the paradigm will be quickly embraced . . 
. nonconformist attempts to justify personal beliefs are often met with skepticism.”396 
                                                
392 Yanow, D. 2004 
393 Yanow, D. 2004: S20-21 
394 von Krogh, G. 2009: 135-136 and von Krogh, G., Ichijo, K. and Nonaka, I. 2000: 35-36 
395 von Krogh, G. 2009: 135 
396 von Krogh, G., Ichijo, K. and Nonaka, I. 2000:36 
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Viewed from the point of view of dominant logic as governing justification, the concepts of 
enablement and care can therefore be interpreted as an argument to incorporate into dominant 
logic values, images, stories and arguments that are supportive of justification and through this 
facilitate organisational knowledge creation. By consciously incorporating supportive 
elements, the dominant logic as a resource in a self-referential knowledge process enables a 
broader array of concepts to be understood as potentially relevant to the organisation.397  
3.5.3 The strategic imperative: justification in support of advancement 
The autopoietic epistemology in which von Krogh’s theory of managerial justification 
originates has at its base a concern with the value of knowledge to the long term progression 
of organisations. In this regard von Krogh proposes that organisations in the KE need to pay 
increasing attention to the development of knowledge as a fundamental prerequisite for 
organisational advancement. Due to the increasingly important role that knowledge plays in 
the ability of organisations to thrive in the KE, it is the processes through which organisations 
create knowledge which form the basis of their competitive advantage.398 Progress in this 
approach becomes a function of the ability of management to effectively harness organisational 
knowledge and nurture its development to enable organisational competitiveness. Knowledge 
development is therefore a managerial concern, and, as von Krogh perceives organisational 
justification as representing the most significant barrier to effective knowledge development, 
he proposes that this phase in knowledge creation receives specific managerial attention.399 
From a strategic point of view, the potential of dominant logic to act as in inhibitor of 
organisational advancement is evident when considering that the barriers it represents to the 
justification of knowledge can lead to significant losses for a firm. In this regard von Krogh 
refers to two negative consequences that result from rigidity in dominant logic as the guiding 
structure affecting justification.400 Firstly, it can act against the expression of knowledge claims 
as a result of reinforcing negative narratives of failure and strong adherence to organisational 
process. In this instance, as compliance is valued over novelty, ideas seldom mature, and firms 
risk their knowledge base becoming stagnant. Secondly, in reaction to a rigid justification 
environment employees behave in one of two ways: they either accept the situation, thereby 
                                                
397 von Krogh, G., Ichijo, K. and Nonaka, I. 2000: 98 - 101 
398 von Krogh. G., Roos, J. and Slocum, K., 1994 
399 von Krogh, G. 2009: 135-136 
400 von Krogh, G. 2009: 136 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 75 
becoming “passive participants,” or they leave the organisation. Given that managerial 
justification theory holds that knowledge resides in individuals (even if its organisational 
construction is social), both of the former outcomes translate into a loss of potential advantage 
for the organisation. In the first instance, the requirement that organisations create new 
knowledge cannot be realised under circumstances where organisational members withdraw 
from the process of knowledge creation. Secondly, when organisational members resign out of 
frustration with justification processes, it introduces the risk that they will find opportunities 
where their particular knowledge claims can be justified and in doing so, their innovations will 
become competitive.401     
3.6 Limitations 
Within managerial justification theory, the specific conceptualisation of justification and the 
underlying notion of discourse aimed at introducing shifts in justification criteria imposes 
certain limits on its ability to establish criteria deciding the validity of organisational 
knowledge. Firstly, managerial justification theory does not address the role of the external 
environment to resist organisational knowledge. As a consequence, there is no direct focus on 
the issue of how perturbations in the environment could be interpreted by the organisation in 
relation to justification processes and criteria. Secondly, and related to the autopoietic 
epistemology, managerial justification theory is perceived as subject to an unreasonable 
assumption on the level of operational closure, and in this sense does not take into consideration 
the impact of extra-organisational knowledge development on justification criteria. In the third 
instance, as a consequence of von Krogh’s emphasis on consensus and understanding, 
managerial justification theory neglects the issue of politics, power and interest in shaping 
justification criteria. Finally this limitation also exposes managerial justification theory to 
criticism in terms of its ability to truly reflect justification processes that align with the creation 
of novelty. 
3.6.1 Extra-organisational influences 
While autopoietic systems are fundamentally self-determining, they are not self-contained. In 
other words, while perturbations from the environment do not determine the behaviour of an 
autopoietic system, the system is open to these disturbances. An important consequence of this, 
for the survival of autopoietic systems, is that failure to observe perturbations threatens the 
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existence of the system.402  As the validity of knowledge is internally determined by the 
acceptance of knowledge in relation to prior knowledge, this raises the question of how 
perturbations in the environment impact the organisation in the instance of false knowledge. 
Interpreting the relationship between the validity of knowledge and an external world in the 
context an autopoietic system, Mingers indicates that “false knowledge leads to the destruction 
of the autopoietic process.”403 Validation in this sense implies “the maintenance of successful 
autopoiesis.”404 In similar vein, Knorr Cetina’s interpretation of the environment in relation to 
an autopoietic system provides a further starting point for the argument that managerial 
justification overlooks the role of the environment in modifying the internal reconstructions of 
knowledge in autopoietic systems. In this regard she writes of Luhmann’s notion of autopoiesis 
that “internal reconstructions can and should be changed in response to irritations and 
resistances provided by the external world when we try to impose our construction upon it. 
This model of the world as a ‘resistor’ . . . makes an impact on our accounts through stimulating 
modification in response to the resistance it offers.”405 
In positioning justification von Krogh himself alludes to the validity that knowledge needs to 
attain in relation to the environment when he raises the question, “how does knowledge become 
relevant for a broader range of people . . . or even an industry, customers and external 
partners?”406 Considering that the justification of knowledge, at managerial level, concerns the 
acceptance of a knowledge claim as locally true, and therefore, as indicated by von Krogh, 
results in the allocation of resources to support the development of this knowledge as a new 
product or service,407 this locally accepted validity of knowledge is tested in the external 
environment, as the final justification of the validity of locally created knowledge is determined 
in the broader society.408 Practically, this implies that organisations may accept a given 
knowledge claim as justified, which results in the production of a particular product. In 
sensemaking terms the failure of a product to be accepted in the market implies a shock which 
requires specific attention. This shock can be conceived of as a violation of the justified 
                                                
402 Blackman, D.A. and Hendersen, S. 2004: 188 and Seidl, D. 2004: 159 
403 Mingers, J. 1995: 90 
404 Mingers, J. 1995: 90 
405 Knorr Cetina, K. 1993: 84 
406 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 16 
407 Compare von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 15 
408 See Nonaka, I and Takeuchi, H. 1995: 86 & 94  
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organisational beliefs. Moreover, from this perspective, shocks would result in dissatisfaction 
and in purposeful action to resolve this. It triggers sensemaking and cognitive change.409 As an 
autopoietic system the organisation would experience this external failure as a perturbation 
which either leads to destruction or compensation.410 The question that remains largely 
unanswered in managerial justification theory is how organisations, assuming that false 
knowledge does not destroy them, compensate for such perturbations in the organisation of 
their systems of justification.  
3.6.2 Organisational boundaries and the problem of justification 
One of the more problematic aspects of an autopoietic epistemology is the requirement that a 
clear boundary is established around the organisation.411 As a fundamental assumption, the 
boundary determines the distinction between the organisation and its environment, and allows 
it to act as an autopoietic system that is operationally closed.412 Viewed critically, several 
authors question the possibility that an organisation as a social phenomenon can display such 
final closure between itself and its environment, specifically as organisational members have 
to be considered holistically as belonging to multiple systems. Biggerio413 for example argues 
that multiple membership implies a cross-boundary characteristic, and as a result the level of 
closure required between an organisation and its environment is not possible if individuals are 
the elements of an autopoietic system. Giroux and Taylor414 expand on this argument 
specifically in the context of justification. Here, the autopoietic view of justification as a 
process inside a firm, takes place as the reproduction of internal structure,415 contrasting with 
the notion of multiple membership implying multiple justification processes and criteria. As a 
result the ability for justification, as an instance of tacit knowledge, spans organisational 
boundaries and creates conflicting criteria within the same organisation.416      
Giroux and Taylor investigate the extent to which justification criteria develop extra-
organisationally to provide a critique against the notion of impermeable organisational 
                                                
409 Weick, K. E. 1995: 84 - 100 
410 Mingers, J. 1995: 15 & 33 
411 Mingers, J. 2004:417 to 418 
412 Compare von Krogh. G., Roos, J. and Slocum, K. 1994: 60 
413 Biggerio, L. 2001: 09 
414 Giroux, H. and Taylor, J.R. 2002 
415 Compare Mingers who explains how autopoietic systems reproduce their own components (Mingers, J. 2004: 
404) 
416 Giroux, H. and Taylor, J.R. 2002: 501 
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boundaries. In applying their observations, it appears that there are grounds to question the idea 
that justification criteria only develop self-referentially: that is either as a result of what is 
contained in the dominant logic, or what is related through the principles of discourse to 
dominant logic. Instead of perceiving the organisation as existing within a boundary, they 
propose that organisations exist as multiple micro-communities that reference not only 
themselves, but also the relationships they have across organisational boundaries. In this sense 
justification criteria develop in a trans-organisational fashion, incorporating elements from 
both the industry and the generic elements of micro-communities spanning organisational 
boundaries. The evolution of discourse and interest therefore transcends organisational 
boundaries, and justification criteria can originate in discourses that are intra-organisational or 
extra-organisational. At this level, i.e. outside of the direct scope of dominant logic, discourse 
is positioned in the realm of interests, and in the proposal presented by Giroux and Taylor, 
developing justification criteria follows a process of translation aimed at illustrating how new 
knowledge serves a particular shared interest.417  
3.6.3 Power and politics418 in justification 
A surprising conclusion drawn by von Krogh, given his reliance on Foucauldian419 analysis, is 
that the role of dominant logic in organisations reduces the likelihood that organisational 
decisions are influenced by “corporate power plays or self-interested individuals”.420 As 
indicated earlier, he draws this conclusion from the observation that dominant logic presents 
itself tacitly and as such is seldom consciously reflected on. This conclusion however results 
in managerial justification omitting to address the possibility that dominant logic is influenced 
by the political interests of a dominant coalition. While the potential for politics and interests 
are acknowledged in the notion that managerial activities may constitute manipulation, von 
Krogh does not elaborate on the extent to which political interests affect efforts to achieve 
justification of knowledge. Following Marshall and Rollinson,421 the argument can be made 
that such a view on organisational knowledge construction fails to take into consideration that 
                                                
417 Giroux, H. and Taylor, J.R. 2002 
418 The notions of power and politics is raised here in an organisational context and largely relates to Morgan’s 
description of the interplay between different organisational members interests, the inherently political nature 
of this and the resolution of conflicting interests through power (Morgan, G. 2006: 158-166).  
419 Juniper  takes specific issue with von Krogh’s interpretation of Foucault and conclude that he presents a 
largely denatured view of Foucault’s intention with the principles of discourse stemming from a neglect of the 
political aspects of Foucault’s work (see Juniper, J. 2002) 
420 von Krogh, G. and Grand, S. 2000: 20 
421 Marshall, N. and Rollinson, J. 2004: S74 
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the social construction of knowledge is not merely a function of achieving mutual 
understanding, but often characterised by wilful disagreement in the face of understanding. 
In terms of the influence of justification as politically motivated, Giroux and Taylor422 offer an 
interesting alternative interpretation of how dominant logic could be inflected, which 
simultaneously illustrates how political interests become shared in the process of justification. 
Employing the notion of intéressement, Giroux and Taylor argue that knowledge in 
organisations is justified when a sufficient coalition of organisational members share the view 
that a specific claim to knowledge serves their interests. Knowledge in this view translates into 
organisational action once the point has been achieved where an idea has garnered sufficient 
support from different organisational communities who believe that a specific idea is aligned 
with their own interest.423 Akrich, Callon and Latour424  describe how, in this process of 
creating coalitions of shared interest, alienation of those excluded from an interest group is a 
by-product. Creating interest groups to facilitate adequate support for knowledge to be justified 
necessarily requires the organisation of supportive views and a process of aligning goals across 
multiple groups. Intentionally or unintentionally, the creation of such groups, supporting the 
justification of a knowledge claim, creates an opposing group of those whose interests are not 
included. Power and politics enter this fray when those outside of an interest group experience 
the adoption of knowledge as a direct attack on them.425  
Aside from presenting an argument for illustrating how justification can be viewed as political, 
the preceding discussion of intéressement also brings to mind the concept of a dominant 
coalition and the extent to which its original intention was precisely to draw attention to the 
political nature of management and organisations.426 This view, as reflected in Giroux and 
Taylor’s argument that the construction of an organisational identity is in itself a social 
construction of knowledge,427 provides an important insight into the mechanisms at play in 
establishing dominant logic in the first instance. From the point of view of intéressement, 
dominant logic is an expression of the shared interests of a group, in this case, management; 
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while from the perspective of a dominant coalition these shared interests are arrived at through 
a process of political bargaining.428   
A further issue with regards to the role of organisational politics, is raised by Tsoukas and 
Mylonopoulos,429 when they underscore the role of power relations in shaping the criteria 
against which the validity of competing knowledge claims are evaluated. Here Marshall and 
Rollins’430 interpretation of knowledge and power appear relevant to managerial justification 
theory, particularly considering the principles of discourse in relation to dominant logic. While 
von Krogh does not elaborate on the underlying dynamics of power that drive the perceived 
gradual shift in dominant logic, an understanding of how various coalitions compete for power 
and the acceptance of justification criteria arguably enriches the notion of knowledge as 
constructed through managerial discourse.  
In researching the relationship between knowledge and power, Marshall and Rollins431 argue 
that the political nature of deciding organisational knowledge claims is particularly evident at 
points where sensemaking432 breaks down. Here they conceptualise disruptions as constituting 
not only an opportunity for sensemaking, but also an opportunity for power relations to become 
more explicit in influencing meaning. This notion draws on the idea that attempts to influence 
meaning are most noticeable when prevailing interpretations are questioned. The process of 
arriving at consensus under such circumstances is conceived of as an inherently political 
process of negotiating.433 Power under these circumstances is envisaged in Foucauldian terms 
as “exercised through a wide range of micro-strategies, dispositions and manoeuvres.”434 In 
exercising power through language and negotiation, attempts are made to influence the criteria 
for the evaluation of knowledge claims in order to bring closure. These attempts focus on the 
justifiability of knowledge claims to attempt to influence the outcome of closure in a specific 
                                                
428 Thomas, A.B. 2003: 58 
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direction, i.e. the acceptance of a knowledge claim which serves the interests of a particular 
coalition. Through negotiation, the process becomes focussed on attempts to privilege one 
particular set of justification criteria over another. Underlying these attempts are micro-
strategies through which power is exercised in an attempt to establish a version of knowledge 
as more acceptable. Power and knowledge in this sense are mutually constituted, as power both 
influences the acceptance of knowledge and itself is a construction that is maintained by 
knowledge.435 Against this background an understanding of shifts in the justification criteria 
inherent to dominant logic becomes more than a matter of creating intersubjective 
understanding of relating new criteria to established logic. Instead, it acknowledges that in this 
process the local construction of knowledge is characterised by interests driven by more than 
consensual agreement.  
3.6.4 Dominant logic and the development of novelty 
In conceiving of dominant logic as self-referential, and organisational justification as 
ultimately shaped by this self-referential process, managerial justification theory is arguably 
subject to Stacey’s criticism of autopoiesis as a formative teleology. In Stacey’s reading of 
autopoiesis as an approach to organisational knowledge, autopoiesis is viewed as formative in 
so far as it relies on the notion that conversations unfold in the context of a predetermined 
organisational identity and rules.436 This is for example evident in von Krogh’s argument that 
dominant logic is reinforced through the everyday practices and activities of managers. While 
justification is considered a local process, it essentially follows a tacit understanding of how 
justification may take place, and how it could potentially be changed. However, in both 
instances what unfolds in discourse is rule bound, as an actualization and reproduction of 
dominant logic.437 Arguing from the point of complexity theory, Stacey is critical of the 
possibility that any attempt at interpreting organisational communication in relation to enfolded 
tacit systems of meaning can result in a theory of organisational knowledge that provides an 
adequate explanation of the emergence of new knowledge. In this regard he argues that the 
outcome of the emphasis on regularity that results from such accounts is an overemphasis of 
shared understanding. Following this line of argument, autopoietic epistemology 
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Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 82 
underestimates the importance of conflict and disagreement in accounting for the emergence 
of novelty in conversations that unfold in unknowable ways.438  
This criticism is fundamental when considering that managerial justification theory is at its 
very core an attempt to explain how organisations justify new knowledge. At the same time it 
provides a possible explanation for the extent to which von Krogh veers away from 
emphasizing the political nature of justification both in the context of the construction of 
dominant logic and in its subversion through the principles of discourse. Extending Stacey’s 
argument on the emergence of novelty in conversations to justification as a process in 
managerial discourse, it appears that dominant logic as a resource, in the establishment of new 
justification criteria, would be insufficient to explain the possible outcomes of discourse. Here, 
Stacey for example argues that, while rules are used as resources in conversations, they are not 
a permanent feature of conversation. Instead, Stacey proposes that what happens in 
conversation is a collective effort at sensemaking in “an unreflective, unforced, unplanned and 
unintended way.”439 This notion contrasts with that of von Krogh, in as far as discourse at 
managerial level is seen as the intentional use of strategies to influence dominant logic. As 
conversations take place they are punctuated by misunderstandings, and these in turn trigger 
other themes in a conversation, lending to communication the capability to transform in 
unintended ways. It is out of this instability that novelty takes shape, representing an outcome 
that is unintentional.440  
Justification criteria, as developed through a set of clearly defined strategies aimed at a 
continual process of relating back to dominant logic, would therefore, from a complex 
responsive process point of view, provide an understanding of justification that is too narrowly 
conceptualised to explain any major changes in the process of organisational justification. If 
the creation of new knowledge involves novelty, and novelty is understood as the characteristic 
of being unusual and different,441 one could similarly argue that its justification would 
introduce the need for criteria and arguments that are in measure unusual and different. This 
limitation could be related to the manner in which von Krogh conceptualises knowledge that 
is subject to managerial justification. As discussed in section 3.4.1, managerial justification 
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theory locates the origin of knowledge in tacit beliefs, and is specifically concerned with how 
tacit beliefs are justified to an audience that is removed from its production. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Rooted in constructivism and autopoiesis, managerial justification theory is formulated against 
the view that knowledge is situated and context-specific. As such, it is open to a multitude of 
influences that are locally determined. Moreover, taking an autopoietic view of knowledge 
implies that the traditional approach to knowledge, as a representation of reality, is no longer 
accepted as grounds for justification. Organisational knowledge in this context is considered 
valid under circumstances where it can be justified in relation to prevailing views on what 
constitutes knowledge under a particular set of circumstances. Equally, it is the local conditions 
that determine which criteria of justification will be appropriate and result in the successful 
adoption of a knowledge claim. In this process von Krogh pays specific attention to the role 
that management plays as the final arbiter in the acceptance of knowledge as valid. He 
conceives of this process as a discourse which is simultaneously maintained as a belief system 
of established knowledge, and a set of strategies that attempt to influence this discourse toward 
the acceptance of new knowledge. Considering the possibility that existing justification criteria 
act as a barrier to new knowledge creation, he places emphasis on the role of management in 
creating an environment that is conducive to the justification of new knowledge.  
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Chapter 4  





Tell’s justification framework is a purposeful attempt at addressing the criticism that the 
definition of knowledge employed in practice-based approaches results in a conceptually vague 
notion where all organisational action is equated to knowledge. Departing from the point of 
view that knowledge is both pluralistic and grounded in practice, Tell proposes that a solution 
to this critique may be found in studying the grounds on which organisational members claim 
to know. With this proposal Tell attempts to move the discussion of organisational knowledge 
away from “what” knowledge is, to “how” knowledge is used as a concept in organisational 
discourse. In expanding on this argument, Tell proposes that, while universalistic 
epistemological theories are insufficient to depict the nature of organisational knowledge, and 
while practice determines how knowledge is legitimated, it is possible to find general patterns 
employed in justification practices that transcend organisational boundaries. As a secondary 
concern to Tell’s proposal, he argues that the conceptual understanding of organisational 
justification needs to move beyond the tacit-explicit dichotomy to encompass a broader 
understanding of the nature of organisational knowledge creation.  
In the discussion presented in this chapter, there is firstly a focus on the main tenets of Tell’s 
approach to understanding organisational knowledge.442 This is followed by a detailed 
discussion of his proposed typology of organisational justification contexts. Finally, the chapter 
                                                
442 Unlike von Krogh, Tell’s proposal is not embedded in a body of work aimed at establishing an alternative 
theory of organisational knowledge. Rather his theory of knowledge is intimately tied to his theory of 
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for claiming to know. From a practical point of view this affects the structure of the discussion in this chapter, 
as Tell deals only very briefly with his theory of knowledge, but expands in detail on his framework for 
justification. 
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reviews the most pertinent implications and limitations of his proposal in light of its 
contribution to a practice-based view of justification. 
4.2 Conceptual context of Tell’s justification framework 
Although Tell does not ground his theory of justification on an elaborate theory of knowledge, 
three influences are discernible in his approach to knowledge. Firstly, following authors such 
as Spender, Blackler and Cook and Brown, he positions knowledge in the context of pluralism 
and action, arguing that organisations “know in various forms”.443 Secondly, he proposes that 
a possible solution to the criticism that pluralistic and practice-based views of knowledge result 
in an “anything-goes” view of knowledge, can be addressed by focussing on the basis for the 
justification of knowledge, rather than on the essence of knowledge.444 In proposing this idea 
Tell draws on Wittgenstein’s linguistic analysis of knowledge, and specifically on how the use 
of the word knowledge draws on grounds for claiming to know. Finally, and related to the 
former, Tell introduces the argument that while universal criteria are inadequate as an 
explanation for organisational knowledge, there are generally discernible patterns in 
justification that elucidate the patterns of justification in organisations beyond local practice.445 
The latter forms the basis for Tell’s justification framework, and introduces one of the 
fundamental differences between Tell and von Krogh’s approaches to justification which is 
worth elaborating on. In Chapter 3 it was argued that von Krogh’s conceptualisation of 
knowledge looks toward theories outside of the traditional realm of epistemology to enable an 
understanding of knowledge in general and justification specifically. In contrast to von Krogh, 
Tell looks toward philosophy and epistemology to attempt to enrich an understanding of 
justification and from this derive a fourfold set of ideal types of justification contexts, which 
he then relates to different ways of knowing in organisations. 
4.2.1 Knowledge as distributed practice 
The departure point for Tell’s proposal, that a focus on justification in organisational KM is of 
value, is his acknowledgement that knowledge is situated in practice. In this regard he argues 
that there is an interrelationship between what is known in an organisation and what 
organisations do. Knowledge in this sense becomes “the practising of skills in a social 
                                                
443 Tell, F. 2004: 444 
444 Tell, F. 2004: 444: “Rather than focusing on the question of what the essence of organizational knowledge is 
(its form or essence), a focus on the justification allows for an analysis of the grounds organizations and their 
members make use of when they claim to know” 
445 Tell, F. 2004: 444 and 464 
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context.”446 These social contexts are situated not only in the realm of the organisation, but also 
in the participation of organisational members in networks that extend beyond organisational 
boundaries. Furthermore, as action is informed by different ways of knowing, organisational 
knowledge cannot be reduced to one form. Knowledge therefore needs to be understood 
through organisational practice and as a pluralist construct.447 However, Tell acknowledges 
that the emphasis on the nature of knowledge as activity has resulted in criticism that 
knowledge in practice-based perspectives amounts to nothing more than equating all 
organisational behaviour to expressions of knowledge. Here, Tell proposes that a possible 
solution to this criticism is to focus on the rules that are at work when organisations or 
individuals claim to know. While acknowledging the proposals of Nonaka and von Krogh to 
this debate, Tell argues that these contributions lack in two central aspects. On the one hand he 
is critical of the dichotomous nature of explicit and tacit knowledge central to Nonaka’s 
theorising and argues that “a more subtle understanding”448 of organisational knowledge can 
be obtained by moving beyond this view. Secondly, with regards to managerial justification 
theory, Tell argues that if knowledge and learning is situated in action and practice, justification 
practices should be understood as they occur in the distributed activities of organisational 
members, and not only as managerial practices.449  
4.2.2 Knowledge as a language game 
Tell proposes that, following Wittgenstein, the analysis of knowledge in the context of 
organisational practice should focus on how knowledge, as a concept, is used in language. In 
this framework the meaning of knowledge is derived from the possibility of providing grounds 
for claiming to know in ordinary language.450 For Tell this understanding has two implications 
for a theory of knowledge, both contrasting with the traditional analysis of knowledge as 
justified true belief. On the one hand, focussing on how knowledge is used in language does 
                                                
446 Tell, F. 2004: 444 
447 Tell, F. 2004: 444: “Another interpretation can, however, be offered: organizations and their members may 
know in various forms (Blackler, 1995; Spender, 1998). In the practices of organizations, pluralism prevails, 
which is not captured by traditional universal (scientific) theories of knowledge. However, this may imply that 
anything goes; that one then can be completely eclectic and say that any kind of organizational behaviour is 
just and expression of another form of knowledge” 
448 Tell, F. 2004: 445 
449 Tell, F. 2004: 445: “ . . . the literature on organizational knowledge and learning directs attention to 
organizational activities and practices and fundamental. This implies that it is not just top management 
practices that are important and should be investigated when studying the justification of knowledge” 
450 Tell, F. 2004: 446: “For Wittgenstein the very meaning of knowledge lies in how it is used in denoting our 
possibility of giving grounds for knowledge claims in ordinary language . . .” 
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not involve imposing absolute conditions of truth. It is in this sense that Tell’s proposal is not 
an attempt to focus on the essence of knowledge.451 On the other hand, Tell sees Wittgenstein’s 
approach as a move away from knowledge as belief. This follows from the rejection of the idea 
that as a word “knowledge” reflects a “description of a mental state”.452 Instead, following 
Wittgenstein,453 knowledge as a word represents a signal and in a social context the use of this 
word is judged as appropriate or not. This leads Tell to argue that knowledge is “justification 
in a social context”454 and therefore resides in practice. The resulting understanding of the 
justification of knowledge is therefore not focussed on how knowledge describes cognition or 
corresponds to an external reality, but rather how knowledge is used in organisations to express 
different grounds for claims to knowledge. 
Although Tell does not position his theory as such, his view on knowledge as described above 
exhibits similarities with social constructionist and post-modernist theories of legitimation that 
draw on the recognition of validity in practice.455 With regards to the former, Alvesson for 
example argues that the socially constructed nature of knowledge determines that knowledge 
is dependent on social recognition. Validation in this context can only occur in relation to 
others, and in practice, by being recognised as valid in a particular set of circumstances and for 
a particular audience.456 From a post-modernist perspective the notion of language games is 
central to the rejection of the idea of meta-narratives, i.e. unitary, all-encompassing theories 
that attempt to find a conclusive account of how knowledge is legitimated. Instead following 
Lyotard,457 there is no single unifying account that provides final legitimacy to knowledge 
outside of the practical function it serves for those who employ it. Rather, reality is 
characterised by micro-narratives or language games, each determining their own legitimacy 
in communicative practice.  
                                                
451  See section 4.2.4 for a more detailed elaboration on this point 
452 Tell, F. 2004: 447 
453 Wittgenstein, L. 1953: 73 quoted in Tell, F. 2004: 447 
454 Tell, F. 2004: 447 
455 Note that Tell himself does not reference either of these approaches 
456 Alvesson, M. 2001:872: “As a socially constructed phenomenon, knowledge does not exist on its own, but is 
dependent on social recognition; without being perceived and recognized by others, for all practical matters, 
knowledge does not appear as such . . . A company that claims to be in the knowledge business – and to offer 
services or products with a sophisticated knowledge content – calls for the specific or institutionalized 
confirmation and support of significant others” 
457 Lyotard, J. 2004. 
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In the context of Tell’s pluralism, an important aspect of the language game perspective is to 
understand its relationship to positivism and rationalism in the creation and legitimisation of 
knowledge. Here, positivism and rationalism (objectivism) are recast as language games 
themselves, i.e. systems of meaning that have been socially constructed and which determine 
the justification criteria that serve as the grounds for knowing when playing this particular 
game of objective knowledge.458 While this brief discussion superficially indicates similarities 
in the use of the language game concept to conceptualise knowledge and justification, it is 
important to note that Tell’s proposal is not based on a similarly strong notion of practice 
characteristic of constructivism.459 Of specific concern here is the level at which Tell 
generalises in the instance of justification criteria. Although Tell’s conceptualisation of 
knowledge draws on a generally similar image of knowledge as used in language games, it is 
by his own admission intended to be weaker in its emphasis on the localised nature of 
justification context.460 In this sense Tell’s proposal for knowledge in relation to justification 
criteria can be seen as an attempt to establish the basis for multiple meta-contexts describing 
the general rules to which knowledge in a particular language game will tend to conform. 
4.2.3 Pluralist epistemology461 
As an epistemological approach, pluralism has its roots in the critique of the adequacy of a 
single method/theory in the philosophy of science in explaining certain natural phenomena, 
proposing instead that any understanding of the world is both characterised by and requires 
multiple approaches.462 Pluralism therefore contrasts with monism, where the latter is based on 
five central tenets:463  
a) That the objective of science is to derive a fundamental set of principles that provides 
a unified and single account of the world 
b) That reality is of such a nature that a) can be achieved 
                                                
458 Lyotard, J. 2004: 360 – 361 and Mauws M.K. and Phillips, N. 1995: 325 - 326 
459 This argument draws on the discussion in Knorr Cetina, K. 1993: 81-85 of variants of constructionism/vism 
460 Tell, F. 2004: 464: “ . . . this article suggests that a weaker understanding of organizational knowledge is 
required, since the rules for knowledge justification are generic rather than confined to the boundaries of the 
organization.” 
461 It should be noted here that Tell himself does not provide a detailed discussion of a pluralist epistemology 
and the discussion here draws on Blackler and Spender who he references in relation to his position as a 
pluralist 
462 Kellert, S.H. Longino, H.E. Waters, C.K. 2006: vii and Davies, E.B. 2006 
463 Kellert, S.H. Longino, H.E. Waters, C.K. 2006: x. Note here that the authors provide an explanation of 
monism specifically in the context of scientific knowledge, the description here draws on a more general 
notion of monism in relation to knowledge 
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c) That a single methodology exists through which a) can be achieved 
d) That methodologies must be judged by their ability to achieve a) 
e) That the evaluation of knowledge claims are to be judged on their ability to provide a) 
Pluralism’s argument against monism starts with a rejection of proposition b), i.e. the idea that 
the world can be adequately described through a single theory. Instead, the pluralist argument 
is that this proposition cannot be known as a metaphysical truth and instead it is a hypothesis 
that should be subject to empirical enquiry.464 This argument undermines all other remaining 
propositions, as a rejection of b) implies that if reality cannot be adequately described through 
a unified and universal theory, it is not reasonable to assume the ultimate goal of science is to 
achieve such a description. As propositions c) to e) rely on the truth of proposition a) it follows 
that it is unreasonable to believe that a single methodology that will result in a universal and 
unified theory of the world can exist; similarly, the adequacy of methodologies can therefore 
not be judged on their ability to achieve a); and finally knowledge claims cannot be evaluated 
on their ability to provide a).465   
In relating pluralism to an epistemology of organisational knowledge, Spender466 particularly 
juxtaposes it with positivism as the dominant monist epistemology evident in theorising about 
organisational knowledge. In this context, he focusses particularly on the problematic notion 
of knowledge as existing in essentially one form, as objective knowledge of an external reality. 
This view reduces the complexity of organisational knowledge through its assumptions that a) 
knowers are objective observers detached from context, their different ways of knowing and 
their emotions, and b) reality is an unproblematic world existing in its totality independently 
of knowers.467  
For Spender, the monist notion of knowledge is based on the failure of positivism to realise 
that its scientific method implies two types of knowing existing in respectively in “‘pre-
scientific’. . . knowledge, typically based on the experience of observation, and a ‘scientific’ or 
abstract, law-like mode of knowing”.468 This rejection, of a monist conceptualisation of 
knowledge, is paralleled in Blacker’s argument for the maintenance of complexity in 
                                                
464 Kellert, S.H. Longino, H.E. Waters, C.K.  2006: x 
465 Kellert, S.H. Longino, H.E. Waters, C.K.  2006: x-xi 
466 Spender, J.C. 1998 
467 Spender, J.C. 1998: 237 
468 Spender, J.C. 1998: 236 
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knowledge.469 Here he puts forward the proposal that organisational knowledge requires 
rethinking both the locus and nature of knowledge. In this regard, he proposes that from an 
organisational point of view, there is value in locating knowledge in processes, and therefore 
focussing on knowing as an activity rather than knowledge as an end-product. Secondly, rather 
than focussing on segregating different ways of knowing, the conceptualisation of knowing 
needs to draw on the multi-dimensional nature of the concept. For Tell these arguments form 
the basis of an approach that affords primacy to the proposition that knowledge, as 
organisational practice, is characterised by pluralism.470  
Acknowledging that organisational knowledge is pluralistic does, however, not only depend 
on the recognition of multiple forms of knowledge. In particular, Spender observes that the 
recognition that knowledge exists in more than one form results in awareness that knowledge 
creation occurs in interaction between different forms of human knowing.471 A pluralist 
epistemology of organisational knowledge therefore concerns itself with a two-fold problem. 
On the one hand it must distinguish between different types of knowledge, and on the other 
concern itself with drawing out the consequences of the interrelationships between different 
types of knowledge into a knowledge system.472 This approach is evident in Blackler’s 
argument that understanding the relationships between knowledge types in a multi-faceted 
concept of knowing “is at least as important as the delineation of . . . differences [in knowledge 
types].”473  
4.2.4 Theory of Truth 
An important point raised by Tell, in his pluralist approach to justification, is the absence of 
any specific theory of truth. In Tell’s general approach this relates back to his objective to 
deliberately not investigate the inherent properties of knowledge, but rather focus on the 
context in which justification occurs.474 This proposition follows from the arguments of Brown 
and Duguid, that the complex and paradoxical nature of knowledge lends itself to a more 
detailed understanding when approached from a social and cultural account of knowledge, 
                                                
469 Blackler, F. 1995: 1035 
470 Tell, F. 2004: 444 
471 Spender, J.C. 1998: 236 
472 Spender, J.C. 1998: 237 
473 Blackler, F. 1995: 1033 
474 Tell, F. 2004: 445: “Hence this article follows the advice of Brown and Duguid (2001: 200): rather than 
addressing knowledge in terms of the inherent properties of knowledge itself, it investigates and 
organizational environment in which knowledge is created and diffused.” 
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rather than a focus on the properties of knowledge.475 Here Tell argues that focussing on truth 
concerns the “essence of knowledge,”476 as it essentially attempts to determine the conditions 
under which any description of knowledge can be said to be accurate. As his pluralist approach 
is not concerned with a fundamental description of knowledge, his approach to truth concerns 
itself with the criteria for truth in whichever form it may take, rather than truth itself. Tell refers 
to this position as a “justification project,”477 which by its nature does not concern the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for truth, nor attempt to offer any type of analyses of truth.478  
4.3 Tell’s Justification Framework 
Drawing on philosophy, Tell proposes that justification can be conceived of as existing in two 
dimensions, relating to respectively the structure479 of justification as internal or external to the 
knower, and to the process of justification drawing on either rationality or action (see figure 
4.1). The intersection of the two dimensions results in a justification context, which in turn 
determines the general rules of the language game that would apply to knowledge used in a 
particular context. As per the discussion below, Tell locates the theoretical origins of the poles 
of each dimension in philosophy, and expands on the application to organisational justification. 
Figure 4.1 Tell’s justification dimensions and contexts  
Source: Tell, F. 2004: 451 
 
                                                
475 Brown, J.S.  and Duguid, P. 2001: 200 
476 Tell, F. 2004: 446: “In many definitions of knowledge, absolute conditions of truth are considered necessary 
for an accurate account of knowledge. Focussing on truth, one could say, is aiming for the very ‘essence’ of 
knowledge.” 
477 Tell, F, 2004: 446 
478 Kirkham, R. L. 1992: 26 
479 This observation draws on the work of Fumerton, R. 2010. 
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4.3.1 External justification: foundations for knowledge 
Tell conceptualises the structure of external justification through foundationalism, and 
specifically its concern with non-inferential and independent beliefs.480 Through this, he 
proposes the external property of justification as a structure that is characterised by realism and 
reference to an objective reality as the source of warrant. For Tell, external justification 
expresses the need to justify knowledge as “objective” based on an understanding of the world 
as existing independently of human experience and cognition.481 In this approach to 
justification, what is at stake is that the justification process establishes a relationship between 
the knower and the environment which allows for an objective assessment that is non-
inferentially true. Moreover, in Tell’s distinction, such an external justification requires that 
the justification of a knowledge claim is independent of the knower.482 
By drawing on foundationalism, Tell introduces into this distinction the idea that it is possible 
for knowledge to be justified in relation to certain infallible truths. Here he specifically refers 
to the nature of external justification as non-inferential.483 Non-inferentiality can be viewed as 
the distinguishing characteristic of foundationalism,484 with non-inferential justification 
representing a solution to the problem of infinite regress.485,486 The foundationalist proposal 
here is that all beliefs are justified by means of foundations. These foundations of justification 
in essence represent the termination point of all other beliefs,487 therefore signifying a finite 
point in the regress argument to which all inferential beliefs can be related, but which in 
themselves do not refer to any further basic beliefs.488 The latter notion brings to mind the idea 
                                                
480 Tell, F, 2004: 447 - 448 
481 Tell, F. 2004: 447: “The thought of objective reasons for our justification reveals the importance of our 
understanding of the reality ‘out there’ to be investigated by us. In order to find proper justification for our 
beliefs, we have to exit our subjective ideas and refer to reliable causes in a general reality.” 
482 Tell, F. 2004: 448 
483 Tell, F. 2004: 448 
484 Fumerton, R. 2010 
485 Crumley, J.S. 2009: 112 – 113.  
486 In epistemology the infinite regress problem in relation to justification can be understood as an infinite cycle 
of beliefs in the structure of justification that results from inference. The basic argument here is that of 
regress, which proposes that a belief is justified only if some form of evidence exists in support of the belief 
(Crumley, J.S. 2009: 110-111). The foundationalist position argues that, if it is accepted that justification is 
inferential as per the regress argument, i.e. the justification of a belief draws on other beliefs, and if all beliefs 
are based on inferential justification there would be no basis for claiming justification of any belief, since all 
beliefs would only be inferentially true (Fumerton, R. 1995: 56-57). 
487 Crumley, J.S. 2009: 113 and Bonjour, L. 1976: 282 
488 Lycan, W.G. 2002: 430 
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of “ultimate data”489 or “facts” that exist as the basis of justification for all knowledge that 
relates to them. In the Cartesian tradition, where knowledge is essentially cognitive, these 
foundations are uncovered through rational and logical thought processes that disclose the first 
principles of belief on which the justification for further belief builds.490 
However, Tell indicates that non-inferentiality alone is not sufficient as a foundation for 
external knowledge, but also requires that the justification of knowledge must be independent 
of the knower.491 This requirement in foundationalism is expanded on by Maher492, who argues 
that the problem of final foundations to knowledge is not merely solved through beliefs that 
are not inferred from further beliefs, but also requires that a foundational belief is not dependent 
on any other knowledge. In this sense, a foundational belief must be independent of the 
knowing subject. This idea in foundationalism is referred to as the notion of “the given,”493 
representing the idea that independent knowledge exists which is “intrinsically credible.”494 
This notion of “given” knowledge is arguably most clearly illustrated in the externalist 
foundationalist theory proposed through reliabilism. Reliabilism avoids the problem of infinite 
regress by arguing that justified belief is formed through external input other than beliefs, 
which is processed through human cognition to result in truth.495 Fumerton explains that in this 
view, human cognition is akin to an input-output model, where given stimuli in the 
environment result in immediate and unreflective conclusions which, through human 
evolution, have reached the point where they are normally true. This view of innate knowledge 
furthermore implies that humans by nature have access to a vast array “of foundational 
knowledge upon which we can draw in arriving at inferentially justified conclusions.”496  
For Tell, the value of understanding justification from this point of view lies in the extent to 
which organisations and organisational theory interpret their environments as “given” in a way 
similar to that found in foundationalism. In terms of the former, he specifically refers to the 
                                                
489 Lycan, W.G. 2002:430 
490 Ollson, E. 2014 
491 Tell, F. 2004: 447: “These non-inferential foundations referred to when justifying a knowledge claim are thus 
independent of the knowing subject.” 
492 Maher, C. 2012: 9 - 11 
493 Tell, F. 2004: 448 “Such an account of justifications must therefore include a premise that some things are 
‘given’ . . .” 
494 Maher, C. 2012: 10 
495 Fumerton, R. 2010 
496 Fumerton, R. 2010 
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assumptions organisations hold with regard to their environment, as elaborated on by Daft and 
Weick.497 The latter authors propose that organisations essentially interpret their environment 
as either concrete or constructed.498 Where organisations hold the view that the environment is 
concrete and predetermined, their interaction with the environment takes on the characteristics 
of attempting to find an existing answer. Engagements are aimed at uncovering hard facts 
through the application of rational, linear and analytical processes. 499 In this case, as in 
foundationalism, the underlying assumption is that the knowledge organisations seek exists in 
the environment and merely requires being discovered as a basic indisputable fact.  
From the perspective of organisational theory, Tell argues that similar views are espoused in 
the neoclassical theory of the firm, as well as the contingency theory of organisations.500 In 
both instances the rationality of organisations is underscored, either as the response to 
conditions determined by the environment, or alternatively in the optimal design of the 
organisational system in relation to a given set of environmental conditions.501 These 
approaches to underscoring the rational and logical nature of behaviour parallel the beliefs in 
foundationalism that it is possible to derive the first principles of knowledge, i.e. the basis of 
justification, through processes of logical thought.502 
4.3.2 Internal Justification: coherence with belief systems 
Tell proposes internal justification as the antithetical position to external justification, and 
draws on the work of Bonjour and Lehrer to provide the basic characteristics of this concept. 
As a theory of justification, internalism represents an outright rejection of foundationalism, 
proposing instead that justification does not result from that which is external to the knower, 
but rather from the internal coherence of a knowledge claim with other beliefs already 
adopted.503 Here Tell underscores the position held by coherentist theories of justification, that 
                                                
497 Tell, F. 2004: 448: “Daft and Weick (1984) discuss a kindred view of organizations as interpreting their 
environment as analysable and ‘given’, which can be approached passively or actively.” 
498 Daft, R. and Weick, K.E. 1984: 287 
499 Daft, R. and Weick, K. E. 1984: 287 
500 Tell, F. 2004: 448 
501 Tell, F. 2004: 448: “One example of this perspective is the neoclassical theory of the firm, as depicted by its 
critics (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nelson, 1991; Penrose, 1995), responding to conditions given by 
technologies and markets by using economic rationality. Another example is the contingency theory of 
organizations (Thompson, 1967; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969), where organizations are seen as rational 
systems contingent upon their interactions with external environments (Scott, 1998).” See also Morgan, G. 
2006: 46 - 48 
502 Compare Ollson, E. 2014 
503 Tell, F. 2004: 448 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 95 
the basis for justification can only stem from the “system of beliefs” held by a knower. This 
system of beliefs includes both assumptions on the nature of knowledge and reality, and any 
justification of knowledge referring to this system will ultimately have to cohere with beliefs 
already held.504  
A fundamental consequence of the former position is that, whereas the foundationalist 
perspective emphasises the need for uncovering basic beliefs, coherentism views all beliefs as 
equal.505 Given this position, the argument is presented that the justification of knowledge 
claims is found in the network of mutual support that beliefs provide for each other.506 Bonjour 
illustrates this argument, while specifically positioning coherence theory in the context of 
regress and the self-referential nature of justification, by explaining that “the primary unit of 
epistemic justification is such a [closed] system, which is justified in terms of its internal 
coherence.”507 Underlying the former argument is a rejection of the idea that inferential 
justification is linear in nature.508 Here, coherentism takes specific issue with the idea that 
justification is a process where belief A is justified by belief B and so on, until the basic belief 
is reached. Instead, Bonjour argues that, while justification of a single belief may appear to 
take on the nature of linear justification, by virtue of achieving dialectical acceptance of a 
premise belief, the core issue of justification at stake, in coherence theory, is the global 
justification of the belief system itself. Justification of a belief, in this proposal, involves the 
coherence of the system and not specific beliefs from which a particular knowledge claim 
draws its warrant.509  
Lehrer510 offers a further line of criticism against the notion of regress in foundationalism, 
underscoring, amongst others, the pragmatic nature of justification and the non-inferential 
nature of justification in coherence theory. Here, he maintains that the justification of a belief 
takes place in relation to a questioner, i.e. someone other than the knower. Justification is, in 
                                                
504 Tell, F. 2004: 448: “The knowing subject is seen as having a system of beliefs, including ontological and 
epistemological assumptions. Justification can be given only with regard to this system; reasons cannot be 
found outside it.” 
505 Ollson, E. 2014 
506 Ollson, E. 2014 and Crumley, J.S. 2009: 112 
507 Bonjour, L. 1976: 283. Note that this view refers to Bonjour’s summary of the traditional approach of a 
coherence theory of empirical knowledge and not his own view on how regress should be addressed in 
coherentism 
508 Bonjour, L. 1976: 286 
509 Bonjour, L. 1976: 287 
510 Lehrer, K. 2015: 30-31 & 88-90 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 96 
this regard, aimed at providing sufficient warrant for a belief only to the point where an agreed 
premise is reached. The former is the basis for avoiding infinite arguments, as arguments only 
proceed until the point where agreement is reached. In this sense a belief, rather than an appeal 
to evidence, can provide the necessary justification for a disputed belief.  
Drawing on Lehrer, Tell positions the implications of coherence as the idea that any belief can 
be justified, provided that is can be explained “in accordance with the system of beliefs” 511 of 
the knower. Lehrer elaborates on the implications of this view of justification, by putting 
forward the argument that, in this understanding, justification is a matter of subjectivity, as 
ultimately justification rests on the knower’s acceptance of something as justified belief.512 
This implication further distances Tell’s513 notion of internalism from externalism, as unlike 
foundationalism, coherentism does not espouse the idea that knowledge can be justified 
through any objective means.514  
From an organisational point of view, Tell argues that this internalist notion corresponds to the 
self-referential conceptualisation of organisations, evident in the work of authors such as 
Tsoukas, von Krogh and Weick.515 Given the discussion on von Krogh’s view of autopoietic 
epistemology in Chapter 3, these parallels are self-evident, including the notion that knowledge 
is always personal as an interpretation relating to the knower. Furthermore, at an organisational 
level, the environment is always interpreted in a self-referential manner. The influence on 
justification, by an established dominant logic acting as a scheme of beliefs requiring new 
claims to cohere to be accepted as “true”, offers a kindred view of coherentism’s reference to 
a belief system, and the dependence of justification on both the system and other beliefs. For 
Tell,516 internal justification furthermore relates to a constructionist ontology517 as evident in 
Weick’s notion of enactment. Here, Tell argues that the understanding of organisations as 
                                                
511 Tell, F. 2004: 448 
512 Lehrer, K. 2015: 32 
513 Tell, F. 2004: 448: “Moreover, the coherence thesis argues that pure externalism fails to explain how such 
independent foundations can serve to justify beliefs that, by their nature, must be internal to the knowing 
subject. . . . An internal justification for a knowledge claim is thus, in contrast to the external one, dependent, 
upon other beliefs held by the knowledge claimant.” 
514 Lehrer, K. 2015: 32 
515 Tell, F. 2004: 448 - 449 
516 Tell, F. 2004: 449 
517 The classification of Weick’s sensemaking approach as embracing a constructionist ontology draws on the 
observations of Guiette, A. and Vandenbempt, K. 2014 : 159  
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making sense of an environment which they actively create518 “supports the notion of 
knowledge justification as a process in which a coherent ‘fit’ with internally upheld 
assumptions is the outcome.”519 
4.3.3 Procedural justification: rationality and reason 
As a process, Tell’s notion of justification by procedure draws on the dominant notions of 
rationality and positivism in epistemology. Here, the process of justification is presented in the 
context of the scientific methodology, espousing the principles of deduction, reason, logic and 
testing. Of primary importance is the procedure involved in justification, drawing on the ability 
to illustrate the logical deduction of a premise, and the capacity of premises to stand up to 
empirical facts. Following from this, the ability to illustrate adherence to procedure acts as the 
justifier of the knowledge claim, and confers on this claim a certain status associated with 
universality, as the claim can both be reproduced (by following the same procedure) and 
evaluated. 520  In order to create knowledge beyond what is immediately observable, rationality 
in justification is guided by inference, resulting in the creation of knowledge that is abstract.521  
Following Tell, the positioning of justification by procedure in the realm of the rational and 
scientific implies a number of assumptions that would characterise the process of knowledge 
creation. Primary among these is the idea of objective activity by human actors engaging in the 
process of knowledge discovery in a disinterested fashion while applying the scientific 
method.522 Knowledge creation, in this sense, is an activity focussed on uncovering truth as the 
goal of science, and by virtue of adherence to the scientific method, not an activity reflecting 
individual or group interests beyond truth.523 Related to the former, decisions in relation to 
knowledge claims are taken only on force of better evidence. In this regard, Newton-Smith 
explains that the shift of allegiance from accepting one knowledge claim over another, is purely 
                                                
518 See Weick, K.E. 1995: 30: “I use the word enactment to preserve the fact that, in organizational life, people 
often produce part of the environment they face . . .” 
519 Tell, F. 2004: 449 
520 Tell, F. 2004: 449: “The hypothetical-deductive method stands as an archetype for the rational pursuit of 
knowledge (Losee, 1993). A central concept of this justification process is the procedure in which the 
argument is presented – how data and warrants are used (Toulmin, 1958). Showing the logic of how 
hypotheses have been deduced, and the way these hypotheses have been confronted with empirical facts, 
provides the argument and justification for the knowledge claim. . . . Following the procedure, certifies the 
knowledge claim, making it universally understood, reproducible and possible to evaluate. Inference guides 
the procedure of rational justification, and an outcome of this process is theories, models and other 
abstractions.” 
521 Tell, F. 2004: 449 also see Andersen, H. and Hepburn, B. 2015. 
522 Newton-Smith, W.H. 2003: 01 & 99  
523 Newton-Smith, W.H. 2003: Chapter 1 also see Knorr Cetina, K. 1988. 
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dependent on internal factors relating to the claims themselves, the relationship between these 
claims and the evidence available to evaluate claims.524 As is the case with the view of the 
objectivity of knowers, the former again reiterates the irrelevance of context and human interest 
in the procedural justification of knowledge. Consequently, the scientific method affords a role 
for social factors only in instances where there is deviance from rational normativity.525 
In the field of organisational theory, Tell likens the process of justification by procedure to the 
logic of consequences espoused in the rational procedure of organisational decision-making as 
presented by March.526 In this regard, March argues that rationality in organisations refers to a 
set of procedures which inform organisational choice and “pursue a logic of consequences,”527 
which are aimed at informing a decision through addressing the alternatives, expectations, 
preferences and decision rules when a choice is made. For Tell, this decision-making process 
parallels with that of the scientific method in its objective to uncover truth, as the economic 
agent attempts to optimise her decision-making by engaging in a rational process of choice.528 
Illustrating this position, March observes that processes of rational decision-making are 
characterised by “decision makers and professionals try[ing] to find the right answer.”529,530 
In his argument, that research in this field is mainly normative and focussed on prescribing the 
criteria to arrive at rational decisions, Brunsson531 provides a further exposition of how 
decision-making theory mimics the scientific method. Furthermore, where rationality fails, it 
is amongst others attributed to poor cognitive skills or related to problems of information 
processing. Action in procedural justification is therefore positioned as a consequence of 
rational processes, which provide reasoned warrant for choices and behaviour.532  
                                                
524 Newton-Smith, W.H. 2003: 4 
525 Newton-Smith, W.H. 2003: 6-7 
526 Tell, F. 2004: 450: “In organization studies, March and Olsen (1989) call this rationality the ‘logic of 
consequence’. Like the scientist in search of truth, the economic agent, for instance, searches for different 
alternatives and evaluates their consequences when making a decision (March, 1994).” 
527 March, J.G. 1994: 16-17 
528 Tell, F. 2004: 450 
529 March, J.G. 1994: 29 
530 An interesting remark made by March (1994: 17-18) in the context of rational decision making, relates to the 
idea that people “rationalize” decisions. That is when faced with questions on why a decision was taken, 
people explain their behaviour in terms of reasons. This suggests the notion of “finding” reasons to justify the 
decision which brings to mind the notion of rationality as constructed retrospectively in the sense that Weick 
(1995: 26) intends through sensemaking 
531 Brunsson, N. 1982: 30 - 31 
532 Tell, F. 2004: 450: “Action founded on such premises may rightfully be conceived as rational action from a 
decision-making perspective (Brunsson, 1982). . . . The justification resides in the procedures and measures 
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4.3.4 Performance-based justification 
On the obverse dimension of justification processes, Tell positions justification by 
performance, and specifically draws on epistemological approaches opposing the notions of 
rationality and procedural methodology as the basis for knowledge creation.533 These 
approaches, as evident in the work of Polanyi and Feyerabend, draw on criticism of the 
likelihood that new knowledge can be produced following the rigorous procedures of a 
scientific method.534 Instead, in Tell’s interpretation, these authors propose that knowledge 
creation occurs precisely when the principles of rationality are violated. Based on this, Tell 
observes that, rather than inference, performance-based justification draws on the notion of 
influence and accounts for knowledge representing “intuitions, aesthetics and conventions.”535  
Feyerabend’s criticism of the scientific method stems from his rejection of a “common 
structure”536 that can be discerned in scientific results and events, and which is universally 
present in all scientific investigations. Instead, he contends that whichever methodological 
factors lead to success in one endeavour may well have disastrous consequences if replicated 
under a different set of circumstances. In all instances methods, therefore, cannot be understood 
independently of the context in which they are applied. Furthermore, success in science is 
precisely dependent on its failure to “obey general standards”537 as it moves beyond that which 
already known and accepted.538 Feyerabend’s rejection of a universal scientific method draws 
on two arguments: on the one hand if it is accepted that “the world . . . is a largely unknown 
entity,”539 expanding knowledge of this world cannot be dependent on limiting principles of 
knowledge creation. On the other hand, he rejects rational processes as a constricting condition 
on human life, which attempts to force all knowledge into conformation to a set of ideals. 
Instead of a unified universal scientific method, Feyerabend proposes methodological anarchy, 
an approach characterised by its violation of methodologically proper principles by, for 
                                                
taken to obtain the most rational decision possible. There is a reason for acting in accordance with the 
decision made, if the right methods for gathering and evaluating information have been used.” 
533 Tell, F. 2004: 450 
534 Tell, F. 2004: 450: “Critical reasoning and justifying methods may not be conducive to the development of 
new ideas or new actions. Following in Herschel’s footsteps, Polanyi (1946) and Feyerabend (1975), for 
instance, have pointed out the deficiencies of rigorous methodology for the production of new scientific 
knowledge.” 
535 Tell, F. 2004:450 
536 Feyerabend, P. 1993:01 
537 Feyerabend, P. 1993: 01 
538 Feyerabend, P. 1993: 01 
539 Feyerabend, P. 1993: 12 
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example, employing “ad hoc hypothesis and propaganda.”540 For Feyerabend such an 
anarchical methodology is characteristic of the practice and history of science, and serves to 
elucidate how knowledge is discovered, before it is reduced in the language of science to an 
appearance that conforms to the principles of rational justification.541 While traditional 
approaches in the philosophy of science allow for irrationality and context to influence the 
context of discovery, Feyerabend is not content with methodological anarchy as a characteristic 
of discovery, but instead proposes that the distinction between the context of discovery and 
justification, upheld in philosophy, is purely artificial and does not reflect the true nature of 
scientific knowledge.542 This proposal can be interpreted as placing both the rational 
(justification) and the irrational (discovery) on an equal footing, thereby allowing for the 
irrational to be as relevant to the acceptance of knowledge claims as the rational.543 By 
removing the boundary between justification and discovery, this approach allows for the 
recognition of the contextual nature of justification, effectively resulting in the argument that, 
if the validity of knowledge claims are locally determined, it is not possible to arrive at a set of 
universal criteria according to which justification takes place.544  
While Tell associates justification by procedure with action,545 his discussion of this, in relation 
to the dimension of justification processes, elaborates on the epistemological implications only 
very briefly.546 Here, specifically, he offers the argument that the justification of knowledge, 
when viewed from the perspective of tacit knowledge, knowing how and knowledge of 
acquaintance, draws on processes stemming “from non-rational or performance-driven 
reference.”547 Tell’s argument here mainly focusses on juxtaposing Feyerabend and Polanyi’s 
criticism of the scientific method as a means to explain knowledge creation. However, an 
understanding of how this argument relates to justification as practice, can be obtained from 
                                                
540 Tell, F. 2004: 450 
541 Feyerabend, P. 1993: 17-18 
542 Feyerabend, P. 1993: 147 - 148 
543 Adams, J. 2007: 111-112 
544 Knorr Cetina, K. 1981: p 10 & 28: “I am referring here to Feyerabend’s contention that the interpretations 
which scientists choose are relative to a cultural and historical context, and can only be understood if we look 
at these contexts. The thesis rules out the possibility of specifying a set of context-independent criteria 
according to which consensus formation proceeds.” 
545 Tell, F. 2004: 451 
546 Similarly in his discussion, of the forms of knowledge that result from the intercepts between process and 
structures, is characterised by brevity in the attention that is paid to the element of action or practice 
547 Tell, F. 2004: 451 
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understanding how authors such as Rorty548 relate the foregrounding of context to justification 
as arising from practice. In this regard, Guignon and Hiley549 propose that following Rorty, in 
theory, where the justification of knowledge is positioned as a social practice, the only basis 
for agreeing certain knowledge claims is constructed in social settings, rather than a 
representation of universal criteria. Justification as such can therefore not be dissociated from 
its context and becomes a matter of “what one’s peers will let one get away with  . . . this means 
that justification reaches bedrock when it has reached the actual practices of a particular 
community.”550  
Tell551 argues that representations of justification through performance are evident in 
organisational theory in the notion of action rationality. Action rationality is positioned as an 
approach to decision-making aimed at addressing two limitations following from decision 
rationality, namely uncertainty and the reduction of personal responsibility. In the instance of 
the former, Tell draws on Brunsson to argue that decision rationality, with its emphasis on the 
investigation of alternatives, increases uncertainty precisely because it is focussed on 
understanding many different possibilities. Furthermore, Tell argues that decision rationality is 
an attempt to reduce personal responsibility through the analysis of options and consequences. 
Here, it appears that the combination of these two factors is perceived as emphasising the risk 
inherent in a decision, and as a result acts as a disincentive for action, as decision makers 
attempt to avoid risk. Action rationality instead focusses on ensuring commitment to action552 
by actively ignoring “alternatives and critical judgments.”553 Rather, the focus in action 
                                                
548 The use of Rorty to illustrate this argument draws on the parallels between his and Feyerabend’s work, in as 
far as the rejection of a universal methodology (compare Hendley, S. 1991: Chapter 6) and their shared 
criticism of the distinction between the context of discovery and justification is concerned (compare Viale, R. 
2001:07) 
549 Guignon, C. and Hiley, D.R. 2003: 10 
550 Guignon, C. and Hiley, D.R. 2003: 11 
551 Tell, F. 2004: 450-451: “In the same vein, but in the organizational domain, Brunsson (1982, 1985) develops 
a terminology in which he distinguishes between rationality and action rationality. The problem with a 
decision made in accordance with decision rationality is that it increases uncertainty by recognizing many 
alternatives and investigating their consequences. Analysis in a decision-rational manner also aims at active 
reduction of personal responsibility. Both the factors lead to a decrease in the willingness to take risks and 
thus to induce actions. In order to enhance action rationality, an impressionistic decision mode has to 
substitute for a prevailing rationalistic decision mode, Brunsson (1985) argues. In action rationality, it is the 
ignorance of alternatives and critical judgement that counts. Instead of judging the procedures followed, 
performance serves as justification. Similarly, March and Olsen (1989) call processes of justification by 
performance the ‘logic of appropriateness’, where organizations act ‘ad hoc’ grounded in questions of 
recognition, identity and rules (March, 1994).” 
552 Brunsson, N. 1982: 36 
553 Tell, F. 2004: 451 
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rationality is on ensuring motivation and commitment aimed at uniting support for the 
completion of action.554 Brunsson explains how organisational ideology acts as the framework 
for enabling organisational action by reducing, rather than emphasising, the complexity of 
decision-making.555 While ideology and processes, aimed at constricting the number of factors 
impacting decision-making, may be viewed as irrational, Brunsson argues that organisations’ 
primary challenge is not taking decisions (as the view of rational decision-making would 
suggest), but rather taking organised action. 
Tell further argues that a kindred notion of organisational decision-making, as based on 
appropriate action, is found in the concept of the “logic of appropriateness” as presented in the 
work of March and Olsen.556 In this view, behaviour is directed by rules that are accepted as 
representing appropriate action.557 As a consequence, justification by procedure can itself be 
seen as a subset of appropriate behaviour in a given context, i.e. in certain instances, taking 
decisions based on a rational decision model, may be prescribed and accepted as the correct 
process to follow.558  
4.4 Knowledge ideal types 
Having identified the dimensions of justification, Tell distinguishes between the four ideal 
types of knowledge that are grounded in the justification contexts introduced by the intersection 
of the two dimensions. Each of these ideal types is discussed in detail in the remainder of this 
section. 
4.4.1 Objective knowledge 
Tell’s notion of objective knowledge draws on conceptualisations that position knowledge as 
existing independently of humans and arrived at through rigorous scientific method.559 He 
proposes that, philosophically, one such view of knowledge is discernible in the work of 
Popper,560 who conceives of objective knowledge as existing independently of belief. Popper 
                                                
554 Brunsson, N. 1982: 36 
555 Brunsson, N. 1982: 42 
556 Tell, F. 2004: 451 
557 March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. 2004: 02 
558 Tell, F. 2004: 451 
559 Tell, F. 2004: 452 
560 Tell’s use of Popper to illustrate knowledge that results from an essentially foundationalist argument may be 
rather controversial given Popper’s opposition to the notion of foundationalism and moreover justificationism, 
see for example Popper, K. 2002: 22-23 and Firestone, J.M. and McElroy M.W. 2003b: 04 
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proposes that objective knowledge is the mainstay of the advancement of human knowledge,561 
and formulates this knowledge as existing in the realm of World 3, in his pluralist ontology, as 
“objective thought contents.”562 Here, thought contents exist independently of any knowing 
subject, as their existence is not a function of humans having knowledge of a World 3 object.563 
Rather, World 3 objects exist as if they represent a physical characteristic of a physical564 
object. In the physical world the existence of a characteristic, i.e. the hardness of stone, is not 
dependent on any human experience of the characteristic; in other words, it exists 
independently of human knowledge or belief. Popper conceives of objective knowledge as 
representing a similar structure, so that in World 3, thought contents exist which may never be 
discovered by humans, but their existence is not refutable based on a lack of human 
knowledge.565  
The second component of objective knowledge in Tell’s ideal type relates to Popper’s notion 
of the scientific method as the procedure through which knowledge is validated.566 Here, the 
emphasis of method is on the procedures that allow for the distinction between myth and 
knowledge.567 While Popper proposes a critical methodology568 which in content is intended 
to be substantively different from the positivist scientific method,569 the procedural notion of 
justification in objective knowledge remains pertinent in establishing the objectivity of 
scientific claims, as Popper declares that “the objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact 
that they can be inter-subjectively tested.”570 This ability to objectively test statements relies 
on the requirement that observations are regulated and repeatable, as this provides the basis for 
                                                
561 Tell, F. 2004: 452: 452: “. . . Popper argues that there is another, objective world, which consists of objective 
theories, objective problems and objective arguments. . . . In Popper’s view, there is objective knowledge 
independent of anybody’s subjective belief. We can thus speak of objective knowledge without entering the 
subjective minds of individuals. . . . The prime example of objective knowledge is scientific theories, which 
exist even though no one goes around ‘knowing them’. The scientific method is one where ideas are 
scrutinized by empirical testing and discussions between scientists. Moreover, the scientific method has 
supreme status in the way it enhances the growth of scientific knowledge” 
562 Kletzl, S. 2014: 119 
563 Tell, F. 2004: 452 and Kletzl, S. 2014: 119 
564 Note that Popper identifies the existence of physical objects with World 1 – see for example Popper, K. 
1978. 
565 Kletzl, S. 2014: 119 
566 Tell, F. 2004: 452 
567 Popper, K. 1962: 127 
568 Popper, K. 1962: 127 
569 Popper, K. 2002: 28 
570 Popper, K. 2002: 22 
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testing the veracity of any claim.571 This methodological rigour of scientific knowledge also 
establishes, for Popper, the reason why belief does not justify knowledge, as belief, as the basis 
for knowledge, cannot be objectively examined. 
Organisationally, Tell relates objective knowledge to instances in which organisations find 
external standards against which internally created knowledge can be evaluated.572 As 
examples of such standards, he refers to “technological progress, the scientific community or 
markets.”573 At the same time, there is the expectation that organisational members involved 
in new knowledge creation possess knowledge of the technical methods and procedures to be 
followed in creating knowledge, as well as formal knowledge of relevant disciplines. 
Justification of knowledge, in these contexts, draws directly on the ability of knowledge 
workers to illustrate the potential to replicate findings under different circumstances. The 
ability to abstract knowledge from its context therefore justifies the claim.574 Related to the 
former, where knowledge exists as embedded575 in technology, its justification arises from “the 
ability to transfer an application between products and firms.”576 This knowledge transfer is 
effectively the replication of objective knowledge, accompanied by the expectation that 
knowledge will remain valid under different circumstances. Therefore, even in instances where 
knowledge creation results from the violation of standard scientific principles, its acceptance 
is conditional on the ability to replicate findings using the scientific method. External 
justification, in organisational knowledge, however, also involves the ability of knowledge 
claims to withstand criticism from a wider audience than represented by those directly involved 
in the formulation of the knowledge claim.577 In this regard Tell argues that, where knowledge 
is procured outside of the organisation, validation results from disputes and active criticism of 
a solution to ensure adherence to accepted standards.  
Finally, the objectification of knowledge in this context of justification creates knowledge 
“objects” through the process of codification. Here the requirement of replication requires that 
                                                
571 Popper, K. 2002: 23 
572 Tell, F. 2004: 452 
573 Tell, F. 2004: 452 
574 Tell, F. 2004: 452 
575 Note that the notion of embedded knowledge here draws on the conceptualisation of Kinghorn, J. 2007 
576 Tell, F. 2004: 453 
577 Tell, F. 2004: 453 
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objective knowledge is stored as findings in order to ensure repetition.578 This process of 
codification results in further decontextualization of knowledge, reinforcing the objective 
character of knowledge by distancing it from both the knowing subject and the context under 
which it was created.579 
4.4.2 Personal knowledge 
In the context of internal, performance-based justification, Tell associates the resulting ideal 
type of knowledge with Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge, describing personal knowledge 
as resulting from the idea that “knowledge . . . is known by someone subjectively.”580 For 
Polanyi, tacit knowledge embodies the shared structure of all forms of knowledge, representing 
the principle that there are no instances of knowledge which are not underpinned by skilful 
action.581 Central to this notion is the inseparability of knowledge and the knower, and an 
“acritical attitude”582 toward justification. The former results in the argument that all 
knowledge is fundamentally linked to the commitment of the knower to a belief. Polanyi 
describes this commitment as the reliance that individuals place on external objects in an effort 
to achieve an outcome.583 External objects are here not conceived of only as physical objects, 
but also intellectual objects, such as interpretative frameworks and schemes.584 The externality 
of objects disappear when they are used in skilful action “in a process of assimilation by which 
we identify ourselves with them.”585 This process results from an uncritical acceptance of 
objects, in which they become part of the knower and are given meaning through action.586 For 
                                                
578 Tell, F. 2004: 453 
579 See Knorr Cetina, K. 1981: 47: “. . . once the selections of the laboratory have been crystallised into a 
scientific result, the contingencies and contextual selections from which it was composed can no longer be 
differentiated. In fact, the scientists themselves actually decontextualise the products of their work when they 
turn them into “findings”, “reported” in the scientific paper.” 
580 Tell, F. 2004: 454: “According to Michael Polanyi (1962, 1983) there is a tacit component of knowledge that 
– contrary to the notion of objective knowledge – stems from an acritical attitude. This gives rise to personal 
knowledge, knowledge that is known by someone subjectively. All explicit, articulated knowledge also 
involves a tacit act of knowing, which is quite different from what is articulated. Knowledge involves a 
personal commitment, where the belief and the ‘tacit assent’ of the knower are central. . . . Tacit knowing is 
like letting something become a tool for our use and allowing it to become an extension of us.” 
581 Tsoukas, H. 2002: 3-4 
582 Tell, F. 2004: 454 
583 Tell, F. 2004: 454 
584 Polanyi, M. 1962: 62 
585 Polanyi, M. 1962: 63 
586 Polanyi, M. 1962: 63 and Tell, F. 2004: 454 
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Tell this process, through which tools become extensions of the knower, represents the core of 
tacit knowledge.  
Tell explains that, as tacit knowledge requires a personal commitment to belief, the only basis 
for its justification is the belief itself. Polanyi describes this circularity of justification in tacit 
knowledge as the idea that “Any enquiry into our ultimate beliefs can be consistent only if it 
presupposes its own conclusions. It must be intentionally circular . . . Logically, the whole of 
my argument is but an elaboration of this circle; it is a systematic course in teaching myself to 
hold my own beliefs.”587 This idea, that tacit knowledge can only be circularly justified, results 
from Polanyi’s argument that all knowledge involves tacit knowledge and that ultimately 
knowledge involves more than can be expressed.588 As a result, the justification of knowledge 
can never be fully explained in terms of tracing a belief back to its origins, and can never be 
comprehensively justified precisely because it can never be completely externalised.589 For 
Tell, the implications of this view of knowledge are that tacit assent in itself represents a 
personal judgement, suggesting that the knowing subject effectively engages in an internal 
process of justification. The validity of knowledge, in this process, is not determined by the 
subject’s ability to rationally explain beliefs, but rather “by the act that an individual is able to 
perform.”590 
Organisationally, Tell locates tacit knowledge, and the accompanying processes and structures 
of justification, in the personal knowledge of employees’ know-how. Such knowledge is 
described as beyond conscious awareness and likened to gut feel and sensing.591 In many 
instances, these abilities, that defy detailed description beyond the notion of action, are 
considered essential to the ability of employees to execute organisational objectives. While 
personal knowledge features in both routine and unfamiliar work, it is specifically during the 
                                                
587 Polanyi, M. 1962: 315 
588 Compare Tsoukas, H. 2002:06: “We must rely (to be precise, we must learn to rely) subsidiarily on 
particulars for attending to something else, hence our knowledge of them remains tacit . . . In the context of 
carrying out a specific task, we come to know a set of particulars without being able to identify them. In 
Polanyi’s (1966:4) memorable phrase, “we can know more than we can tell”.” 
589 Virtanen, I. 2010: 06: “Thus, in addition to being capable of stated clearly, explicitness seems to refer also to 
the possibility to trace the origins of the focal knowledge – the justification would make knowledge more 
explicit. However, knowledge cannot be exhaustively justified because it is always based on unspecified 
particulars . . .” 
590 Tell, F. 2004: 454: “The tacit assent forms a personal judgement, coming from within the knower. Polanyi’s 
description of tacit knowledge thus resembles a subconscious process internal to the subject. This internal 
process has great practical bearing on knowing and is justified not in the way arguments are or are no found 
valid, but by the act that an individual is able to perform.” 
591 Tell, F. 2004: 454 
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latter where Tell points toward the importance of evaluating knowledge not by “Why it works”, 
but by “What works.”592 This turn toward justification by performance is perceived as an 
outcome of venturing into the realm of the unknown, where little formal scientific knowledge 
exists and the focus shifts toward the achievement of an outcome.593  
4.4.3 Subjective knowledge 
For Tell, the notion of subjective knowledge is fundamentally characterised by a structure of 
attempting to achieve truth, where truth is intended as the coherence of a belief with other 
beliefs. This coherence with other beliefs implies the subjective/local nature of justification, 
but the process of arriving at truth, as the objective of justification, is characterised by a 
procedure of reasoning.594 In epistemology, the ideal type Tell turns to as exemplifying 
subjective knowledge is Lehrer’s coherence theory of justification. Here Tell argues that the 
internal structure of Lehrer’s proposal resides in the condition that justification requires “an 
internal criterion of coherence.”595 This internal criterion is related to beliefs held by a knower, 
and the reasons for accepting that a belief is justified, in relation to this criterion, are related 
only to the benefit that the knower derives from holding such a belief. In order to justify beliefs 
in relation to other beliefs Lehrer invokes the concept of doxastic system, which Tell describes 
as a “justification system of beliefs.”596 This system consists of subjective statements expressing 
what the knowing subject believes; coherence here therefore follows from how a belief fits 
within the structure of beliefs, rather than from coherence with other beliefs.597  
As the reasons for holding beliefs in the doxastic system concerns the utility of beliefs, rather 
than the normative nature thereof, the doxastic system in itself is not sufficient to determine if 
                                                
592 Tell, F. 2004: 455: “There are very few scientific methods and formulas to be used for design. Therefore, 
trial-and-error processes characterize the design phase. ‘What works’ becomes the standard for evaluation, not 
‘Why it works’ . . .” 
593 Tell, F. 2004: 455 
594 Tell, F. 2004: 456: “Justification has truth as an objective, but not the truth set by an external standard. 
Instead, it is a construction of internal relations in the subjective world and the assumption that the believer is 
veracious, i.e. rational in seeking truth. For a statement to be true, it must cohere with other statement in the 
subjective world. . . . In the search for subjective coherence, the knower will be able to choose between 
competing statements and therefore maintain an experienced subjective justification of his belief: obtaining 
subjective knowledge. This implies a procedural mode of justification, since a rational activity will take place 
in comparing the statements in the epistemic field, albeit local. Moreover, inherent in his account of 
knowledge and justification is a belief in the rational striving for something similar to truth, and Lehrer uses 
decision theory to show the utility for a veracious man to believe only what is true.” 
595 Tell, F. 2004: 455 
596 Tell, F. 2004: 455 
597 Lehrer, K. 1974 quoted in Tell, F. 2004: 455 – 456; Duran, J. 1989: 38-39 
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a knowing subject is epistemologically justified in holding a particular belief.598 Therefore, 
while Lehrer’s proposal of subjective knowledge looks to the knower for the structure of 
justification, it turns to rationality and procedure to relate justification to truth. Tell explains 
this process by referring to the importance of truth as the objective of justification in Lehrer’s 
theory.599 In this regard he notes that truth too relates to internal standards, and more 
specifically the “construction of internal relations in the subjective world.”600 The construction 
of a truthful doxastic system here is interpreted by Tell as central to the assumption of the 
veracity of the knowing subject. The intention of the knowing subject is therefore to attempt to 
uncover truth in a rational manner.601 Procedural rationality, as associated by Tell in the context 
of subjective knowledge, is an outcome of the process of the comparison of statements in an 
attempt to identify the statement with the highest degree of coherence with the belief system.  
Tell argues that organisational coherence is exemplified in the explicit statements of project 
objectives and plans, which create a shared framework for participants to make sense of, when 
projects are discussed. In this regard, he proposes that the articulation of such a framework in 
documents provides organisational coherence by encompassing the organisational ideology as 
a common denominator binding various members and departments in a project together. 
Similar outcomes of coherence are of concern when organisations evaluate the strategic fit of 
the proposed projects. Here the emphasis is on the extent to which projects fit with what the 
organisation believes its core competencies and guiding business principles to be. The 
pervasiveness of a belief system in the organisation creates an implicit screening mechanism 
for new ideas, which do not require an ongoing formal process, but rather become part of what 
organisation members do on a continuous basis.602  
In focussing on how coherence is achieved through procedural means, Tell identifies two broad 
mechanisms. Firstly, he identifies the localisation of procedure with the objective of illustrating 
coherence with local requirements, in the application of general methods of procedural 
justification in the organisational context. While procedures, such as testing and prototypes, 
are general, the criteria for success and evaluation of success are localised based on their 
subjective origins in the organisational belief system. In localising procedures, guidelines for 
                                                
598 Tell, F. 2004: 455 and Duran, J. 1989: 39 
599 Tell, F. 2004: 456 
600 Tell, F. 2004: 456 
601 Tell, F. 2004: 456 
602 Tell, F. 2004: 456- 457 
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evaluating the fit of a potential solution with organisation-specific requirements are derived 
through the understanding that follows from gathering insights for specific circumstances.603  
Secondly, Tell draws on the broader application of coherence outside of the realm of 
philosophy.604 Here, he is specifically concerned with the general characteristics of coherence 
in reasoning, as representing the process through which relationships between seemingly 
disparate impressions are established. In the field of knowledge creation, Tell draws on 
Nonaka’s arguments for the use of metaphor and analogy, as well as Tsoukas’ notion of 
analogical reasoning in organisation studies, and proposes that the use of analogical reasoning 
represents an instance of establishing procedural coherence. Without elaborating on the detail 
of analogical reasoning, it is worth noting that the predominant concern here, for Tell, is that 
this approach represents a structure of argument which is aimed at achieving coherence through 
reasoning by following a specific procedure. 605 Furthermore, in as much as the origins of 
analogy in metaphor are considered as a deficient method of scientific reasoning,606 Tell argues 
that analogical reasoning plays an important role in the initial development of new concepts.607 
Amongst others, analogical reasoning provides an argument that, while knowledge discovery 
and justification in this context are still procedural, they do not require the strict adherence to 
the process required for objective knowledge. In this way analogical reasoning “shelters” the 
justification of concepts from harsh scrutiny, allowing the concept to be tested and evaluated 
through criteria that are more conducive to innovation.608 
4.4.4 Institutional knowledge 
To exemplify how institutional knowledge is created in the context of performance-based 
external justification, Tell draws on Wittgenstein’s concepts of certainty, rules and their 
relationship through language games.609 Here it appears that Tell is first of all concerned with 
                                                
603 Tell, F. 2004: 457: “In the organization conducting research in electrical engineering, a ‘case study’ type of 
methodology, where insights are generated for particular circumstances instead of general claims, was used. 
Nevertheless, by forming a more or less coherent system of results in the field it is possible to develop some 
general practices or ‘rules of thumb’ that could be used internally for product development.” 
604 Tell, F. 2005: 07 
605 Tell, F. 2005: 09 
606 Compare Tsoukas, H. 1993: 333 
607 Tell, F. 2005 
608 Tell, F. 2005: 18: “As discussed by Hughes (1989: 25; 27), inventors needed “sheltering” from the outside 
world where hostility and ridicule could undermine the confidence of the inventor. Drawings and models 
could easily be “suffocated” in such contexts.” 
609 Tell, F. 2004: 458 
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establishing a strong notion of practice610 as contained in Wittgenstein’s proposal that the 
philosophy of language involves a move away from logic and ideals, toward practice and 
action.611 The notion of language games introduces this concept by proposing that meaning 
derives in practice, and not from correspondence between external objects and what they are 
named.612 Understanding, in this view, follows from know-how as encapsulated in both 
knowing how to identify a concept, and knowing how to act in relation to the concept.613 
Importantly, language games are implicitly linked to rules, 614 but in Wittgenstein’s theory these 
rules do not represent external facts reflective of an objective reality.615 Rather, Wittgenstein 
proposes that the rules of a language game exist only in practice.616 In this regard, Bloor 
explains that Wittgenstein proposes that rules appear as if they exist in an objective reality as 
a result of unreflective practice. In this instance, the illusion is created that rules exist separate 
from practice, but the former only result from the degree to which socialisation of rules allows 
humans to behave mechanistically in practice.617 In Wittgenstein’s view, rules therefore exist 
only as socially constituted, and are self-referential in as far as they can be understood only in 
the context of the actions they represent in a particular practice, and the way these actions are 
described.618 As participation in a language game requires the use of rules, the quality of 
performance against the rule becomes the criteria for justification.619 However, both the rule 
and the judgement of performance against the rule originate from social agreement in a 
                                                
610 This observation is based on the interpretation of Tell’s argument relating to Wittgenstein’s description of the 
ideal as unshakable in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Tell, F. 2004: 458: “The philosophy of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953, 1972) and his idea of certainty and rules shed some light on the justification 
context for institutional knowledge. We are justified in adhering to certainties in playing language-games. 
Public knowledge has its limits—as it were—on the outside. We may run into the walls of language, finding 
its constituent logic inexpressible within the realm of language itself. “The ideal, as we think of it, is 
unshakable. You can never get outside it; you must always turn back. There is no outside; outside you cannot 
breathe. – Where does this idea come from? It is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see 
whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off.” (Wittgenstein, 1953: 45).” 
611 See Pradhan, R.C. 2008: 22 
612 Moyal-Sharrock, D. 2011 
613 Schatzki, T. 2005: 62 – 63 
614 Tell, F. 2004: 458 
615 Bloor, D.  2005: 104 
616 Bloor, D. 2005: 104 
617 Bloor, D. 2005:104 
618 Bloor, D. 2005: 114 
619 Tell, F. 2004: 458: “Certainty, as well as rules, is shared within a community of practitioners of language-
games. Wittgenstein argues that the one way to find out something about the rule is by playing the game—
using the rule. This does not mean, however, that the rules of the game are completely arbitrary. Actually, you 
play ‘well’ (i.e. perform) from the standpoint of the rule. We learn the functions of rules and become trained 
to obey ‘orders’ presented to us by them.” 
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particular community.620 Unlike the notion of procedural justification, there is then no basis in 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy for arguing that the knower can stand objectively, and removed, 
from the procedure through which knowledge is gained, as these procedures exist only as the 
action of knowing subjects and not as a set of rules for uncovering knowledge independent of 
knowing subjects.621 
For Tell, Wittgenstein’s rules represent a form of life that defines the context in which the 
knowing subject exists. Tell’s argument, regarding forms of life, in turn relates to his idea that 
justification of institutional knowledge takes place against an external structure, as “a form of 
life is shared and not internal to one single unit.”622  Here, Tell proposes that the external 
structure of justification, invoked through rules and certainty, represents an important 
distinction between Wittgenstein and Polanyi’s philosophies. Whereas Polanyi conceives of 
tacit knowing as inherently private, Tell interprets Wittgenstein’s notion of certainty as 
inextricably linked to “something that by its nature must be public since it is part of a game.”623 
The notion of an external structure to the justification of institutional knowledge resides on the 
one hand in the rules of a language game, as in Tell’s interpretation these are public, if not 
always explicit, while on the other hand it is located in that which is taken for granted. This 
notion of certainty does not imply absolute truth, but rather shared understanding within a 
community where language games take place.624 In this regard, Tell’s interpretation of certainty 
appears to draw on the idea that there are agreed and accepted ways of knowing, which are 
imparted through socialisation and training in various language games.625  
                                                
620 Compare Shotter, J. and Katz, A.M. 1999: 81: “In other words, the activity of explaining thing belongs, as 
Wittgenstein (1953) would say, to a particular “form of life” with its associated “language-game”. As such, it 
belongs to a particular disciplinary sphere of human activity in which one must ‘get things right’: in such 
spheres, one must act according to pre-established standards, and talk and/or write about things in accord with 
procedures for proving one’s statements true.” 
621 Tell, F. 2004: 458 
622 Tell, F. 2004: 458 
623 Tell, F. 2004: 458. As argued by Tell this also represents the primary difference between his and Tsoukas’ 
interpretations of Wittgenstein and Polanyi. Tell’s distinction between the structure of justification as internal 
and external results in his instance on treating the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Polanyi as separate (see 
Tell, F. 2004: 465) compared to Tsoukas’ “fusion” of the two philosophies based on the commonalities of 
social construction (see Tsoukas, H. 2005: chapter 5) 
624 Tell, F. 2004: 458 “The justification mode for institutional knowledge is performance; it is the practical 
actions that determine how well the game is played (understood). Even though the rules are socially 
constructed, they provide the form of life in which the knower resides. A form of life is shared and not 
internal to one single unit, hence institutional knowledge is provided by external justification.” 
625 Also compare Stickney, J. 2008 
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The foregoing argument regarding the external structure of justification in institutional 
knowledge plays an important role in Tell’s interpretation of organisational knowledge 
practices that align to this ideal type.626 While he acknowledges that external constructions can 
straddle divergent organisations and provide a shared framework for action, his particular 
concern is with the isolating effects of varying justification criteria, which result from the 
conflicting practices represented in a single organisation. As justification criteria are 
determined by the community to which practitioners belong, this implies than in any given 
organisation627 there is representation from a diversity of practices, each with a potentially 
different set of criteria for justifying knowledge. To exemplify this, Tell refers to differences 
that result when viewing knowledge from the practice of scientific research compared to the 
practice of commerce. Whereas scientific research emphasises justification by doing things 
correctly, commerce emphasises justification by doing things profitably. The extent of these 
differences touches on pragmatic concerns relating to what is considered relevant in a particular 
“thought world”. Justification is therefore determined by its ability to deliver on practical 
concerns.628 For Tell, the presence of institutional knowledge, understood as representing 
divergent rules, where performance is measured in practice, implies multiple interest groups 
“all justified in different forms of life,”629 representing the potential for conflict. The latter is 
expressed in ideas that are contradictory, and the failure of different departments to understand 
each other’s point of view. From Tell’s commentary, it appears that he views the resolution of 
such conflict as particularly difficult, given that justification criteria draw on practices that are 
external to the organisation and can only be evaluated in performance.630 
                                                
626 Tell, F. 2004: 459: “ . . . Tell’s (1997) contemporary study of a joint venture between an electrical equipment 
manufacturer and a utility shows that there is divergence in institutional knowledge in the relations between 
the researchers working in the joint venture and its principal owners. This stems from the roots they have in 
the scientific community vs. the commercial community. The researchers attack problems in a way that is 
highly scientific and problem-solving, justified by their background as trained researchers acting in a research 
community. The principals of the joint venture inhabit another life-world, where products and efficiency 
count. They are justified by the way they are able to satisfy customer and shareholder expectations and needs, 
provide products and attain profitability.” 
627 Organisation here is used loosely to also include cross-organisational co-operation 
628 Tell, F. 2004: 459 
629 Tell, F. 2004: 459 
630 Tell, F. 2004: 459 – 460: “Diverging world-pictures and rules develop in different parts of the organization. 
In development projects, these rules collide and tension is created. People come from different departments 
with different ways of thinking.  . . . In these situations, different ideas clash and organization members feel 
that they are ‘speaking different languages’ (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995: 99). In each institutional context, 
organization members develop diverging coding schemes (Allen, 1977: 139) or, rather, rules for their coding 
schemes. This kind of institutional knowledge thus implies justification with reference to an external 
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4.5 Dynamics of organisational knowledge 
In expanding on the relationships between the different justification contexts, and the resulting 
ideal types of knowledge, Tell argues that the different contexts are interrelated through the 
support and contradiction they represent in relation to each other, as well as the transformation 
of the ideal types from one type to another.631 Elaborating on this argument, he focusses mainly 
on illustrating how different processes of justification affect organisational activities.  
4.5.1 Objectification 
As far as the justification of objective knowledge is concerned, Tell focusses on the process of 
codification as an example of the objectification of knowledge. Codification is related to the 
commodification of knowledge, i.e. an object, that can be purchased and re-used, providing the 
organisation with benefits such as a reduction in time spent on knowledge creation. At the same 
time, codification is considered an attractive option for organisations, due to its perceived 
benefit as protecting the organisation from knowledge losses that result from an over-
dependence on tacit knowledge.632 From the point of view of justification, Tell argues that, 
when organisations place a strong emphasis on the context of objective justification, at least 
two discernible influences on other justification activities are likely. Firstly, practices involved 
in justifying knowledge through other means may be discarded in favour of objectification, 
while secondly a focus on the need to for example codify knowledge “may serve as a ‘reality 
check’ in localized organizational practices.”633 The latter is specifically contextualised 
against the justification requirements of objective knowledge, as focussed on external and 
procedural means of arriving at knowledge. In this regard, arguably the outcome in the 
organisation would be an increased focus on how to translate local justification criteria into 
more general terms that would withstand the requirements of objective justification.  
4.5.2 Personalisation 
As a second transformation of knowledge, Tell identifies the personalisation of objective, 
subjective and institutional knowledge as the development of individual skills and routines in 
the organisational context. The process is arguably akin to what Nonaka describes as the 
internalisation of external knowledge, in as far as the objective here is to develop personal skill, 
                                                
community of practitioners (Brown J.S. and Duguid, P. 1991: 49), which is hard to articulate because it can be 
evaluated only on the grounds of performance.” 
631 Tell, F. 2004: 460 
632 Principe, A. and Tell, F. 2001: 1376 
633 Tell, F. 2004: 460 
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resulting from processes such as learning, in which externalised knowledge becomes justified 
through action as personal.634 In Tell’s conceptualisation of personalisation, the outcome is 
focussed on the results achieved in performance and action, as individuals develop the 
capabilities required for skilful practice. On the level of individuals, the notion of 
personalisation is related to the skill of knowledge workers, both in relation to their productive 
capacity and the growing reliance of organisations on knowledge workers. In the case of the 
productive capacity of workers, Tell argues that the skills organisational members develop over 
time, in practice become an important source of organisational efficiency attached to specific 
individuals.635  
The professionalisation of work, and the growing level of expertise embodied in knowledge 
workers, implies, in Tell’s line of reasoning, an organisational recognition of the importance 
of the personal justification context. In this regard, it is possible to argue that the implicit value 
which organisations place on the skill of professional and expert knowledge workers, combined 
with the extent to which it is precisely this skill that is “sold” by knowledge-intensive 
organisations, acts as an implied acceptance of personal justification. The importance of 
personal knowledge in this instance is further reinforced by the notion that economic value in 
this instance, is the capacity, rather than the tangibility of skills, that is represented by 
knowledge workers.636  
4.5.3 Institutionalisation 
Tell relates the dynamic of institutional knowledge closely to the notion of communities of 
practice (CoP) as proposed by Brown and Duguid. The CoP perspective underscores the extra-
organisational nature of work practice, and the bearing this has on an individual, and therefore 
ultimately organisational knowledge. In the context of justification, Tell argues that CoP, as a 
source of justification, emphasises the degree to which participation and action “serve as the 
primary ground for knowledge claims.”637 Practice and knowledge, in this view, are conceived 
                                                
634 Compare Nonaka, I. 1994: 19: “The other [mode] is the conversion of explicit knowledge into tacit 
knowledge, which bears some similarity to the traditional notion of “learning” and will be referred to here as 
“internalization”.” 
635 Also see Lindkvist, L. Soderlund, J. and Tell. F. 1998: 944: “Such learning and knowledge then reside in 
individuals and remain largely ‘tacit’ rather than becoming firmly crystallized in impersonal guidelines . . .” 
636 Tell, F. 2004: 461. Also compare Winch, G. and Schneider, E. 1993: 923-924: “. . . what distinguishes a 
profession is that its ‘product’ is sufficiently intangible to prevent it from being traded as a commodity, yet 
sufficiently standardized to allow it [to] be differentiated from services provided by others, and therefore 
traded widely. It is this standardized intangibility which is central the KBO [Knowledge Based 
Organization].” 
637 Tell, F. 2004: 461 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 115 
of as ultimately being more reflective of sub-cultures of shared identities than of the overall 
organisational culture. Resulting from this view, there is a strong sense of the external 
influences on organisational knowledge, questioning the notion of the degree to which 
organisational culture and identity influence institutional knowledge. Instead, the CoP thesis 
proposes that knowledge is institutionalised within organisations across members engaged in 
similar work, and outside of organisations through members’ shared identities in a particular 
profession.638 A consequence of this weaker notion of a single internal shared identity is the 
possibility for internal organisational conflict, resulting from the distinct views of knowledge 
associated with different CoP.639 Tell argues that such conflicts may be both conducive, and 
limiting, to the creation of organisational knowledge, as disagreements may, on one hand lead 
to novel ideas, but simultaneously act as a barrier for the acceptance of knowledge claims 
against justification criteria that are not shared organisationally. Simultaneously, the possibility 
exists that institutional knowledge creates pressure towards conformity and in the process 
counteracts the ability of the organisation to generate new knowledge, as justification criteria 
are forced into a unified approach. In Tell’s view the risk of this occurring is particularly great 
when institutional knowledge is viewed as “facts . . . and taken for granted.”640 In similar 
fashion to von Krogh, he points here to the difficulty of attempting to change accepted practice 
in order to allow for justification criteria to be influenced. 
4.5.4 Subjectification 
Tell’s notion of subjectification can be conceived of as the process of justifying knowledge 
through coherently relating general, personal and institutional knowledge to an organisational 
system of beliefs. The emphasis here is therefore on localising knowledge by creating 
coherence. The latter results in procedures that are specific to the organisation, and in 
interpretations of knowledge that reflect the organisational ideology. In this sense, 
subjectification ties knowledge to the local context and, through enunciation, acts as a process 
of creating mutual understanding.641 Subjective knowledge, however, also establishes the 
relationship between representation and action, as subjectification firstly draws on the reasoned 
                                                
638 See Brown J.S. and Duguid, P. 2001: 201-202 
639 Tell, F. 2004: 461: “Diverging institutional knowledge may thus become a hindrance to communication and 
the sharing of knowledge within the organization . . . However, institutional knowledge and its justification 
context can also be conforming and preserving, leading to isomorphic pressures on organizations”. Also see 
Brown J.S. and Duguid, P. 2001: 202 
640 Tell, F. 2004: 462 
641 Tell, F. 2004: 462 
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process of relating action to organisational belief systems, and secondly provides the “sense 
and ‘cues’”642 that enable organisations to act.  
In the first instance Tell relates subjective knowledge to Weick and Roberts’ concepts of the 
collective mind and heedfulness.643 As a concept, the collective mind represents the proposal 
that the interrelationship between the actions of individuals working toward a shared purpose 
constitutes a capacity of the social group. The concept of mind here is intended to convey a 
disposition “to act in a certain manner or style.”644 When individual action is considered, rather 
than being rash or habitual, this action is characterised by heedfulness, and it is through heedful 
action toward a joint purpose that the collective mind emerges and becomes more intelligent.645 
For Tell the collective mind relates to justification through the characteristic of shared purpose, 
which he argues creates an internal mechanism of justification. Shared purpose then provides 
the justification for action, and in the context of the intelligence of the collective mind, 
heedfulness is required in the system and is achieved through reflection. This “reflection on 
action”646 is a process of reasoning about coherence, based on the local context in relation to 
the shared purpose.647 Organisational narratives are one of the processes that transmit and 
organise heedful action, by coherently relating the various aspects of knowledge, outcomes and 
meanings in a single story.648 As described by Weick “A good story holds elements together, 
which enables it to serve as guide for sensemaking and organizing.”649 In relation to the 
divergence that institutional knowledge implies, subjective knowledge plays an important role 
in relating various practices in the organisations to a coherent system, i.e. the collective mind. 
As the requirement for justification here is found in heedfulness, it implies, according to Tell, 
a different mode of justification to that which is involved in pure practice or global rationality. 
What matters in this sense is context and the ability to relate action to a shared purpose.650 
The second link between representation and action is established through the framework for 
action that subjective knowledge provides, both as the content of justified organisational 
                                                
642 Tell, F. 2004: 463 
643 Tell, F. 2004: 462 
644 Weick, K.E. and Roberts, K.H. 1993: 361 
645 Weick K.E. and Roberts, K.H.  1993: 364 - 365 
646 Tell, F. 2004: 462 
647 Tell, F. 2004: 462 
648 Tell, F. 2004: 462 and Weick, K.E. and Roberts, K.H. 1993: 368 
649 Weick, K.E. 2011: 149 
650 Tell, F. 2004: 462 - 463 
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knowledge, and as the processes for evaluation of knowledge.651 In relating subjective 
knowledge to a framework for organisational action, Tell loosely draws on Weick,652 and 
arguably proposes the general notion that a shared system of beliefs, such as that envisaged 
through subjective knowledge, guides organisational action.653 In attempting to direct action, 
subjective knowledge may be codified as normative organisational expectations which 
represent a purposeful effort to create consistent action.654 As explained by Tsoukas,655 there 
is, however, a consistent tension between the normative and the practical in any given situation. 
This tension becomes resolved through local judgement of what makes sense under a particular 
set of circumstances. In Tell’s argument the acknowledgement of such tension illustrates a 
further basis for the relationship between subjective knowledge and action, which results from 
the conflict between expectations and ongoing action. Here Tell is particularly concerned with 
the creation of variety in knowledge systems that results from noise and creative chaos, which 
is resolved by drawing on divergent justification mechanisms which result in increasing 
organisational complexity.656  
4.6 Implications 
When considering the implications of Tell’s framework, there are three underlying arguments 
that enrich an understanding of justification in practice-based theory. Primary among these is 
Tell’s adoption of pluralism - an argument which underscores the complexity of the knowledge 
construct and concomitantly of justification practice. Crucially, this recognition of plurality in 
Tell’s framework allows for organisationally relevant knowledge to include justification 
beyond that which can be explicitly stated and agreed upon. The second implication draws on 
the positioning of justification as a shared organisational activity. While Tell’s notion of the 
                                                
651 Tell, F. 2004: 463: “[Subjectification] also occurs in the design of policy documents, administrative 
structures and other formal organizational devices that purport to code organizational expectations of its 
members. Such normative expectations are, compared with institutionally rule-based and situated practices in 
organizations, to some extent manageable by organizations (Tsoukas, 1996). However, inherently ‘open’ 
internal concepts may also induce organizational action through provocation, and force organization members 
to shun what is conceived of as ‘objectively possible’ through interpretation in daily activities, making them 
‘more noisy’ (Tsoukas, 1997) and creating ‘creative chaos’ (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). In this way 
organizations are able to complexify themselves as these subjective conceptualizations meet other justification 
mechanisms, generating greater variety in local knowledge systems.” 
652 Tell, F. 2004: 463. “Subjectification in this sense facilitates organizational action through its ability to 
provide sense and cues.” 
653 See Weick, K.E. 1995: 04 & 65 
654 Tell, F. 2004: 463. Also compare Tsoukas, H. 1996: 22 
655 Tsoukas, H. 1996: 22 
656 Tell, F. 2004: 463 
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justification context of subjective knowledge shows parallels with that of managerial 
justification theory, it also brings to mind the ongoing nature of justification as an activity that 
is not only of concern for the creation of new knowledge, but a characteristic of organisational 
sensemaking. Finally, it is argued that Tell’s framework draws attention to the extra-
organisational influences on justification practice, including those originating independently of 
the organisation and accepted as unproblematically true. 
4.6.1 Pluralist justification 
Although the notion of a pluralist epistemology is, arguably, not a highly-developed concept 
in KM,657 pluralistic approaches share certain common characteristics across the field of KM, 
philosophy and epistemology.  In this regard, epistemic pluralism has two broad implications 
for understanding validation from a KM perspective, both of which are discernible in Tell’s 
work. Firstly, pluralism is offered as an alternative to monist conceptions of knowledge in 
various forms. Secondly, resulting from this, pluralism maintains a degree of complexity, rather 
than dogmatism in the knowledge construct.658 
Arguably one of the most important contributions of Tell’s approach to justification is its 
inclusion of non-propositional justification criteria. By allowing for this inclusive approach, 
and furthermore by not situating personal knowledge merely in the realm of the pre-articulated, 
Tell addresses, from a validation point of view, one of the more fundamental issues in KM 
theory, namely the exclusion of tacit knowledge as a relevant concern in justification.659 
Consequently, Tell does not reduce the validation concern in the case of tacit knowledge to a 
model where explication is required.660 In relation to the exclusion of tacit knowledge, 
Schneider argues that tacit knowledge, more so than explicit knowledge, represents the primary 
source of advantage in the KE. As a result proposals such as that of Schreyögg and Geiger (see 
Chapter 2), to employ the validation of knowledge as a means to exclude tacit knowledge from 
                                                
657 While pluralism is often implicit in the work of many authors in the KM field, it is seldom referred to as 
such. Blackler (Blacker, F. 1993) for example does not explicitly refer to his own approach as pluralist and 
Spender, in his foreword to Boisot’s Knowledge Assets (Boisot, M. 1998), classifies Boisot’s framework as 
pluralist, while Boisot himself refrains from discussing pluralism in any detail 
658 Compare Nicolini, D. 2009: 488 – 489 and Schneider, U. 2007: 628 - 629 
659 Compare Schneider, U. 2007: 627, who criticizes Schreyögg and Geiger’s proposal for the requirement that 
validation can only take place where “propositions, as well as arguments, need to be stated in language.”  
660 von Krogh, in his collaborations with Nonaka, serves as an example of the idea that the organisational 
justification of tacit knowledge involves only forms of tacit knowledge that have been explicated. For 
example, von Krogh, G., Kazuo, I. and Nonaka, I. (2000: 94-97) describe how new knowledge is created 
through firstly “sharing tacit knowledge”, followed by “creating concepts” from this knowledge and in the 
justification phase evaluating the concept. 
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the knowledge construct in KM, is seen as reducing knowledge validation, in the context of the 
KE, to something of only marginal interest to organisations in practice.661 Concerning the 
limitation on validation as applying to tacit knowledge only once it has been explicated, 
Harmon662 points to traditional epistemology as firstly ignoring non-propositional knowledge 
and secondly being incapable of providing justification criteria for knowledge that has not been 
explicated. The first of these issues relates to Schneider’s criticism and is a fundamental 
limitation of monist conceptions of knowledge as propositional or linguistic only.663 In this 
sense, traditional epistemology cannot provide justification criteria for knowledge that is purely 
justified in action. Even though Nonaka, and later von Krogh’s, theory of justification in the 
KCC draws on criticism of traditional philosophical approaches, this limitation of classical 
epistemology has been retained in their approaches in as far as any organisational justification 
of knowledge requires knowledge to be propositional (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.2.1). An 
important outcome of Tell’s pluralist framework is therefore to position the justification of 
knowledge in KM away from epistemology’s concern with propositional knowledge, toward 
KM’s concern with knowledge as action. Here Tell’s notion of personal knowledge is viewed 
as a legitimate use of the terminology “to know”, as the grounds for this claim are recognised 
as existing at the level of the individual and proven through her ability to act skilfully. 
The second contribution from Tell’s theory relates to the general nature of pluralist approaches 
and their objective to supplement, rather than subtract from, the concept of knowledge. In this 
regard, in as much as pluralism in KM evolved as a critique of positivism,664 it is not an attempt 
at denying the validity of scientific methods of knowing, but rather an argument to draw 
attention to the limitations of the view of knowledge encapsulated in positivist epistemology. 
Pluralism, in this sense, is an argument for recognising that the positivist view of knowledge 
must be complemented by other forms of knowledge.665 This notion, of the partiality of 
positivism, finds expression in the acknowledgement of the duality of knowledge, and the 
                                                
661 See Schneider, U. 2007: 627: “If knowledge management is guided by such a narrow concept, efforts will 
concentrate on only the tip of the iceberg. As briefly pointed out above the creation of competitive advantage 
depends on the interplay between knowledge and knowing and needs to include the tacit, procedural and 
intuitive side.” 
662 Harmon, I. 2014: 02 
663 Compare Harmon, I. 2014: 84 
664 See Spender, J.C. 1996. Note that this characteristic of Spender’s epistemological pluralism in KM is shared 
with the philosophical treatment of epistemic pluralism as discussed by Healy, S. 2003   
665 Healy. S. 2003: 694 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 120 
necessity of the co-existence of different ways of knowing for either to have meaning.666 
Following authors who support pluralist views of knowledge in KM, the acceptance of the 
plurality of epistemologies and knowledge “types” allows the notion of knowledge to retain its 
complexity. This complexity is seen as a method to enrich theorising and thinking,667 rather 
than the “evidence of disabling fragmentation”668 in KM. Therefore, pluralism’s plea for 
tolerance of difference is a proposal for discourse between different epistemologies669 which 
allows the complexity of the knowledge concept to be kept intact. Schneider’s argument on the 
“fuzziness” of the knowledge concept illustrates that this complexity is useful, not only in KM 
theory, but also practice, as it mirrors the complexity of management activities.670 A similar 
argument is proposed by Glynn et al,671 who take on board Weick’s advice to complicate 
organisational theorizing rather than simplify it, and further argue that pluralist theories achieve 
more accurate representations of organisational complexity.  
Against this background, if Tell’s claim is accepted, that knowledge is a word used in 
organisations where the acceptability of its use is determined by situated, collective evaluation 
of its use,672 there can be no objective measure for justification criteria, as only practice 
determines what is acceptable in given circumstances. In this sense, the justification concept in 
the organisation is kept open, and organisational members can claim to know on different and 
competing grounds. Which grounds for justification prevail, is then determined in practice. 
Justification in this sense remains a complex process even if there are generally discernible 
patterns on which claims to validity draw.  
  
                                                
666 Spender, J.C. 1998: 236 
667 Nicolini, D. 2009: 490 
668 Spender, J.C. and Scherer, A.C. 2007: 13 
669 Spender, J.C. and Scherer, A.C. 2007: 15 - 16 “ . . . every workable epistemology gathers up more or less the 
same components and, because of that, different epistemologies can be present within the same discourse. So 
epistemologies are not incommensurable and unable to enter a discourse but may be incommensurate in the 
various notions of knowledge each allows.”   
670 Schneider, U. 2007: 630: “It is this awareness of multiple perspectives in their own right, which I term 
enlightened fuzziness. Only after having thought about many alternatives can a sound decision be taken for 
one of them and later easily reversed. In contrast to this, are those selections directed by tradition, coincidence 
or dogmatic insistence on a one sided view.” 
671 Glynn, M.A., Barr, P.S. and Dacin, M.S. 2000: 728: “What has resulted is an emphasis that overlooks or 
occasionally disadvantages the study of pluralism and its attendant politics in organizations. . . . our theorizing 
seems to have emphasized generalizability and simplicity over accuracy . . . Thus, we suggest ways of 
responding to Weick’s (1979) admonition to be more “complicated” in our thinking and, perhaps, theorizing 
that advantages complexity and pluralism.” 
672 Tell, F. 2004: 446 - 447 
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4.6.2 Management as the coordination of justification practices 
Tell’s emphasis on the nature of institutional knowledge as drawing on divergent practices, and 
as open to external influences, accentuates the role of management in homogenising 
justification criteria toward coherence and shared interest. In this regard Tell observes that “An 
important strategy for dealing with the variety of institutional influences on the organizations’ 
knowledge is the use of subjective knowledge as a justification principle.”673 At the same time, 
the divergence in institutional knowledge is seen as a source of innovation.674 This idea is 
reinforced in Brown and Duguid’s comment that it is the ability of organisations to co-ordinate 
diverse practices which underpins competitiveness in the KE.675 The impact of this 
understanding in KM theory is commonly expressed in the idea that successful knowledge 
creation requires cross-functional teamwork, but by the nature of conflicting knowledge bases, 
such endeavours require management to engage in providing a unifying framework.676 In one 
sense, organisational knowledge creation in Tell’s theory can therefore be understood as the 
process through which, in the context of subjective knowledge justification, both concepts and 
internal procedures are created, which provides a common framework across divergent forms 
of institutional knowledge. In both Tell’s discussion and KM theory generally, this requirement 
takes on two discernible forms. On the one hand it focusses specifically on the requirements of 
purposeful attempts at organisational knowledge creation. Von Krogh and Nonaka for example 
argue for the creation of a knowledge vision which translates organisation strategy into “the 
types and contents of knowledge to be created . . . thereby [providing] clear direction to the 
members of microcommunities [sic] within an organisation.”677 On the other hand, it focusses 
on the general organisational need for collective sensemaking. Concepts here are expressed, 
amongst others, in narratives emphasizing organisational members’ ability to derive coherence 
from a unifying story.678 Justification in this sense appears closely linked to Weick’s proposal 
that it is “understood as discourse that introduces legitimacy and stability into social 
action.”679 As a general function of management, Tell’s notion of subjective knowledge, as 
                                                
673 Tell, F. 2004: 463 
674 Tell, F. 2004: 461 
675 Brown, J.S. and Duguid, P. 2001: 207: “Ultimately, an organization’s competitive edge, and hence survival, 
depends on its unique ability to coordinate knowledge across these divisions . . . better than both its 
competitors and the marketplace” 
676 See for example Un, C.A. and Cuervo-Cazzuro, A. 2004: S29 and Nonaka, I. 1994: 29 
677 von Krogh, G., Ichijo, K. and Nonaka, I. 2000: 115 
678 Tell, F. 2004: 462 - 463 
679 Weick, K. E. 2011: 144 
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providing the necessary “normative expectations”680 for action, is echoed in management 
theory which underscores the importance of common sensemaking in organisations. This 
approach to sensemaking emphasizes the need to create procedures which lend predictability 
to the behaviour of organisational members.681 This role, which Tell allocates to subjective 
knowledge, is arguably wider than the subjective knowledge at play when new organisational 
knowledge is justified. In this sense it emphasises how attempts toward maintaining coherence 
in divergent justification practices are an ongoing process of stimulating “reflection on action.”  
4.6.3 Influences on organisational justification 
Related to the former, Tell’s conceptualisation of justification entails a much broader notion of 
how justification in organisations takes place, as well as the extent to which it is influenced by 
justification criteria and practices not originating within the organisation. In this regard, both 
Tell’s argument that justification needs to be understood as prevalent across organisational 
practices,682 as well as the idea of the structure of justification originating externally to knowing 
subjects (be that organisations or individuals), have a number of important implications for an 
understanding of justification and knowledge as subject to, and developing in relation to, 
external influences. Firstly, the justification context of objective knowledge raises awareness 
of how the codification and embedding of knowledge resulting from the adoption of external 
criteria, affects the unproblematic acceptance of its justified nature. Tell’s conceptualisation of 
objective knowledge draws on familiar images of knowledge as artefacts that have been 
abstracted and “systematically formalized and codified.”683 This is the image of knowledge as 
an object, abstracted from its context and presented as “confirmed facts.”684 In as much the 
justification context of objective knowledge creates true artefacts, i.e. knowledge encoded in 
documents and embedded in technology, 685 Tsoukas,686 as well as Robertson et al,687 indicate 
how the same principles apply to the practice of expert work in the KE. Here Tsoukas defines 
the expert system as an “impersonal system of knowledge and expertise whose validity is 
                                                
680 Tell, F. 2004: 463 
681 Clegg, S. Kornberger, M. Pitsis, T. 2011: 20 
682 Tell, F. 2004: 445 
683 Boisot, M. 1998: 13 
684 Knorr Cetina, K. 1981: 30 
685 This classification draws on the knowledge distinctions identified in Kinghorn, J. 2007 
686 Tsoukas, H. 2005: Chapter 2 
687 Robertson, M. Scarbrough, H. and Swan, J. 2003 
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independent of those drawing on [it].”688 Moreover the validity of expert systems, by virtue of 
the “impersonal” evaluation criteria applied to them, is implicitly trusted, and justification in 
this sense is assumed.689 Where organisations therefore engage in procuring knowledge, be that 
as an object or service, they neither determine nor engage with the criteria that justify this 
knowledge. In this regard Robertson et al describes the process of procuring the services of a 
technology firm as one characterised by a the client’s disinterest in the process of justifying 
knowledge, as the final product is justified by its status as a patent.690 
A second implication of Tell’s understanding of justification practices relates to Tsoukas’ 
observation that trust in the validity of knowledge created by expert systems is also a function 
of ignorance.691 Arguably in the KE where organisations are continually becoming increasingly 
reliant on the skills of expert workers, 692 the likelihood of managerial ignorance of specialised 
justification practice is much greater.693 In this sense, organisations will inevitably place more 
trust in the validity of knowledge without necessarily understanding the criteria on which this 
is based. Therefore, while one can acknowledge that managerial standards of justification are 
likely to reference the overall subjective knowledge context of the organisation, justification at 
this level does often implicitly assume functioning justification practices at lower or specialist 
levels in the organisation.694  
Related to the former, a third implication of Tell’s external dimension of knowledge 
justification is the extent to which it allows for a relationship to exist between justification 
practice in and outside of the organisation. In this regard authors such as Brown and Duguid695, 
                                                
688 Tsoukas, H. 2005: 50 
689 Tsoukas, H. 2005: 50 and Robertson, M. Scarbrough, H. and Swan, J. 2003: 847 
690 Robertson, M. Scarbrough, H. and Swan, J. 2003: 848 
691 Tsoukas, H. 2005: 50: “Drawing on expert systems implies an attitude of trust in the expectations provided 
by them: a belief that such systems do work as they are supposed to. Trust in expert systems is related to 
absence in time and space as well as to ignorance. I have no idea how my computer functions, but I do rely 
upon those who have made it, who are physically absent from me, to guarantee that it does function as it is 
meant to.” 
692 Blackler, F. 1995: 1029 
693 Brown, J.S. and Duguid, P. 2001: 201: “However, while accepting that firms may provide some degree of 
common culture for their members, it seems important to consider, for example, how much a CEO and a 
technician in a large Fortune 500 company really have in common.” 
694 While this implication is raised here against a the justification context of objective knowledge, it is not 
necessarily limited to this expectation with regards to the capacity of knowledge workers, but could equally 
relate to the trust placed in the personal skills and practice of knowledge workers 
695 Brown, J.S. and Duguid, P. 2001: 203 
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as well as Swan et al,696 comment on the importance of the membership of individuals in 
organisations to networks, by virtue of practice and professions, as this effectively mediates 
the relationship between the organisation and the environment. Knowledge and ideas, in this 
sense, flow between organisations as a feature of the networks to which individuals belong.697 
While on the one hand membership of such networks reinforces justification criteria that are 
accepted,698 it simultaneously represents the channel through which the justification of new 
innovations or practice develops and reaches the organisation. Further to understanding how 
this occurs in management practice as discussed in Chapter 3, it is worth noting the nature of 
legitimisation that can occur in such networks, as the latter illustrates the basis for different 
means of justification. Here Newell et al699 amongst others draw attention to the legitimation 
of knowledge in networks as originating from illustrated and tangible benefits, or the invention 
of concepts and rhetoric that legitimate a claim, or finally through the pressure toward adoption 
created in such networks. Where justification criteria develop from shared experience, they 
become concrete examples of practice that have worked elsewhere, and the reasons that 
accompany a knowledge claim can be expressed in familiar ways, often reiterating accepted 
criteria in specific communities, i.e. improved efficiency or increased profitability.700 In 
contrast knowledge claims that are ambiguous, to a large degree “invent” their own justification 
criteria that attempt to establish a relationship with more familiar criteria. Such knowledge 
claims are for example justified by being “best practice”, a criterion which is purposefully 
open-ended, thereby allowing for a multitude of possible specific organisational needs to be 
addressed by it. As a defining characteristic of social networks it facilitates the creation of 
awareness of the activities of other members. In this sense one of the aspects of knowledge 
flow in networks is knowledge of who is engaged in certain activities. This knowledge can act 
as justification for the adoption of new practices or ideas by creating “pressure” either based 
on the degree of adoption in the network (i.e. “all organisations in the industry are doing this”) 
or by the perceived importance of adopters (i.e. “the industry leader has adopted this”). 701 
  
                                                
696 Swan, J., Scarbrough, H. and Robertson, M. 2002: 479 
697 Abrahamson, E. and Rosenkopf, L. 1997: 290 
698 This leads to the isomorphic nature of institutional knowledge as indicated by Tell, F. 2004: 461 
699 Newell, S. Robertson, M. and Swan, J. 2001. 
700 Newell, S. Robertson, M. and Swan, J. 2001: 07 and Abrahamson, E. and Rosenkopf, L. 1997: 291 - 292 
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4.7 Limitations 
In as much as Tell’s pluralist approach allows for conflicting justification practices to exist 
simultaneously, his framework does not address the possibility that certain justification 
practices may be privileged over others in the context of organisations. To a certain extent 
Tell’s framework here therefore shares with that of von Krogh a lack of consideration for the 
practical impact of political and conflicting undertones in establishing justification practice. A 
second limitation of Tell’s proposal results from his separation of the justification of personal 
knowledge from other justification contexts. In this regard, it is possible to argue that the 
pluralist framework proposed by Tell places emphasis on distinguishing knowledge ideal types 
at the cost of maintaining the inherent complexity of justification as inseparably tied to a tacit 
component. The final limitation considered here relates to the requirement of pluralist KM 
theory to provide a detailed understanding of the interaction between justification contexts. 
Here, the argument is put forward that Tell’s pluralist framework does not provide a sufficiently 
detailed understanding of the full scope of interaction and complexity that would result from 
the simultaneous existence of multiple justification practices and contexts.   
4.7.1 Privileging of knowledge in practice 
Outside of the realm of KM, there is a growing realisation in epistemic pluralism of the bias 
inherent in the justification of particular claims to knowledge. In the philosophy of science, 
Healy argues that the realisation of epistemic pluralism in practice, is constrained by the 
“epistemic sovereignty” of scientific knowledge.702 Amongst others, the former is evident in 
the questioning of justification criteria that are not based on acknowledged scientific 
procedures. Similarly Teffo703 argues that western philosophical thought, in general, has 
marginalised and discounted other ways of knowing. As a result acceptance of knowledge can 
only be achieved by adhering to standards set externally to the social systems within which it 
developed. Following the arguments of these authors, it appears that for pluralism to amount 
to more than the theoretical legitimisation of different ways of claiming to know, it needs to 
address the practical constraints that epistemic sovereignty implies.  
In the context of KM, the impact of the former on practice is noted as a preference among 
managers for quantified abstracted knowledge, i.e. the justification context of objective 
                                                
702 Healy, S. 2003: 696 
703 Teffo, L. 2011 
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knowledge.704 While Tell acknowledges that divergent justification criteria can result in 
conflict, his theoretical proposal does not address the potential for the unequal treatment which 
different grounds for knowing may receive in practice. Although this constraint is arguably 
related to the fact that his framework is intended as a clarification of justification criteria, rather 
than a practical guide to managing justification, the absence of consideration of this 
requirement creates a perhaps naïve view of justification practices in organisations. 
Furthermore, this limitation needs to be viewed against the broader critique of pluralism in 
general as not sufficiently concerned with the structural nature of influence.705  
In Tell’s model, subjective knowledge determines the meaning framework for organisational 
action, and, at the organisational level, is effective in achieving this by providing a 
homogenising framework for action. Considering that this is a function of managerial practice, 
and that this practice will be influenced by both institutional and external knowledge, bias, or 
preference for, a particular form of justification will find expression in the meaning framework 
provided.706 Following Glynn et al707  the pressure toward homogenisation manifests itself in 
external pressures toward e.g. “best practice” and the desire to mimic organisations that have 
achieved success. Considering that the benchmarks for organisational success are often defined 
similarly within an industry, further pressure exists toward legitimising organisational 
behaviour against similar, rather than divergent criteria, across organisations in the same 
industry.708 In this regard Blackler709 remarks that, while in practice organisational action 
seldom follows the ideal of rational or scientific behaviour, pressure to justify behaviour in 
acceptable terms often translates into rational forms of justification. In mainstream 
management the pressure toward homogenisation is not unbiased toward any form of 
justification criteria, but is structurally determined by education and training biased toward the 
scientisation of knowledge.710 At the same time, it is reinforced in managerial thinking toward 
                                                
704 Beamish, N.G. and Armistead, C. G. 2001: 104 
705 This comment draws on criticism of pluralism in the context of societal politics e.g. Manley, J.F. 1983, and 
in the context of managerial politics e.g. Willmot, H. 1987 
706 This draws on comments by Yanow as discussed in Chapter 3 
707 Glynn, M.A., Barr, P.S. and Dacin, M.S. 2000 
708 Glynn, M.A., Barr, P.S. and Dacin, M.S. 2000: 730 
709 Blackler, F. 1993: 865 
710 Yanow, D. 2004: S11ff. 
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knowledge as a commodity,711 and “scientific” methods as both the means to legitimise 
knowledge and to resolve conflict between differing forms of institutional knowledge.712  
Given the former, pressures toward homogenisation of knowledge, as well as the continual 
reinforcement of the objective context of justification in general managerial practice, pose a 
fundamental practical challenge to the theoretical legitimacy pluralism affords to different 
justification contexts. Of importance here is that these pressures manifest in organisational 
praxis, which reinforces the peripheral nature of justification practices that do not conform to 
subjective justification frameworks. Brown and Duguid713 for example draw attention to the 
ways in which organisations identify certain functions in the organisation with the creation of 
knowledge, and relegate others to the performance of routine work. This practice often reflects 
what is considered expert work, i.e. work that is underpinned by formal education and training 
in scientific methods.714 The structural underpinning of such privilege, combined with the 
reinforcement of this through bias in organisational subjective knowledge, serves to create an 
imbalance between different contexts of justification at the level of institutional knowledge. 
Following from this, it is possible to argue that the conflict that Tell perceives between different 
forms of institutional knowledge will be characterised by an unequal distribution of influence. 
Furthermore it is unlikely to be mediated by an organisational framework of justification that 
allows the same ease of relating action to overarching organisational objectives for all forms 
of institutional knowledge. 
4.7.2 Separation of reason and action 
As a practice based theory of knowledge, Tell’s separation of reason and action, as representing 
two distinct processes of justification, can be considered problematic. This argument draws on 
the observations of Nicolini et al715 who emphasise that, in practice-based perspectives 
knowledge is always acquired in action. In this sense, there is no distinction between mind and 
                                                
711 Compare Carter, C. and Scarbrough, H. 2001: 211 
712 In an article entitled “How big data brings marketing and finance together” Nichols, W. 2014 for example 
writes: “Analytics has exposed organizational anachronisms such as adversarial marketing-finance 
relationships and a focus on traditional year-long planning (instead of constant optimization) in marketing 
groups little changed for decades . . . In effect, analytics creates a common language between marketing and 
finance for the first time” 
713 Brown, J.S. and Duguid, P. 2001: 208 
714 Yanow, D. 2004: S19: “Examining these characteristics in light of the theoretical distinctions between local 
and expert knowledge, against the backdrop of other work practices such as participatory design, planning and 
policy analysis, suggest that the source of the problem of disparagement/denigration may be located, at least 
in part, in the politics of ‘expertise’ and of science.” 
715 Nicolini, D. Gherardi, S. and Yanow, D. 2003: chapter 1 
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action as knowing is situated “not in the mind of the individual but in a social subject, a subject 
that simultaneously thinks, learns, works, and innovates.”716 Tsoukas and Yanow explain how, 
from a phenomenological point of view, cognition is not the mere application of reason, but 
rather is embedded in activity.717 When practice is foregrounded, it follows that knowledge is 
created through “being and acting”, and not from cognition isolated from participation. In this 
sense, meaning unfolds as knowing subjects engage with the world. It is only through this 
engagement with the world that knowing subjects come to understand the world, and resulting 
from this explicit thought may be formulated.718 In practice-based theory the former is 
expressed in the argument that knowing always precedes knowledge.719  
To some extent Tell acknowledges the above in his argument that “. . . a logic of consequence 
(i.e. justification by procedure) may be thought of as only a subcategory of a general ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ (i.e. justification by performance).”720 However, Tell maintains that it is 
important to retain the distinction, from an epistemological point of view, in order to 
understand the differences between tacit and explicit knowledge. This latter position opens 
Tell’s approach up to Tsoukas’ general critique of typologies of knowledge. In this regard 
Tsoukas721 argues that typologies, by virtue of treating concepts as classifiable, assume 
“phenomena to be discrete, separate and stable.”722 For Tsoukas, this assumption results in 
artificial distinctions that fail to recognise the mutually constituted nature of, for example 
knowledge types. Here Tsoukas refers specifically to the common distinction drawn in KM 
between tacit and explicit knowledge, creating the impression that two different types of 
knowledge exist. Instead, Tsoukas argues that tacit knowledge is inherent to all forms of 
knowledge, and that the essence of Polanyi’s contribution to an understanding of knowledge 
was his proposal for a “common structure” to all knowledge which could overcome 
dichotomous conceptualisations of knowledge.723 While Tell acknowledges the latter in his 
                                                
716 Nicolini, D. Gherardi, S. and Yanow, D. 2003: 22. Emphasis added 
717 Tsoukas, H. and Yanow, D. 2009: 1347 
718 Tsoukas H. and Yanow, D. 2009: 1349 
719 Nicolini, D. Gherardi, S. and Yanow, D. 2003: 03: “This approach assumes that knowing precedes 
knowledge, both logically and chronologically, for the latter is always an institutionalized version of the 
former.  . . . knowledge is thus acquired through some form of participation, and it is continually reproduced 
and negotiated; that is, it always dynamic and provisional.” 
720 Tell, F. 2004:451 
721 Tsoukas, H. 2005: 111-112 
722 Tsoukas, H. 2005: 112 
723 Tsoukas, H. 2005: 160 - 161 
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description of personal knowledge as “all explicit articulated knowledge also involves a tacit 
component,”724 his treatment of the justification context of personal knowledge, as distinct 
from that of other knowledge types, combined with his focus on describing personal knowledge 
in terms of that which is intangible, rather than persistently present in all other types of 
knowledge, arguably opens his proposal up to the critique Tsoukas levels at typologies in 
general. Following authors such as Brown and Duguid725 and Tsoukas’ argument on tacit 
knowledge, there is no justification context which exists that can be separated from tacit 
knowing and consequently from action. In this regard Tsoukas explains the role of personal 
judgement in all knowledge, arguing that that there are no cognitive tools, i.e. models, laws, or 
rules, that apply themselves. Instead all cognitive tools must be applied by humans who 
exercise personal judgement.726 Exercising personal judgement, as acknowledged in Tell’s 
context of justification, is a matter of action as encapsulated in the notion of skilful 
performance. 727 If all knowledge therefore is based on a common structure of tacit knowledge, 
and tacit knowledge can only be justified based on action, it is essentially not possible to argue 
that the justification context of personal knowledge is separable from other contexts of 
justification.  
4.7.3 Relationships between justification contexts 
As argued in section 4.2.3 of this chapter, a pluralist epistemology does not merely require the 
acknowledgement of multiple forms of knowledge, but equally needs to concern itself with the 
relationships between different forms of knowledge. Following Blackler, one of the core 
requirements of pluralism is to move beyond dichotomies, and instead propose multi-
dimensional processes that characterise the relationship between different ways of knowing.728 
While Tell’s conceptualisation of the dynamics of organisational knowledge focusses on how 
justification contexts manifest themselves in different processes, support or contradict each 
other or transform knowledge types, outside of his conceptualisation of the interaction of 
subjective and institutional knowledge, there is not a strong sense of how the contexts 
interrelate with each other. Rather, given Tell’s focus on how knowledge types transform 
through applying different justification criteria, there is a much stronger focus on how each 
                                                
724 Tell, F. 2004: 454 
725 Brown, J.S. and Duguid, P. 2001: 203 
726 Tsoukas, H. 2005: 160 - 162 
727 Also see Tsoukas, H. 2005: 161 
728 Blackler, F. 1995: 1035 
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justification context relates individually to organisational practice, but not how they interact as 
an integrated whole. As such, his proposal creates clarity on the distinct grounds represented 
in certain forms of practice, but not on the complex interactions that presumably characterise 
justification in an organisational context.729  
Blackler’s use of activity theory illustrates how acknowledging different concepts of 
knowledge can be maintained, without focussing on the distinctions between knowledge. Here, 
the requirements of the type of multi-dimensional processes that may be of concern in 
establishing a framework which will incorporate rather than separate different justification 
contexts, are of particular interest. As a starting point, both activity theory and Tell’s proposal 
share the intent to locate knowledge in the practice of organisations.730,731 While in Tell’s 
proposal the former is an acknowledgement of different ways of knowing, which involve 
different grounds of justification, Blackler emphasises that different forms of knowing should 
be analysed as “the dynamics of the systems through which knowing is accomplished.”732 The 
conceptualisation of an activity system draws on the relationships between knowing subjects, 
social community and activities on the one hand, while on the other positioning these 
relationships as further mediated by language and technology, rules and roles. In the resulting 
system, knowledge “permeates the relations,”733 and as the dynamics in the system change, so 
does the knowledge.734  
At the risk of oversimplification of how justification can be conceived of as an activity system, 
consideration can be given to Alvesson’s comments, that from a social constructionist 
perspective, the knowledge of KIFs735 is validated, amongst others, through the relationships 
between these firms and their clients and in the management of these interactions.736 From a 
justification point of view, the emphasis here therefore would move away from focussing 
mainly on the different grounds, to how justification evolves in the relationships that legitimate 
knowledge. This type of system arguably involves a much greater deal of complexity than Tell 
                                                
729 This comments draws on Tsoukas’ notion of organisational knowledge as complex (Tsoukas, H. 2005) 
730 Blackler, F. 1995: 1039 “. . . activity theory studies knowledge as something that [organisations] do”  
731 Tell, F. 2004: 447: “A translation of the pragmatic idea of language-games into social context of 
organizational action tells us that knowledge will reside in an ongoing practice” 
732 Blackler, F. 1995: 1039 
733 Blackler, F. 1995: 1038 
734 Blackler, F. 1995: 1037 - 1039 
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intends, and he largely acknowledges these shortcomings as areas for further research, 
remarking that some of the questions that remain unanswered concern “procedures, measures 
and actions used,”737 as well as the actors, technologies and language involved. 
4.8 Conclusion 
Approaching knowledge from a practice-based and pluralist perspective, Tell takes specific 
issue with how this type of approach can be maintained without resorting to knowledge as 
being indistinguishable from action. He proposes that conceiving of knowledge as a language 
game, maintains a focus on practice, but simultaneously draws attention to the grounds which 
are implied when knowledge is used in language. For Tell, the centrality of action and practice 
in knowledge determines that justification is a distributed activity in the organisation, and as 
such his framework extends to all levels of the organisation. In addition, he argues that a generic 
understanding of these rules can be achieved by relating epistemological structures and 
processes of justification to forms of knowledge and organisational practices. This leads him 
to identify on the one hand, the structure of justification as external or internal, while on the 
other hand identifying processes of justification as relating to action or reason. The interaction 
of the structural and process dimensions is conceived of as four justification contexts, which 
can be understood as four sets of rules each referring to a different ideal type of knowledge. In 
this sense, knowledge belonging to a particular ideal type is identified as such, as it meets the 
rules for justification of this particular type of knowledge. To illustrate the ideal types, Tell 
focusses both on philosophical descriptions of this type of knowledge as well as the 
organisational application. Maintaining a pluralist framework, none of the ideal types are 
privileged, but rather the model legitimises all justification contexts as equal.  
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Chapter 5 
Justification as complex practice 
 
 
5.1 Viewing organisations through the lens of knowledge 
Practice-based theory’s redefinition of epistemology in the context of organisations shifts the 
emphasis of managing organisations to a perspective that affords primacy to knowledge as a 
means to understanding organisations, and through this guide their activities and strategy.738 
While knowledge creation in this view becomes a central concern of organisational 
competitiveness, it similarly affords pre-eminence to the role that knowledge plays in the 
ongoing activities of organisational members. The latter is evident in the arguments of authors 
such as Knorr Cetina, that the nature of work in the KS is fundamentally characterised by 
epistemisation.739 From a practice-based point of view this implies that the activities of 
organisational members focus increasingly on using and constructing knowledge. Given the 
epistemisation of work, a central implication for organisational action is that decisions are 
made concerning the acceptability of knowledge in a particular context. This notion is 
reinforced in Tell’s observation that knowledge is distributed in the practice of organisations 
and as such decisions on the validity of knowledge permeate all organisational action.740 In 
similar vein, von Krogh argues that justification is a constant activity of organisations and that 
knowledge creation cannot be understood without an understanding of justification 
processes.741 While both authors emphasise the ongoing nature of justification, these theories 
also emphasize that decisions on the validity of knowledge involve both the strategic and 
everyday activities of organisations. In this sense, whether the outcome of a decision is the 
managerial approval of investment of scarce resources in newly created knowledge, or an 
evaluation of the ability of organisational members to follow the rules of a language game, 
                                                
738 See chapter 2: 2.6.3 
739 See chapter 2: 2.6.3 
740 See chapter 4: 4.2.1 
741 See chapter 3: 3.4 
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organisational activities are characterised by constant decisions that legitimise or delegitimise 
ways of knowing.  
If the embeddedness of knowledge construction and use in organisations is accepted as a 
characteristic of the KE, an understanding of organisations in this framework must therefore 
include a focus on the practices that result in the legitimisation of knowledge. It is with the 
former in mind that this research project set out with the objective of investigating the concept 
of justification as viewed from a practice-based perspective of organisational knowledge. In 
order to facilitate this, von Krogh’s theory of managerial justification and Tell’s theory of 
pluralist justification contexts were explored. The selection of these two theories was informed 
by the acknowledgement of the complexity of the knowledge construct, and the underlying 
argument, among practice-based KM theorists, that organisational knowledge must be 
understood as a multi-dimensional concept. With regards to the latter, this thesis has argued 
that the acceptance of a complex notion of knowledge has resulted in the redefinition of the 
justification concern in the context of organisations. Consequently, maintaining a definition 
that embraces the complexity of knowledge equally implies complexity in organisational 
justification.  
If one accepts, as argued by von Krogh and Tell, that knowledge is based in practice, the idea 
of justification needs to remain open to how legitimation takes place in practice. This implies, 
from the outset, that justification cannot, from a practice-based perspective, prescribe how 
knowledge should be justified. Instead, a practice-based approach must remain receptive to an 
understanding that the justification concern amounts to more than the prescription of normative 
criteria that act as a delimitation of knowledge. This argument informs the first conclusion 
drawn from this thesis, namely that engagement with practice-based conceptualisations of 
justification draws attention to the limits of normativity, and specifically rationalist 
prescriptions, with regards to the justification of knowledge. The discussion of practice theory, 
however, also highlights the attractiveness of rationality and scientific procedures, resulting in 
the second conclusion derived in this thesis, that the unproblematic acceptance of objective 
knowledge is evident in attempts in the KE to mimic the perceived success of science and 
rationality. 
The remainder of the conclusions drawn turn to the complexity of justification viewed from a 
practice perspective and informs five further arguments resulting from this research project. 
Firstly, it is argued that practice theory fundamentally challenges the idea that objectivity in 
decisions concerning knowledge is possible. Secondly, practice theory illustrates that 
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organisational justification cannot be conceived of as merely propositional, as it both draws on, 
and is reinforced by, action. Thirdly, the complexity of justification is reiterated by the paradox 
of contradictory justification contexts existing simultaneously in the organisation, and the 
difficulty of introducing contradictory justification practice to an organisation. The fourth 
conclusion that is drawn concerns the extent to which a practice-based understanding of 
justification affords a deeper analysis of the dynamics at play when organisations decide to 
reject knowledge claims. Finally, the argument is presented that the theoretical investigation 
into justification from a practice perspective represents a substantive challenge to the idea that 
“anything goes” when knowledge is viewed as action. Each of the foregoing conclusions are 
elaborated on below, and the thesis closes with some speculative remarks on the nature of 
organisational justification. 
5.2 Limits and appeal of normative approaches 
5.2.1 The limits of rationality and normativity     
As argued in this thesis, a concern with the validity of knowledge in an organisational context 
shares with epistemology a concern with the conditions under which knowledge is considered 
justifiable. This can be viewed as a shared interest in how knowledge is distinguished from 
non-knowledge. In attempting to resolve this concern, an important point of divergence 
between practice and normative KM theory is the treatment of complexity.742 An emphasis on 
justification as a normative concern reduces the complexity of organisational knowledge, and 
equally produces an argument that KM should concern itself with a monist concept of 
knowledge as the knowledge of value in the KE.743 While from a philosophical point of view 
one can empathise with elements of the motivation underlying this argument, it equally has to 
be recognised that this approach has substantive implications for the discipline of KM. Drawing 
on the theories of von Krogh and Tell, as discussed in this thesis, the following section 
addresses three questions with regard to consequences of rationality and normativity in relation 
to organisational knowledge. Firstly, it is argued that practice-based approaches to justification 
bring into focus the consequences of an uncritical acceptance of rationality and realism as the 
“correct” normative approach to arriving at knowledge. Secondly, it is proposed that the 
philosophical ideal of universal rationality is unlikely to be found in practice. Finally, the 
normative approach’s contention that the knowledge of concern in the KE, and therefore the 
                                                
742 See chapter 2: 2.6.3.1 
743 See chapter 2: 2.6.3.2 
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role of justification, is narrowly focussed on explicated knowledge, is questioned in light of the 
importance of novelty and creativity, neither of which lends itself to normative justification 
processes.     
5.2.1.1 Rationality, realism and critical attitudes toward knowledge 
As far as the philosophical concern with the appropriate method of justification is concerned, 
the rationale for proposing normativity expressed for example, in the case of Firestone and 
McElroy,744 a concern with regard to the abuse of power in the creation of knowledge. From 
this point of view, accepting knowledge as legitimised through the authority of organisational 
structures presents an inherent risk to the requirement for knowledge to be critically evaluated. 
Von Krogh’s description of dominant logic, and the innate difficulty of influencing and 
changing established justification practices underscores the problematics of introducing 
alternatives, let alone criticism, to validation practice.745 Moreover, as argued in this thesis, 
power and politics are likely to play a significant role in establishing and maintaining 
preference for certain processes, practices and criteria of organisational validation.746 In 
practice, there are therefore no constraints on the possibility that justification reflects an 
unequal power distribution or the abuse of authority. Organisational knowledge ultimately is 
not required to be morally good or ethically correct. It is precisely this type of concern that 
leads Firestone and McElroy to adopt an argument against justificationism and for criticalism. 
By equating validation to a process of critical reflection, Firestone and McElroy attempt to 
position KCE as integral to ensuring that surviving knowledge claims serve interests beyond 
those of a select few. This is a concern that has value both at the level of the organisation and 
society. Organisational sustainability is arguably more likely if the justification of knowledge 
has its basis in more than just the authoritative preferences of its executives. Similarly, it is 
more likely to be of benefit to society if decisions about knowledge take a wider view of 
evaluation than immediate organisational concerns and benefits.747 From this point of view, 
one can sympathise with Firestone and McElroy’s intention to position KCE as an endeavour 
toward creating a more ethical society. However, it is questionable if a critical attitude to 
organisational knowledge claims necessarily has to be positioned in the realm of rationality 
and ontological realism.  
                                                
744 See chapter 2: 2.6.1.2 
745 See chapter 3: 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 
746 See chapter 3: 3.6.1.3 and chapter 4: 4.7.1 
747 See chapter 1: 1.1 
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In relation to the above, von Krogh’s conceptualisation of knowledge in the realm of 
constructivist ontology748 would suggest that it is precisely the failure of organisations to 
recognise the constructed nature of reality that leads to a lack of reflection in decision-making 
concerning knowledge claims. When knowledge claims are accepted as unproblematically true, 
based on their perceived correspondence to an external reality, independent of human action, 
the “fact”-like nature of such claims does not invite critical reflection on how organisational 
knowledge and activities reinforce this reality. Moreover, in this instance claims that 
knowledge has been justified through its adherence to scientific methods, result in its 
acceptance precisely because scientific approaches are considered privileged above all other 
methods of creating knowledge. In this argument, prescription of the “correct way” of 
evaluating knowledge thereby introduces the risk that adherence to this “one correct way” in 
itself results in increasingly uncritical practice. One can therefore question if adopting a critical 
approach to the justification of knowledge in organisations can be achieved through 
unquestionably accepting the authority of realism, rationality and scientific procedures as the 
one better approach to creating knowledge. 
5.2.1.2 The notion of universal rationality in practice 
Also problematic in the normative approach is the reasonableness of assuming that the notion 
of universal rationality exists in practice. In essence, as proposed by Schreyögg and Geiger, 
this would require that knowledge is accepted based only on the force of the best argument.749 
Practice-based theory, however, suggests that contextless rational decision-making does not 
exist in the practice of knowledge creation. Rather, as illustrated in Tell’s discussion of 
objective knowledge,750 as well as criticism from the sociology of science and in the philosophy 
of Feyerabend,751 the appearance of rationality in justifying knowledge in practice is created 
by the decontextualization of knowledge. Furthermore, it is through the process of 
rationalisation that justification is presented as a series of rational decisions.752 The latter 
process, however, does not imply that rationality adheres to normative rationality, i.e. the force 
of the best argument, but rather that the ideal type of rationality is espoused in how the 
justification of knowledge is presented. In this context, if it is accepted that the process of 
                                                
748 See chapter 3: 3.2.1 
749 See chapter 2: 2.6.3.2 
750 See chapter 4: 4.4.1 
751 See chapter 4: 4.3.4 
752 See chapter 4: footnote 529 
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justification is open to influence by non-rational criteria, it becomes problematic to understand 
how Habermas’ notion of the “forceless force” of better argument enacts itself in practice, 
particularly if it is assumed, as is the case with Schreyögg and Geiger, that the criteria for the 
best argument are determined by practice.  
5.2.1.3 Creating new knowledge and the regularity of justification 
A further problem, with the reduction of organisationally valid knowledge to that which has 
been justified through rational means only, is the underlying assumption that the success of 
organisations in the KE is based on their ability to create objective knowledge. In this regard 
practice theory challenges the notion that any form of regularity can characterise the emergence 
of new knowledge, proposing instead that it is the unexpected and irrational that leads to the 
creation of truly new knowledge.753 Tell’s generalisation of personal knowledge here draws 
attention to the extent that knowledge creation takes place in a context of justification which 
defies explanation beyond what is achieved by knowledge. In this instance, it is the outcome, 
and not the procedure, which justifies knowledge, as the limits of the known are transgressed 
when true novelty emerges.754 From this point, both the organisation and KM as a discipline, 
would fundamentally fail to consider the underlying dynamics of knowledge creation by 
limiting justification to the rational and explicated. Arguably, in the case of new knowledge, 
organisations that fail to develop an understanding of the role that the context of personal 
justification plays, by insisting on strict adherence to process and procedure, risk undermining 
the creation of novelty.755 A related concern, for KM as a discipline, draws on the idea that the 
KE fundamentally changes work practice. In this context the discipline as a whole stands to 
lose a potentially vital outcome by not focussing on how knowledge is created through the 
interaction of various justification contexts, processes and activities, but instead focussing 
narrowly on how objective knowledge outcomes are produced.756     
5.2.2 The attractiveness of rationality and scientific methods 
While the ability of organisations to embed and encode knowledge plays an undeniable role in 
the KE, it is the perception of the process of creating such abstracted knowledge that is perhaps 
most interesting in relation to the validation practices of organisations. Here, Tell’s elaboration 
on the justification context of objective knowledge is valuable in so far as it underscores the 
                                                
753 See chapter 3: 3.6.1.4 and chapter 4: 4.3.4 
754 See chapter 4: 4.4.2 
755 See chapter 3 3.5.3 
756 See chapter 4. 4.6.1 and chapter 2.3.3.3 
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meta-level influence of positivism in formal training and education, and the resulting 
unproblematic acceptance of those knowledge claims drawing on the justification context of 
objective knowledge. Tell’s argument, that the grounds for validation are reflective of accepted 
generalities, underscores the extent to which the privileging of objective knowledge is inherent 
in society at large. In this regard, justification aimed at the objectification of knowledge in 
organisations reflects not only local, but general beliefs in the “superiority” of certain methods 
of validation over others. These beliefs are reinforced in much of management literature, 
consulting practice and in the cross-organisational networks to which organisational members 
belong. Of particular importance in relation to justification is both the perception of the 
“truthfulness” of knowledge following from the “scientific method,” and its pragmatic appeal. 
5.2.2.1 The perception that scientific methods create universal truths 
Arguably much of modern day organisational activities and management practices are focussed 
on replicating the scientific model of knowledge by attempting to distance knowledge from 
context and endow it with the appearance of universal truth and scientific method. 
Understanding how the privileged position of scientific knowledge relates to a particular 
context of justification draws attention to why attempts at the “scientisation” of organisational 
knowledge claims persist. In this regard, the authority with which the scientific method is 
regarded, combined with the mainstream acceptance of reality as existing independently of 
human action, results in a form of justification that is considered a universal method of 
knowledge creation.   
At the same time growth in expert knowledge domains implies that, outside of the realm of a 
particular discipline, practices of validation are unlikely to be understood, resulting in the 
unproblematic acceptance of knowledge claims based on the general acceptance that the 
positivist tradition creates knowledge of more value and importance than competing forms of 
knowledge. Given the extent to which systems of expert knowledge are implicitly trusted, 
efforts to replicate the justification context of objective knowledge are arguably related to 
attempts to establish an equally unproblematic context for the acceptance of knowledge claims 
traditionally not associated with scientific methodologies. Here, the popularity of KM, as an 
extension of information management (IM), essentially establishes the justification of 
organisational knowledge through the standardisation of procedures that are designed to 
support knowledge claims, through reference to fact-like information existing as data. Where 
data is accepted as a representation of an external reality, the validity of knowledge is judged 
by its correspondence to the “facts” perceived to exist in this data. As argued in Chapter 2, this 
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paradigm in KM supports an unproblematic view of validation: knowledge is accepted as true, 
provided the data on which it is based is valid. The IM paradigm furthermore supports the 
notion of the unproblematic validity of knowledge claims, as it enables “scientific analysis” of 
data, which as a process emulates the scientific method of objective and detached discovery of 
“facts”. In this notion of “unproblematic” justification, organisations in essence do not need to 
engage with questions concerning the legitimacy of knowledge as the reference to its basis, 
which draws on data that adheres to known analytical procedures, validates the knowledge as 
acceptable.  
5.2.2.2 The pragmatic value of “scientific” justification 
The appeal of the aforementioned justification context may well be pragmatic, as it creates the 
impression that the complexity of justification is reduced when all knowledge claims are 
required to be based on reference to the “facts” of data and recognised procedures for deriving 
such conclusions. These approaches reinforce the decontextualised nature of knowledge, as it 
is under these circumstances that organisations and KM theory alike neglect to acknowledge 
the contextual nature of knowledge creation and equally the situatedness of justification. From 
a practice-based perspective, it is however precisely this belief, that the justification of 
knowledge can take place in a detached and objective fashion, which is challenged by 
emphasizing the complexity of practice which influences the activities in organisations through 
which knowledge is created.  
5.3 Complex justification: key issues raised 
5.3.1 The centrality of subjectivity 
Possibly one of the most important contributions from practice theory is the extent to which it 
questions the underlying assumptions of detached, objective decision-making about knowledge 
claims. This challenge exists both at the level of organisations and individuals and underscores 
the subjectivity of justification as always situated in contexts.  
5.3.1.1 Organisational subjectivity 
At the level of the organisation, established shared organisational frameworks form the basis 
for relating individual activities to overall organisational objectives. These frameworks, 
whether conceived of as a system of shared beliefs757  or as the practices expressed through 
dominant logic758, have as their core purpose the establishment of a justification framework 
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that guides organisational activity. This framework, however, is not constituted in isolation of 
the context of the organisation, but is influenced by intersubjectively agreed purposes and goals 
of the organisation. As argued by Tell, the subjective justification framework does not originate 
in an externalist view of the characteristics of the organisation, as corresponding to an external 
reality, but rather in the beliefs originating internally to the organisation. In much the same 
way, von Krogh positions dominant logic as created from, and reinforced by, locally held 
preferences, resulting from a shared interpretation of experience and prior success. As the 
overarching framework for guiding justification practice, neither of these theoretical concepts 
support the idea that, organisationally, justification is an attempt to relate knowledge claims to 
an objective view of the organisation. Rather, justification is a process of attempting to relate 
practice to organisational beliefs, by reflecting on the reasons why practice coheres to the 
organisational ideology,759 or by drawing on parallels between knowledge claims and criteria, 
which legitimise the existence of the organisation.760 Furthermore, von Krogh’s incorporation 
of constructionism in justification draws attention to the idea that, even if one acknowledges 
the existence of facts, this does not imply that they are objectively interpreted. Referencing the 
facts, in as much as they may exist as an external reality, is, in knowledge, always accompanied 
by interpretation by the knowing subject in the context of practice and the organisation.761 
5.3.1.2 Individual subjectivity 
At the level of the individual, von Krogh762 emphasises the degree to which knowing subjects 
are situated in a particular context, and any interpretation which gives rise to knowledge claims 
is, necessarily, influenced by the subjective understanding of an individual. In relation to 
justification practices, individual subjectivity, however, also involves the individual’s 
interpretation of justification contexts in a particular organisational milieu. As individuals 
situated in an organisational context, organisational members are part of a local “reality” of 
practices and policies, which prescribe the accepted ways of legitimising knowledge. Amongst 
others, von Krogh positions an individual’s understanding of justification criteria as a potential 
barrier to explicating knowledge claims. At the individual level these barriers can be conceived 
of as subjectively held knowledge of legitimisation practices. This interpretation includes a 
subjective view of the elements of justification which are more likely to result in acceptance 
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761 See chapter 3: 3.3.2 
762 See chapter 3: 3.5.3 
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and the consequences of deviation from these norms. In this sense, it reflects an interpretation 
of a justification context, i.e. its meaning in particular circumstances. It is therefore not just at 
the level of the organisation that the meaning of justification practices is derived and influence 
actions and outcomes, but also at the level of the individual. 
5.3.2 Justification without explication 
Organisationally justification practice exists as a phenomenon much broader than that which 
is explicated. Here both von Krogh’s notion of the enactment of dominant logic,763 and Tell’s 
notion of the context of justification of personal knowledge,764 draw attention to the importance 
of what is not said in relation to the validation practices of organisations. 
5.3.2.1 Justification as practices of involvement 
In the first instance one needs to consider that organisational justification includes 
organisational practices which are not explicated or consciously reflected on. Here, managerial 
justification theory emphasizes the idea that the organisationally accepted belief system 
becomes an unconscious process of acting without reflection. These unreflective actions 
reinforce the practices that result from organisational justification, particularly in relation to 
the conditions of involvement discussed in Chapter 3.765 The ability to influence justification, 
at the level of strategic decisions, is therefore delimited by managerial practice, which 
underpins ideas of who in an organisation may engage in justification discourse. In this sense, 
the practice of excluding, purposefully or unintentionally, the views of non-managerial 
organisational members in justification discourse, is in itself an action that serves to delimit the 
nature of justification.  
Exclusionary justification practices, however, do not only exist in the vertical organisational 
hierarchy, but also, as suggested by Brown and Duguid,766 in the distinctions drawn between 
organisational functions with regards to knowledge work. These divisions, which in many 
instances are accepted as a “fact” of organisational structures, will likely also influence the 
perceived validity of justification contexts based on the organisational function from which 
they originate. Here one may hypothesize that, in relation to justification practice, this will 
affect not only the intended or unintended demarcation of certain departmental justification 
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764 See chapter 4: 4.4.2 
765 See chapter 3: 3.4.2.2 
766 See chapter 4: 4.7.1 
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practices as less relevant to the overall dominant logic, but it will also limit the influence and 
access of managers representing those functional divisions to the overall justification discourse. 
In this instance, exclusionary practice will reflect and reinforce the unequal value placed on the 
knowledge represented by different functions in the organisation.   
5.3.2.2 The tacit element in all justification practice 
Tell’s notion of personal knowledge, and the related idea that the basis for justification of 
personal knowledge cannot be explicated,767 provides an important point of reference in 
considering arguments that justification practices in organisations are necessarily procedures 
dealing with explicated knowledge. If one accepts that knowledge creation in practice is far 
more complex than suggested by mainstream theories, and that knowledge in practice is 
ubiquitous in the activities of organisational members, there will always be, as argued by 
Tsoukas, an element of personal justification involved in all organisational knowledge.768 
Articulated reasons for justification, in this sense, are always an impartial reflection of 
justification, and an understanding of justification in organisations will therefore always be 
incomplete, as it is not possible to explicate and evaluate the context of personal justification 
beyond the capacity to act.  
It is this lack of explicitness in the justification of personal knowledge, which underlies authors 
such as Schreyögg and Geiger’s argument that tacit knowledge should not be considered as 
part of the knowledge that is important in the KE. This in turn stimulates the counter-debate 
that it is in particular tacit knowledge that is of importance.769 However, moving beyond this 
debate, one needs to consider if the purpose of KM is simply to create theories that enable the 
functionalist management of knowledge as a commodity, or if, following authors such as 
Tsoukas and Spender, the purpose of KM is to provide an alternative framework for 
understanding organisations. In the case of the latter, knowledge is not just important in the 
context of what can be explicated and critically reflected on, but it is important as a means of 
understanding the practice that characterises organisations. From this point of view, whether 
one considers tacit knowledge as inherently important to the creation of knowledge objects or 
not, this is not the reason why KM concerns itself with tacit knowledge. Rather, if KM is an 
attempt at providing an alternative theory of organisations, and if personal knowledge is 
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ubiquitous in the practices of organisations, then it cannot be rejected merely because it does 
not meet traditional philosophical criteria of how knowledge should be justified.  
5.3.3 Conflict and coherence as characteristics of justification praxis 
The paradox of justification, which is described by von Krogh as the process through which 
conflicting knowledge claims have to be related to dominant logic,770 can be viewed as the 
continual balance between conflict and conformance required to achieve novelty and to ensure 
that the organisation is not in a continual state of flux. While conflicting justification practices 
and criteria exist in managerial justification theory as an important means through which to 
drive the adoption of new knowledge, Tell’s pluralist framework underscores conflicting 
justification contexts as a basic characteristic of organisations.771 Organisations, however, do 
not exist in a constant state of conflict, and the notion of dominant logic and organisational 
belief systems draws attention to the ongoing processes of relating and reflecting organisational 
behaviour to an overarching framework.772 Furthermore, selected authors included in this 
research project draw attention to the importance of coherence, not only for the internal 
functioning of the organisation, but also for the holistic functioning of the KE. 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, sources of conflict and variety in justification practices are 
multiple, and may originate through internal processes and interests, and through the broader 
context in which the organisation and its members are situated. In managerial justification 
theory the creation of new knowledge necessarily represents the potential for conflict with 
accepted knowledge. In this sense justification processes and procedures accepted as “true” are 
challenged by new approaches and practices. Conflicting justification contexts, however, also 
originate with the acknowledgement that organisational members can simultaneously draw on 
divergent structures and process of justification, while different forms of institutional 
knowledge exacerbate the proliferation of justification procedures and points of external 
reference between organisational members belonging to different professions.  
As conflicting contexts of justification can simultaneously be viewed as enabling and 
constraining, the management of conflict therefore needs to harness the potential for creativity 
that stems from productive conflict, while limiting the potential for destructive practices to 
characterise such conflicts. The above-mentioned process of co-ordination is further 
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772 See chapter 3: 3.4.2 and 3.4.2.1; chapter 4: 4.4.3 
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complicated by acknowledgement that practice exists at an inter-organisational level. Networks 
of practice therefore act as an important source of new principles for justification that may 
originate outside of organisational boundaries.773 The characteristics of subjective 
organisational knowledge, and dominant logic in organisational justification practices, 
however, act to regulate attempts at introducing new justification criteria in the local context. 
In both instances, justification criteria will ultimately have to cohere with the broader 
organisational intention.  
While from an autopoietic point of view von Krogh’s justification theory particularly draws 
attention to the difficulty of attempting to introduce new justification principles to an embedded 
dominant logic, inter-organisational practice can create pressure toward the adoption of 
justification practices that do not originate locally. However, both von Krogh and Tell’s 
theories underscore that such justification practices will still have to be related to a locally 
determined framework. Particularly in the case of managerial justification, attention is drawn 
to the extent that organisations will accept justification more readily if there is a clear and direct 
alignment with the organisation’s existing dominant logic. This ability to align the justification 
of knowledge claims to a notion of shared interests arguably represents a salient characteristic 
of commercial activity aimed at selling codified, embedded and expert knowledge in the KE. 
The dissemination of knowledge services and technologies throughout organisations in the KE 
is therefore at least in part dependent on the ability of vendors to establish alignment with the 
justification criteria internal to organisations.  
5.3.4 Rejecting knowledge claims 
As argued by von Krogh, justification does not only concern knowledge that is accepted, but 
also that which is rejected.774 Understanding, rather than prescribing, justification arguably 
provides a stronger basis from which to conceptualise the organisational rejection of seemingly 
“valid” knowledge claims. While from a normative point of view one would argue that it is the 
failure of organisations to follow rational procedure that results in such rejection, practice 
theory underscores how attempts at understanding this rejection would originate in the 
justification practices of the organisation, as well as the difficulty of unseating and changing 
these practices. Here, von Krogh’s notion of dominant logic, reinforced through everyday 
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practices, appears particularly valuable to conceptualise the dismissal of certain knowledge 
claims.  
5.3.4.1 The role of managerial discourse and interest 
In considering the rejection of knowledge claims, the procedures that characterise the 
reinforcement of dominant logic act as exclusionary to the extent that specific knowledge 
claims may never enter the managerial discourse. The former results from the unacceptability 
of certain arguments, as it fails to relate to images of knowledge that are prevalent in the 
dominant logic. While a weaker understanding of organisational boundaries suggests that 
knowledge may well be accepted as valid at lower levels of the organisation, the exclusionary 
nature of dominant logic acts as a barrier to the possibility that such challenges to accepted 
notions of knowledge are discussed at the level of management.  
At a pragmatic level, if one considers that managers, in their functional capacity, act as the 
primary interface between their employees and the dominant managerial discourse, the ability 
of management to accept and relate alternative justification criteria to the dominant logic is of 
primary importance to the introduction of alternatives. Alternative justification criteria may 
therefore be rejected by individual managers, either as they themselves do not accept its 
validity, or alternatively as they fail to engage in the subversion required to introduce 
alternatives. The notion of interest, power plays and politics in establishing dominant logic 
sheds further light on how members of management may act in self-interest by purposefully 
supressing knowledge claims from lower levels in the organisation, and by rejecting the 
contexts from which their validity draws. Hence, if coherence to organisational beliefs is valued 
at all costs, as it protects the interest of a dominant coalition, knowledge claims which draw on 
alternative justification criteria may simply never be introduced to discussions.   
5.3.5 Practice does not equate to “anything goes” 
In Chapter 2 it was argued that, when approaching the problem of complex knowledge, authors 
proposing justification as a normative concept, amongst others draw on the critique that 
knowledge from a practice theory perspective is a vague and all-encompassing concept. 
However, the arguments presented in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis illustrate that, by 
considering the conceptualisation of justification in practice theory, the notion of knowledge is 
not open to any interpretation, but rather characterised by justification practices or contexts 
which distinguish between this concept and other organisational activities. The difference 
between these approaches and the normative concern, however, is that practice theory does not 
place the same emphasis on deploying justification in service of rationality.    
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5.3.5.1 Delimiting organisational knowledge in practice-based theory 
In the first instance knowledge as a language game draws attention to the idea that in 
organisations, claims to knowledge refer to locally accepted rules for using the concept of 
knowledge. As a consequence, organisations do not refer to every opinion and belief in the 
organisation as knowledge, rather knowledge is associated with the grounds that validate 
certain claims or actions. For Tell, these grounds for validation reflect larger societal structures 
and processes that characterise different forms of knowledge. In this sense his proposal can 
therefore be viewed as an attempt to elucidate the meta-level rules of language games at a 
societal level and the local replication of such rules in the justification contexts used by 
organisations. 
Secondly, from a strategic perspective, it is clear when considering von Krogh’s view - 
organisations’ ultimate commitment to knowledge follows from the allocation of scarce 
resources - claims to knowledge have to be justified in relation to organisational beliefs. 
Organisations ultimately do not invest resources in everything that is believed by their 
members, or every idea or opinion that is expressed. Instead, organisations internally determine 
practices and processes that guide their decisions on knowledge. That such processes and 
practices do not follow one type of universally generalizable approach, does not imply that 
what organisations create, in these locally determined justification processes, is not knowledge. 
It merely indicates that there is not a single universal approach to creating knowledge in 
organisations.  
5.3.5.2 Expectations of rationality 
In both Tell and von Krogh’s arguments it is clear that organisations commit, in one way or 
another, to certain practices or claims as knowledge, and through this process distinguish these 
practices and claims from non-knowledge. These justification practices or contexts may not 
reflect a rational-realist expectation of justification, but here one may question why rational 
theorists appear to believe in the validity of rational procedures as if these represent in 
themselves an infallible truth? What is particularly interesting from the rationalist perspective 
is how the failure of normative rationality is persistently positioned in the realm of practice, 
rather than the failure of theory. As argued in chapter 4, where rational processes do not deliver 
on their expected benefits, it is not procedure that is questioned but the availability of 
information and cognitive skills. Similar undertones exist in the idea that power and authority 
interfere with the ability of organisations to adhere to rational justification processes. However, 
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to paraphrase Knorr Cetina: if practice suggests that the philosopher’s ideal of normative 
rationality does not exist, why is this considered a shortcoming of practice and not of theory?    
5.4 Conclusion 
Engaging with the justification debate from a practice perspective draws attention to the 
complexity that governs the acceptance of knowledge in an organisational context. In much the 
same manner as knowledge in practice cannot be reduced to a single form, neither can the 
process of justification be described as consisting of a single approach that determines the only 
knowledge of importance in the KE. Drawing on the discussion in this thesis, one can therefore 
conceive of justification as an ongoing process of attempting to relate both practice and 
knowledge claims to what is accepted as knowledge by mimicking or changing the practices 
and rules that govern the acceptance of knowledge. This process will furthermore reflect, and 
be characterised by, duality in much the same manner as the practice view embraces the dual 
nature of knowledge as construct. Against this background, and the theoretical contributions 
from practice theory discussed in this thesis, one may speculate how such duality presents itself 
in the nature of organisational justification. 
Organisationally, legitimisation will embrace both the conscious and unconscious acceptance 
of knowledge, as justification occurs both in instances where knowledge is accepted as 
unproblematically true and in instances where the acceptance of knowledge calls for conscious 
reflection on practice and in discourse. Importantly, the unreflective acceptance of knowledge 
will not only characterise individual legitimisation, but also organisational justification, as 
much of the ongoing activities of organisations draw on the unquestioned acceptance of 
established practices.    
The acceptance of organisational knowledge will furthermore reflect preferences, inclusive of 
grounds, contexts and interests, which are both conflicting and conforming. Conflicting 
justification practices may originate from within the organisation, through conscious attempts 
to change, for example, what are considered to be failures in justification practice, or the idea 
that practices can improve and do not adhere to what is considered best practice. In this sense 
justification practices both reflect that which is local, i.e. internal reflection on stories of failed 
projects, and global, i.e. reflection that turns outward to what is considered best practice in an 
industry or discipline.  
Simultaneously, the organisational impetus toward coherence will give rise to justification 
strategies purposefully aimed at illustrating the conformance between a particular set of 
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preferences and existing established preferences. As a conscious justification strategy, the 
emphasis here will be on highlighting that which coheres and on masking that which conflicts 
with current justification practices. The conflicting nature of justification preferences, 
however, implicitly characterises organisations and in this sense is not only an overt strategy 
to influence justification, but a basic property of organisations. Given the distributed nature of 
organisational knowledge, justification practices which conflict with that which is dominant 
will still exist. In this case, even in organisations which value creativity above method and 
procedure, there will always be the need for knowledge drawing on the context of objective 
justification, as is for example the case with finance departments where prescription and rules 
are not only characteristic of the discipline, but also a legal requirement.  
Viewing justification practice as fundamental to the nature of work in the KE emphasises that 
legitimisation occurs both at the level of the individual and the organisation. As organisations 
come to rely on the expertise of knowledge workers, and in many instances translate this 
reliance into an unquestioned acceptance of the validity of individual knowledge, the process 
of justification takes place in the micro-practices that characterise the work of individual 
organisational members. In this sense, much justification practice may be conscious at the level 
of individuals and unconscious at the level of the organisation.  
Individuals as socially situated will draw on personal interpretation of the meaning of 
justification contexts in the realm of a particular problem and related to a particular 
organisational framework. As the inter-organisational membership of individuals establishes 
an important connection between internal and external justification practices, the ability of 
organisational members to relate alternative validity claims to their own context will in itself 
become an important point of acceptance or rejection of knowledge. Here the interest and skills 
of the individual may well play a significant role in the transmittal of justification practice, as 
individuals will evaluate the implications of such practice to their own abilities and aspirations. 
In this instance one needs to consider that much of the knowledge in KE can be perceived as 
threatening, in particular where such knowledge is seen as exposing shortcomings in skills, or 
potentially resulting in the redundancy of certain skills. Where individual interests are 
perceived to be threatened by knowledge, it is highly unlikely that such knowledge will be 
evaluated in a positive light and individuals may actively attempt to not only insulate the 
organisation from the knowledge, but also to limit the possibility that this knowledge becomes 
organisationally accepted. While the individual worker may not possess the capability to 
prevent organisational legitimation, it is through the process of forming shared interest groups 
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that both workers and managers can act in self-, rather than organisational, interest against the 
adoption of new knowledge.   
Reflection and change in justification practices may be brought about by both internal and 
external influences. In as much as the theory of managerial justification draws attention to 
conscious reflection on justification in the creation of new knowledge, external influences can 
lead to conscious reflection, both in instances of new and established knowledge. Organisations 
may be forced to reflect on justification practices when organisationally accepted knowledge 
fails in the broader context of society, as would be for example the case of failed innovations, 
which are likely to lead to scrutiny of the basis on which an innovation was organisationally 
accepted. In such instances, changes to justification practice may be drastic and involve the 
overhaul of previously accepted justification procedures. However, the nature of change may 
also be much more subtle, and occur over time, when elements of external legitimisation, which 
cohere with the organisational belief system, are incorporated in a fragmented fashion.   
The nature of duality in organisational justification therefore suggests that, as a practice, it is 
both individual and organisational, drawing on contexts that are both local and global and 
reflecting preferences that are simultaneously conflicting and conforming. It furthermore is 
evident in organisational discourse and activity at both an operational and strategic level, 
involving practices where accepted knowledge is used and new knowledge is created. Change 
in justification practices can be brought about by internal or external influences and can be both 
sudden and subtle. As encompassing of practice, interests, actions and actors, occurring in a 
complex environment, justification practice is not a neat linear model of progression from 
knowledge claim to acceptance, but rather a mesh of interwoven influences reflecting the 
complexity of knowledge creation.  
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